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IMPLICATIONS OF FOUNDATIONAL CRISES IN
MATHEMATICS: A CASE STUDY IN
INTERDISCIPLINARY LEGAL RESEARCH
Mike Townsend*
Abstract: As a result of a sequence of so-called foundational crises, mathematicians have
come to realize that foundational inquiries are difficult and perhaps never ending. Accounts of
the last of these crises have appeared with increasing frequency in the legal literature, and one
piece of this Article examines these invocations with a critical eye. The other piece introduces
a framework for thinking about law as a discipline. On the one hand, the disciplinary
framework helps explain how esoteric mathematical topics made their way into the legal
literature. On the other hand, the mathematics can be used to examine some aspects of
interdisciplinary legal research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For whatever may be said about the importance of aiming at depth
rather than width in our studies, and however the demand of the
present age may be for specialists, there will always be work, not
only for those who build up particular sciences and write
monographs on them, but for those who open up such
communications between the different groups of builders as will
facilitate a healthy interaction between them.
James Clerk Maxwell'
This Article consists of two related pieces. One piece examines
invocations by legal scholars of what mathematicians2 describe as "the
third foundational crisis that mathematics is still undergoing."3 Casual
readers of law reviews might be astonished to discover that accounts of
various aspects of this crisis have appeared with increasing frequency in
the legal literature,4 and one piece of this Article examines these
invocations with a critical eye. The other piece introduces a framework
for thinking about law as a discipline. Central to this framework is a
particular conception of the Western intellectual tradition in terms of
disciplines. The notion is that a discipline is at once a science, an art, and
a technology. How are these seemingly disparate pieces related in this
"case study"? On the one hand, the disciplinary framework helps explain
why esoteric mathematical topics such as GLdel's Theorems and non-
Euclidean geometry have appeared in the legal literature. On the other
hand, the mathematics is used to examine some aspects of
interdisciplinary legal research. The rest of this Introduction expands the
sketch of the Article presented thus far.
I. Quoted in Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820-1900, at 230 (1986).
2. For the purposes of this Article, no distinction will be made between mathematicians,
mathematical logicians, and philosophers of mathematics.
3. Abraham Fraenkel et al., Foundations of Set Theory 14 (2d rev. ed. 1984).
4. See M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 31, 33
n.13 (1993). Indeed, there are three recent pieces devoted largely to various aspects of the crisis. See
Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal
Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 Hastings L.J. 1439 (1992); David R.
Dow, Gidel and Langdell-A Reply to Brown and Greenberg's Use of Mathematics in Legal
Theory, 44 Hastings L.J. 707 (1993); John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the
Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 992 (1992).
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As a result of a sequence of so-called founda,:ional crises,
mathematicians have come to realize that foundational inquiries are
difficult and perhaps never ending. Although accounts of this crisis have
appeared with increasing frequency in the legal literature, there are a
number of problems with these presentations.
At the most basic level, there are problems with attempts merely to
state the mathematics. One law review article tells us that ".as Kurt G6del
demonstrated, any formal logical system ultimately rests on some
undecidable-that is, unprovable-propositions."5 Another refers to
"Gidel's proof of ultimate inconsistency in mathematics."6 A third
explains that "a 'complete' theorem is inconsistent if it is an axiom.
Nothing purely complete is proved."7 Think this sounds like
gobbledygook? It is. At a minimum, this Article provides the reader with
an understanding of the mathematics involved.
There also are problems with attempts to apply the rathematics to
law. Many authors, for example, use mathematics to bolster or attack
various positions on "legal indeterminacy."8 One legal scholar tells us
flatly that "[t]he implications of Gtdel's Theorems for any theory of law
have been ignored for too long .... Every theory of law is incomplete."9
Think that it can't be this simple? It isn't. Authors, for example,
routinely ignore the important fact that results such as G6del's Theorems
only apply in a very specific setting. This Article does not evaluate the
ultimate conclusions reached through these types of invocations. The
Article does ask, however, whether scholars have carefully considered
the mathematics they invoke.
Perhaps most troubling are uses of the current mathematical crisis as
support for a general intellectual skepticism. Indeed, scholars such as
Edward Purcell and Joan Williams have traced the intellectual roots of
current critiques of the Western intellectual tradition, including critical
legal studies, in large part to the current mathematical crisis.1" One legal
commentator tells us that "it should not be surprising to find that the
philosophical implication of Gdel's theorem should question the basic
5. Lee Loevinger, Standards of Proof in Science and Law, 32 Jurimetrics 323,343 (1992).
6. Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.J. 303, 382 (1991) (quoting Robert Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture 16
(1966)).
7. Leonard R. Jaffee, Empathic Adjustment--An Alternative to Rules, Policies, and Politics, 58 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1161, 1193 (1990).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 345-47.
9. Daniel Kornstein, The Music of the Laws 127 (1982).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 376-79 and 389-91.
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premise of philosophy--that is, the basic question of whether reality
exists."" Think there must be more to the story? There is. If only used
metaphorically, such invocations may not be problematic in the same
sense as previously described. Yet a mathematician still can point out
why a law review article assertion that the rejection of objective truth and
certainty has "permeated . . . mathematics" 2 is misleading, if not
inaccurate. The mathematician dlso can note that as a result of its crises
mathematics has- matured, not declined, as a discipline.
Obviously, these problems are related. The first type leads to the
second, which in turn leads to the third. In any case, they stem from a
lack of attention to the intellectual history of the current crisis.
Accordingly, the mathematical piece of this Article devotes a large
amount of space to presenting this history.
The second piece of this Article stems from the assertion that in an era
in which higher education in general and legal education in particular are
undergoing something of an identity crisis, a starting point for an
examination of law's place in the modem university setting is essential.
For the purposes of this Article, the starting point is the notion of a
discipline. The premise of this notion of discipline is that the basic goal
underlying the Western intellectual tradition is to understand, appreciate,
and utilize our environment. Understanding (i.e. science) involves
classification, appreciation (i.e. art) involves interpretation, and
utilization (i.e. technology) involves the means for providing sustenance
and comfort. The environment, however, is complex and textured, and
thus the intellectual tradition centers on disciplines--more focused
approaches to the basic goal. A discipline is at once a science, an art, and
a technology. A discipline is characterized as a science by the objects
considered, the properties studied, and the classification employed. As an
art, a discipline is characterized by the range of interpretations given and
the symbolic medium used. Finally, a discipline is characterized as a
technology by the methods and scope of its applications. Within each
discipline, science, art, and technology work together to present a
specific part of a world view.
To assert that law is a discipline is to assert that law is a science, that
law is an art, and that law is a technology. The core of understanding (i.e.
science) is classification. There is no attempt in this Article to provide
11. Randall Kelso, Book Note, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 822, 833 n.44 (reviewing Douglas R.
Hofstadter, G4del, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1980)).
12. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the
New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429,430-31 (1987).
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any classification scheme for law. The Article merely asserts that
classification is the heart of the scientific component of law as a
discipline. That law is a technology is probably the least controversial of
the assertions, while the assertion that law is an art perhaps is the most
appealing yet the hardest to accept. The resulting legal world view is not
only what makes it possible to write a book on comparative law, but also
what makes it easier for a lawyer than a mathematician to digest it.
This Article focuses on law as a science. For example, some time is
spent discussing Christopher Columbus Langdell's controversial views
on the matter. In fact, the disciplinary part of the Article is the most
important, and future case study articles will discuss other aspects of law
as a discipline. Thus, this Article is the first part of a work in progress.
What is the relation between the seemingly disparate mathematical
and disciplinary pieces described' above? On the one hand, the
disciplinary framework helps explain how esoteric mathematical topics
such as Gidel's Theorems and non-Euclidean geometry made their way
into the legal literature. The past 150 years have seen a. complex and
comprehensive reevaluation of the Western intellectual tradition. Indeed,
recent intellectual critiques such as Marxism and post-modernism can be
characterized in terms of fundamental reevaluations of science, art, and
technology. From this perspective, the use of the current mathematical
crisis, both within and outside of law, represents a particular
manifestation of the overall reevaluation of science. On the other hand,
the Article uses specific critiques of the invocations of the current crisis
to make some general points about meaningful interdisciplinary research.
Few doubt Maxwell's assertion that interdisciplinary research is
important. 3 Such research sharpens the resolution of the intellectual
picture by applying the perspectives of differing disciplines to the most
interesting aspects of the environment. Moreover, interdisciplinary work
has been, and continues to be, a major force in the creation and evolution
of disciplines themselves. A major intellectual challenge today, however,
is fostering such work in an information-rich era in which it is difficult to
master even a small part of a given field. Much of the discussion in the
legal literature of the current foundational crisis in mathematics
illustrates two basic difficulties in doing meaningful interdisciplinary
legal research: gaining a sufficient understanding of what is often a
foreign discipline, and employing that discipline in a man..er that reflects
both its relevance to, and separateness from, law.
13. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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Admittedly, there is much to be said for using something other than
invocations of the current foundational crisis as a case study. Although
the mathematics is interesting per se and involves some of the crowning
achievements of modem thought, it is subtle and somewhat difficult.
Nevertheless, legal scholars have put it in play and, as indicated above,
in a big way. The only responsible response is to face the mathematics
head on. Moreover, addressing the mathematics does illustrate the
magnitude of the effort that often is required for meaningful
interdisciplinary research.
Part II of this Article presents more detail on the disciplinary
framework. The reader should keep in mind, however, that this
framework will be more fully developed and illustrated in future articles.
Part III contains a discussion of law as a science, focusing on Langdell's
views on the matter. Parts H and III set the stage for part IV's discussion
of the legal invocations of the current mathematical crisis. After some
preliminary comments in section A of part IV, section B provides a
careful description of the content and context of the foundational crises.
Section B also provides a detailed analysis of the accuracy of
descriptions in the legal literature. Section C uses the discussion
presented in section B to examine some of the invocations of the
mathematical material. Part V presents a few final observations. Some
patience is required for section B of part IV. The mathematics is
important for developing the disciplinary points of the Article. Moreover,
any meaningful use in law of the current foundational crisis must begin
with a careful study of the mathematics.
Washington Law Review
II. DISCIPLINES AND THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION
Man is a singular creature. He has a set of gifts which make him
unique among the animals: so that, unlike them, he is not a figure
in the landscape-he is a shaper of the landscape. In body and in
mind he is the explorer ofnature....
... Man is distinguished from other animals by his imaginative
gifts... [so that] the great discoveries of different ages and
different cultures, in technique, in science, in the arts, express in
their progression a richer and more intricate conjunction of human
faculties, an ascending trellis of his gifts.
Jacob Bronowski
14
A. The Notion of a Discipline
The premise for this Article's notion of a discipline is that the basic
goal underlying the Western intellectual tradition is :o understand,
appreciate, and utilize our environment. 5
Understanding refers to science. This use of the word "science"
connotes systemization and organization, as opposed to its more narrow
association with what usually are called the natural sciences. 6 Science
involves the classification of the objects appearing in the environment
according to their important properties. 7 These objects may be sensory
or non-sensory, and the exact nature of the classification, such as
description, prediction, prescription, or explanation, depends on the
context.' This admittedly is an older use of the word "science,"' 9 but it
14. Jacob Bronowski, The Ascent of Man 19-20 (1973).
15. Nothing said here is meant to imply that other traditions lack these concepts.
16. For a discussion of this distinction, see David A. Funk, Juridical Science Paradigms As
Newer Rhetorics in 21st Century Jurisprudence, 12 N. Ky. L. Rev. 419,435 (1985).
17. See Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 771 (1972) (giving .as one definition "a
department of systematized knowledge as an object of study <the [science] of theology>").
For the purposes of this Article, I am not interested in debates about the ontology of the objects
"appearing" in the environment.
18. A general discussion of classification is provided in Stephan Kmer, Classification Theory, in
4 Encyclopaedia Britannica 691 (15th ed. 1974). For more detailed discussions in specific contexts,
see Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function o1 Theory, Probability
Vol. 71:51, 1996
Interdisciplinary Legal Research
captures the essence of one of the three basic dimensions of the
intellectual tradition.
Appreciation refers to art. This use of the word "art" connotes
aesthetics, as opposed to its more narrow association with what usually
are called the fine arts. Art involves the interpretation of the environment
through the creative use of a symbolic medium.2" As with the concept of
science, this Article does not attempt to fill out these ideas completely. In
particular, no effort is made to develop the concepts of the artist, the
work of art, and the spectator.2 Nonetheless, as with science and
technology, the intent here is to present notions that cut across
disciplines.'
Finally, utilization refers to technology. This use of the word
"technology" is intended to connote application, as opposed to its more
narrow association with what usually are called the engineering sciences.
Technology involves the means employed to provide sustenance and
comfort.' 3
The environment is complex and textured, and thus the intellectual
tradition centers on disciplines--more focused approaches to the basic
goal described above. A discipline is at once a science, an art, and a
and Law in Science 9-10 (1953) (discussing scientific laws); Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific
Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science 135-73 (1965) (discussing natural and
social sciences); W.S. Jevons, The Principles of Science 673-734 (2d ed. 1877) (discussing natural
sciences); Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations (2d ed. 1967) (discussing arts).
19. Some even view this use as "obsolete." See Barbara J. Shapiro, Law and Science in
Seventeenth-Century England, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 727, 727 (1969).
20. See John A. Fisher, Reflecting on Art 324 (1993) ("Four major concepts dominate traditional
aesthetics: beauty, representation, expression, and form."); Dewitt H. Parker, Aesthetics, in
Encyclopedia of the Arts 14, 15 (Dagobert D. Runes & Harry G. Schrickel eds., 1946) ("Three
general conceptions of art have dominated the history of aesthetics: imitation, imagination, and
expression or language.").
21. Any such effort would move far beyond the scope of this Article and into controversial areas.
See Hugh Curtler, What Is Art? 1, 3 (1983).
22. Cf Helen Gardner, Understanding the Arts 318-28 (1932).
No attempt is made here to define the term "art" as it is used in connection with music, painting,
etc. Indeed, there is perhaps nothing more problematic. See Horst W. Janson, History ofArt 9 (1967).
For a discussion of the problems involved, see Paul Ziff, The Task of Defining a Work of Art, 62
Phil. Rev. 58 (1953). For a collection of standard perspectives, see Frank A. Tillman & Steven M.
Cahn, Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics from Plato to Wittgenstein (1969). For general overviews,
see Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History (1966);
Munro, supra note 18, at 49-109.
23. See Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 905 (1972) (defining technology as "the
totality of the means employed to provide... human sustenance and comfort").
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technology.24 A discipline is characterized as a science by the objects
considered, the properties studied, and the classification employed. The
expression of this characterization is the corpus or set of significant
statements of the field. As an art, a discipline is characterized by the
range of interpretations and the symbolic medium used. Finally, a
discipline is characterized as a technology by the methods and scope of
its applications. Within each discipline, science, art, and technology
work together25 to present a specific part of a world view.2"
B. Mathematics As a Discipline
To make the concepts introduced in the last section :more concrete,
consider mathematics as a science, an art, and a technology.27
Mathematics is used here rather than law for two reasons. First, one part
of this Article deals with subtle mathematical concepts, and therefore the
Article introduces some mathematics here. Second, the use of
mathematics makes it possible to illustrate the concepts of science, art,
and technology in a context in which they are not likely to be
controversial. Part III of the Article discusses some of these notions in
the context of law.
As a science, mathematics deals with objects whose essential
properties involve number, shape, and function." Indeed, these three
24. For another "dimensional" approach to the notion of a discipline, see Timothy P. Terrell,
Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development ofFundamental
Normative Principles, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 288 (1984).
25. Others posit an antagonistic relationship. Cf Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial
Society 374-77 (1973) (discussing potential antagonism between "scientific, technological, and
cultural estates"); The Republic of Plato b.X (Francis M. Comsford trans., 1941) (discussing
potential corrupting influence of fine arts on search for knowledge).
26. What does it mean, after all, to say that students are taught to think like a lawyer? The notion
of the separation of disciplines can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle. Se T.Z. Lavine, From
Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest 76 (1984). The current scope and organization of
disciplines has been affected in part by the social and institutional factors that accompanied the
transition from the educated amateur, to the professional society, to the modem research university.
See Roger L. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth ofAmerican Research Universities 1900-
1940, at 20-27 (1986). For discussions of the American version of this transition, see The
Organization of Knowledge in Modern America 1860-1920 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds.,
1979) [hereinafter Oleson & Voss]; The Pursuit of Knowledge in the Early 4merican Republic:
American Scientific and Learned Societies from Colonial Times to the Civil Wa,; (Alexandra Oleson
& Sanborn C. Brown eds., 1976).
27. See Morris Kline, Mathematics: A Cultural Approach 1-10 (1962).
28. See Nat'l Research Council Bd. on Mathematical Sciences, Mathematical Sciences: Some
Research Trends 21 (1988) [hereinafter Research Trends]. Of the three, the notion of function may
be the least familiar to the general reader. Roughly speaking, a function from an nput set A to a set B
Vol. 71:51, 1996
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concepts provide the starting points for the traditional branches of
algebra, geometry, and analysis.29  The heart of mathematical
classification is the deductive method.3" Using this method, mathematics
generates its corpus, a typical example of which is the statement that
there is no rational number whose square is two." As an art, mathematics
interprets using number, shape, and function in conjunction with a
consists of the assignment to each element of A one and only one element of B. For example, if A is
the set of natural numbers {0, 1, 2 .... } and B also is the set of natural numbers, then the assignment
of a number to its square is a function. This squaring function might be denoted by a single letter and
described in terms of the value assigned to an arbitrary member of its input set. That is, the squaring
function might be denoted byf and described by saying thatj(n) = n*n. For a brief introduction to
the notion of function, see I Tom M. Apostol, Calculus 50-54 (2d ed. 1967).
29. See Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times 949-54 (1972)
[hereinafter Kline, Mathematical] (discussing role of functions in development of analysis); Morris
Kline. Geometry. Sci. Am.. Sept. 1964, at 60 (discussing role of shape in development of geometry);
W.W. Sawyer, Algebra, Sci. Am., Sept. 1964. at 70 (discussing role of number in development of
algebra).
Obviously, a complete description of these branches would amount to a substantial mathematical
education. The Sawyer and Kline articles present elementary introductions to algebra and geometry.
For an elementary introduction to analysis, see Edward Kasner & James R. Newman, Mathematics
and the Imagination 299-356 (1940). The traditional branches are replete with interactions and
subdivisions, and they have been supplemented by a variety of new areas. For a general introduction,
see 1, 2 Edna E. Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics (1970).
30. See Yu I. Manin, A Course in Mathematical Logic 48 (1977) ("[T]he ideal for what
constitutes a mathematical demonstration of a 'nonobvious truth' has remained unchanged since the
time of Euclid: we must arrive at such a truth from 'obvious' hypotheses, or assertions which have
already been proved, by means of a series of explicitly described, 'obviously valid' elementary
deductions.").
This is the "ideal," but the required rigor has changed from time to time. See Raymond L. Wilder,
Relativity of Standards of Mathematical Rigor, in 3 Dictionary of the History of Ideas 170 (1973);
see also Judith V. Grabiner, Is Mathematical Truth Time-Dependent?, 81 Am. Mathematical
Monthly 354 (1974).
31. Recall that a rational number can be expressed as a fraction p/q where p and q are integers 0,
1, -1, 2, -2 .... and q is not zero. Recall also that a fraction can be reduced to lowest terms by
removing common factors. For example, the reduced form of 16/10 is 8/5, obtained by removing the
common factor 2.
Now suppose to the contrary that there is a rational number r such that r*r = 2. Suppose r = plq in
lowest terms. By the assumption on r, we have that (p/q)*(plq) = 2. By simple algebra, this implies
that p*p = 2q*q. But 2q*q is an even number, so thatp must be even since an odd number times an
odd number is odd. Sayp = 2k. Substituting 2k forp in the equality p*p = 2q*q, one obtains q*q =
2k'k, implying that q is even. Because p and q are even, they have a common factor of 2. One
concludes from this contradiction that there is no rational number whose square is two.
G.H. Hardy called this a "mathematical theorem[ ... which every mathematician will admit to
be[ing] first rate[,] ... simple both in idea and in execution, but there is no doubt at all about [its]
being [a theorem] of the highest class[,] ... as fresh and significant as when it was first discovered-
two thousand years have not written a wrinkle on [it]." G.H. Hardy, A Mathematician's Apology 91-
92 (3d prtg. 1967).
This result actually is relevant to this Article! See infra text accompanying note 104.
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medium that consists of a highly refined symbolic language.32 Euclidean
geometry, for example, represents an elegant interpretation of some of
the spatial aspects of the environment. Finally, mathematics as a
technology is used to solve problems that can be modeled in terms of
number, shape, and function.33
The three dimensions of mathematics interact symbiotically. 34 The
history of mathematics contains many examples in which mathematics as
a science has been driven by mathematics as a technology and vice-
versa. For example, the development of the field of probability is due
largely to the investigation of a number of practical problems.35
Conversely, the study of prime numbers,36 long considered to be of little
practical use, 37 has become immensely important in a variety of applied
areas.3' There is a similar relationship between mathematics as a science
and mathematics as an art. The symbolic language of mathematics helps
guide mathematical reasoning. 39 Conversely, the development of non-
32. See Henri Poincar6, The Relations of Analysis and Mathematical Pnysics, 4 Bull. Am.
Mathematical Soc'y 247, 248 (1898) ("[Mathematics has] an end esthetic. ... [A]depts find in
mathematics delights analogous to those that painting and music give. They admire the delicate
harmony of number and of forms; they are amazed when a new discovery d scloses for them an
unlooked for perspective .... "). For other discussions of mathematics as an art, see Nathan A.
Court, Mathematics in Fun and Earnest 127-40 (1964); P.R. Halmos, Mather.atics As a Creative
Art, 56 Am. Scientist 375 (1968); J.W.N. Sullivan, Mathematics As an Art, in Aspects of Science:
Second Series 80 (1926); Henri Poincar6, Mathematical Creation, Sci. Am., Aug. 1948, at 54. See
also Scott Buchannan, Poetry and Mathematics (1929); Jerry P. King, The Art of Mathematics
(1992).
Many mathematicians exalt this dimension of mathematics above all others. See Lynn A. Steen,
Mathematics Today, in Mathematics Today 1, 10 (Lynn A. Steen ed., 1978) ("[B]eauty and elegance
have more to do with the value of a mathematical idea than does either strict truth or possible
utility."); see also Hardy, supra note 31.
33. For a general discussion with a number of interesting examples, see Felix E. Browder &
Saunders MacLane, The Relevance of Mathematics, in Mathematics Today 323 (Lynn A. Steen ed.,
1978).
34. The technological dimension at times has existed in an uneasy alliance with the other two. See
Philip J. Davis & Reuben Hersh, The Mathematical Experience 85-89 (1981); Research Trends,
supra note 28, at 2-3.
35. See Ian Hacking, The Emergence ofProbability 11-12 (1984).
36. Recall that a natural number 0, 1, 2.... is prime if it is larger than 1 and divisible only by 1
and itself. Thus, 7 is prime, but 0, 1, and 9 are not.
37. As late as 1940, Hardy could write that "[we] may be justified in rejoicing that there is one
science at any rate [number theory) . .. whose very remoteness from ordinary human activities
should keep it gentle and clean." Hardy, supra note 31, at 121.
38. For a general discussion with a number of examples, see M.R. Schroeder, Number Theory in
Science and Communication (2d enlarged ed. 1986).
39. See G. Polya, How to Solve It 134-41 (2d ed. 1957).
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Euclidean geometries illuminated the nature of mathematics as an art.4°
Finally, there is a symbiotic relationship between mathematics as an art
and mathematics as a technology. Indeed, the symbolic medium of
mathematics largely defines the scope of its applications.4' Conversely,
practical problems involving the motion of objects in a plane led to the
general study of curves in the plane,42 many of which are known for their
elegance and beauty. 3
As a science, an art, and a technology, mathematics presents a unique
perspective on the environment. A fundamental reason for learning
mathematics is to be exposed to what it means to view the world like a
mathematician.'
C. Interdisciplinary Research
Disciplines share certain commonalities because the most interesting
aspects of the environment appear in many different guises. The resulting
interactions manifest themselves in at least two ways. First, disciplines
often are categorized by a common emphasis or approach to one or more
of the three basic dimensions.45 There is, for example, the rough division
of disciplines into the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the
humanities. Second, and more importantly, disciplines intersect. To
consider just one example, the study of DNA fingerprinting illustrates
how a wide-ranging collection of disciplines (law, genetics, mathematics,
etc.) deals with the concept of coincidence.'
Interdisciplinary research sharpens the resolution of the intellectual
picture of the environment by applying different perspectives to the most
interesting aspects of the environment. Moreover, such research is a
40. See Sullivan, supra note 32.
41. For many examples illustrating this principle, see M.M. Schiffer & Leon Bowden, The Role of
Mathematics in Science (1984).
42. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 544-54.
43. The reader is encouraged to look through the figures in J. Dennis Lawrence, A Catalog of
Special Plane Curves (1972).
44. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 1-10.
45. This classification of disciplines, each of which involves classifications, raises the question of
a metastance. A fill discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a legally-based introduction to the "meta," see Stuart Banner, Please Don't Read the Title, 50
Ohio St. L.J. 243 (1989). In any case, "groundedness" problems are nothing new. See, e.g., 1
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy 295 (1946) (discussing Aristotle's critique of Plato's
theory of universals).
46. For an overview, see Comm. on DNA Technology in Forensic Sciences, Nat'l Research
Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992).
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major force in the creation and evolution of disciplines themselves.
Scholars, however, must be aware of two basic difficulties in doing
meaningful interdisciplinary research: gaining a sufficient understanding
of what is often a foreign discipline,47 and employing that discipline in a
manner that reflects both its relevance and separateness. a The major
intellectual challenge today is fostering meaningful interdisciplinary
work in an information-rich era in which it is difficult to master even a
small part of a given field.
D. Reevaluating the Western Intellectual Tradition
The past 150 years have seen a complex and comprehensive
reevaluation of the Western intellectual tradition.49 In its negative sense,
the reevaluation involves a fundamental reexamination of the ideas of
science, art, and technology." In its positive sense, the reevaluation
encompasses a variety of attitudes ranging from evolution to revolution
to anarchy. This Article is more concerned with the negative sense. With
respect to science, foundational crises challenge the traditional bases of
classification schemes." With respect to art, certain theories question the
notions of creativity, interpretation, and symbolism. 2 With respect to
technology, critics expose and probe normative starting points. The
archetype of the technological component of the reevaluation is Karl
47. See Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 Yale J.L. & Human. 79, 79-
80 (1992); Sinclair, supra note 4, at 32; Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History,
100 Yale L.J. 1515, 1515 n.1 (1991); Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979).
48. See Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm, 42
Duke L.J. 840 (1993); Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humamstic Theory in Lmv:
Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 Duke L.J. 191 (1991);
Dow, supra note 4, at 724; Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations
About the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203 (1987).
49. See Pauline M. Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences 4 (1992) ("[A] radically
new and different... movement is coalescing in a broad-gauged re-conceptualization of how we
experience and explain the world around us."); see also Gonter Frankenberg, Down by Lmv: Irony,
Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 360, 371 (1989) ("[Ain epochal intellectual-political
battle has been raging ... ").
50. See Rosenau, supra note 49, at 15-17.
51. Commentators have denoted this challenge in a variety of ways. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value 47-73 (1973)
(using phrase "non-Euclideanism"); Williams, supra note 12, at 429-39 (using phrase "new
epistemology").
52. For an introduction to some of these theories, see Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An
Introduction (1983).
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Marx's economic analysis of class conflict. 3 His technological focus was
symptomatic of the aftermath of the so-called Revolutions of 1848,' 4 and
this date is the somewhat arbitrary starting point for the 150 year period
mentioned above.
The reevaluation consists of discipline-centered critical schools, such
as the critical legal studies movement, and discipline-independent critical
stances, such as Marxism, feminism, and post-modernism.5 The
reevaluation might be viewed in terms of a three-dimensional "critical
space." One axis includes the critical stances, and another axis includes
the critical schools. That is, Marxism cuts across a variety of disciplines,
and the critical legal studies movement embraces a variety of critical
stances. A third axis consisting of science, art, and technology represents
the scope of a particular challenge. A given critic will occupy a region of
this three dimensional space.
This description, however, hides a number of complexities. Critical
stances or schools may be subdivided. Moreover, although there is much
agreement about questioning the intellectual status quo, there are many
tensions hidden beneath this common cause. 6 Finally, one commentator
notes that any attempt at a description "may be inherently objectionable
to those ...who view such endeavors as necessarily misguided, as
flawed attempts at systemization."57 Such a description, however, does
indicate that one aspect of the reevaluation consists of engaging the
tradition on the tradition's own terms. In this sense, the current
reevaluation can be viewed as the most recent incarnation of a dialectic
that has characterized Western thought since its inception."
53. For a brief introduction to his ideas, see Lavine, supra note 26, at 288-301.
54. See Charles Breuning, The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 1789-1850, at 276-78 (2d ed.
1977).
55. Some of these stances, such as Marxism, began within a particular discipline. For a brief
introduction to the development of this stance, see Lavine, supra note 26, at 261-320.
56. See Rosenau, supra note 49, at 14 (discussing tension within post-modernism); id. at 6, 158-
60 (discussing tension between Marxism and post-modernism).
57. Id. at 19.
58. Modem epistemological arguments, for example, can be traced back to ancient Greek
disputes. See Mary Tiles & Jim Tiles, An Introduction to Historical Epistemology: The Authority of
Knowledge 52-53 (1993). Moreover, classical Greek literary criticism encompassed a variety of
positions, many of which anticipated modem issues and stances. See I Cambridge History of
Literary Criticism at x-xi, 346 (George A. Kennedy ed., 1989). Finally, Athenians engaged in a
robust debate about the normative premises underlying their society. See Victor Ehrenburg, From
Solon to Socrates: Greek History During the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C. 48-74 (1968); Ivan M.
Linforth, Solon the Athenian 46-91 (1919).
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III. IS LAW A DISCIPLINE?
Langdell seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early
in his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with
all the tenacity of genius. Langdell's idea evidently corresponded
to the felt necessities of the time. However absurd, however
mischievous, however deeply rooted in error it may have been,
Langdell's idea shaped our legal thinkingforfifty years.
Langdell 's idea was that law is a science.
Grant Gilmore 9
A. Introduction
The framework of this Article presupposes that law is a discipline.
This part of the Article explores one aspect of that suppoition--that law
is a science (i.e. that law involves classification) °.6 Any discussion of law
as a science must deal with the controversy surrounding Langdell's
conception of the relationship between law and science.6 ' This part
examines two components of his views: that the study of law is suitable
for the modem research university and that law involves science.
B. The Emergence of the American Law School As Part of the Modern
American Research University
The emergence of the American research university is a complex
phenomenon.6 ' The research university can be traced in part to three
59. Grant Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican Law 42 (1977).
60. It will be assumed that law has technological and artistic components. Tle assertion that law is
a technology should not be controversial. For one discussion of law as an art, see Laura S.
Fitzgerald, Note, Towards a Modern Art of Layw, 96 Yale L.J. 2051 (1987). Fo- a brief discussion of
the tensions between the scientific and technological components as they manifest themselves in
legal education, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrow,ng the Field: What's
Missing from the MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science, and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash.
L. Rev. 593, 596-603 (1994).
61. There is some question whether Langdell or Harvard President Charles Eliot should be
considered the more important figure. See John H. Schlegel, American Legal Theory and American
Legal Education: A Snake Swallowing It's [sic] Tail?, in Critical Legal Thought: An American-
German Debate 49, 51 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek eds., 1989); see also Robert Stevens,
Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s 36 (1983).
62. For general discussions, see John S. Brubacher & Willis Rudy, Higher Education in
Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities 1636-1976 (3d ed. 1976); Frederick
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specific reforms proposed for American higher education.63 First,
institutions should give greater scope to new disciplines, particularly the
natural sciences. Second, they should offer training preparing students
for specific careers. Third, they should reflect educational trends in
European countries, particularly Germany with its emphasis on faculty-
oriented advanced study and research. The research university also can
be traced to the widespread institutional growth that characterized the
post-Civil War United States.' Like the mammoth networks that came to
dominate manufacturing and energy, the research university system
gained control over the production and diffusion of basic knowledge.65
As a result of these two types of influences, higher education moved
beyond the pre-Civil War model.66 Private schools such as Harvard, state
schools such as Michigan, and entirely new institutions such as Johns
Hopkins sought a new ideal.67
American legal education faced a similar pair of influences. As with
higher education in general, law schools were examining the need for
educational reform.68 Just prior to Langdell's arrival, the Harvard Law
School could be described in the following terms:
[It was] a school without examination . . . or degree. [It] had a
faculty of three professors giving but ten lectures a week to one
hundred and fifteen students of whom fifty-three percent had no
college degree, a curriculum without any rational sequence of
subjects, and an inadequate and decaying library.69
In addition, a variety of social, economic, and political pressures had
been moving legal preparation away from an apprentice-based system
Rudolph, The American College and University: A History (1962); Laurence R. Veysey, The
Emergence of the American University (1965).
63. See Geiger, supra note 26, at 4.
64. See Rudolph, supra note 62, at 244-45.
65. See Edward Shils, The Order of Learning in the United States: The Ascendancy of the
University, in Oleson & Voss, supra note 26, at 19, 19.
66. See Rudolph, supra note 62, at 241.
67. See id. at 272-86.
68. See Lawrence M. Friedman, History of American Law 608-12 (2d ed. 1985); Alfred Z. Reed,
Training for the Public Profession of Law 273 (1921); Stevens, supra note 61, at 24-25.
69. James B. Ames, Christopher Columbus Langdell, in Lectures in Legal History 467, 477
(1913), quoted in Eric M. Holmes, Education for Competent Lauyering-Case Method in a
Functional Context, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 536, 543 (1976).
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and toward the law school°--particularly the university-affiliated law
school.7'
Existing law schools, however, were a marginal part of the academy, 72
and a failure to adapt to the new university ideal risked further
marginalization within the burgeoning intellectual community. Indeed
many, if not most, law schools retained a second class stalus well into the
20th century.73
C. Langdell and Law As a Science
Describing law as a science helped American law schools enter the
intellectual mainstream by appealing to the dominating intellectual
spirit.74 In Langdell's words:
I have tried to do my part towards making the teaching and study of
law [at Harvard] worthy of a university; toward making [Harvard]
... a true university, and the law school not the least of its
departments ....
To accomplish these objects, so far as they depended upon the
law school, it was indispensable to establish at least two things-
that law is a science, and that all the available materials of that
science are contained in printed books. If law be not a science, a
university will consult its own dignity in declining to 1:each it. If it
be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be
learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practises it.7"
70. See Friedman, supra note 68, at 606-07; Stevens, supra note 61, at 20-24.
71. See Brubacher & Rudy, supra note 62, at 205; Friedman, supra note 68, at 606-07; James W.
Hurst, The Growth of American Law 259-60 (1950); Reed, supra note 68, at 151, 189; Thomas C.
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 37-38 (1983); John H. Schlegel, Langdell's
Legacy or the Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1517, 1521-25 (194).
72. See Friedman, supra note 68, at 608-09; Stevens, supra note 61, at 35-36.
73. See Stevens, supra note 61, at 37.
74. See Josef Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law
Schools 17 (1914); Stevens, supra note 61, at 51-52; William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the
Realist Movement 13 (1973); Holmes, supra note 69, at 543-44; Schlegel, supta note 61, at 57-58;
Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law As Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in
American Legal Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 25-26 (1980).
Langdell also tightened admission and graduation requirements, and hired lll-time professional
faculty. See Friedman, supra note 68, at 612; Stevens, supra note 61, at 38.
75. C.C. Langdell, Address at the 250th Anniversary of Harvard University (Nov. 5, 1886), in 3
L.Q. Rev. 118, 123-24 (1887).
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What, however, did Langdell mean by asserting that law is a science?
Consider the following three statements:
(1) Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such mastery of these as to be able to apply
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever tangled skein
of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer. . . . Each of
these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees ....
[I]t is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries. This
growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases; and
much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the
doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is
embodied. But the cases which are useful and necessary for this
purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion to
all that have been reported. The vast majority are useless, and
worse than useless, for any purpose of systematic study. Moreover
the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is
commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same
doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to
which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause
of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could be so classified
and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and
nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their
number. It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible to take such a
branch of the law as Contracts, for example, and without exceeding
comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and arrange all
the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the
growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential
doctrines; and that such work could not fail to be of material
service to all who desire to study that branch of law systematically
and in its original sources.76
(2) [L]av is a science and.., all the available materials of that science
are contained in printed books....
... [The library] is to us all that the laboratories of the university
are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to
the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.77
76. C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts at viii-ix (2d ed. 1879).
77. Langdell, supra note 75, at 124.
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(3) The opinion has... been prevalent that [law] is incapable of being
taught as a science; and, though the correcmess of this opinion will
not be admitted by those who represent this School; it may be
supported by plausible arguments. Law has not the demonstrative
certainty of mathematics; nor does one's knowledge of it admit of
... simple and easy tests, as in case of a dead or foreign language;
nor does it acknowledge truth as its ultimate test and standard, like
natural science; nor is our law embodied in a written text, which is
to be studied and expounded, as is the case with the Roman law and
with some foreign systems."8
Commentators interpret such quotations in various ways. Some find
Langdell's assertion to be that law as a science is deductive.79 Others find
Langdell's assertion to be that law as a science is inductive.8" Still others
find something of a mixture.8' Finally, some commentatcrs see Langdell
as an opportunist willing to adopt a certain mode of expression when
convenient for the implementation of his overriding goal: the
development of comprehensive, university-based legal education."
A premise of this Article is that the core of understanding (i.e.
science) is classification. There is no attempt here to provide any
classification scheme for law. This Article merely asserts that
78. C.C. Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in Fifo-Second Annual Report of the
President of Harvard College 1876-77, at 96-97 (1878), quoted in Anthory Chase, Origins of
Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived As Clinical Instruction in
Law, 5 Nova L.J. 323, 358 (1981).
79. See Friedman, supra note 68, at 617; Banner, supra note 45, at 253 n.33; Dow, supra note 4,
at 708; cf Paul D. Carrington, The Missionary Diocese of Chicago, 44 J. Legal Educ. 467, 468
(1994); Willard Hurst, Changing Responsibilities of the Law School: 1869-1968, 1968 Wis. L. Rev.
336, 336-37; Catherine P. Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The Predictive Theory of Law As an
Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. Ill. U. L.J. 329, 330 (1994).
80. See Redlich, supra note 74, at 15-16; Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of
Men and Ideas, 1817-1967, at 174-75 (1967): Holmes, supra note 69, at 546; Gary Minda, One
Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought from Langdell and Holmes to Posne, and Schlag, 28 Ind.
L. Rev. 353, 358-61 (1995); Speziale, supra note 74, at 29.
81. See Stevens, supra note 61, at 52-53; Grey, supra note 71, at 16; M.H. Hoeflich, Law &
Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95, 119-20 (1986); cf
Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and Scientific Method, 58 Fordham L.
Rev. 263, 275-76 (1989); John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law. 75 Geo. L.J. 1967,
1974-76 (1987).
Some authors are not entirely clear in their descriptions of Langdell. For an example, see Gilmore,
supra note 59, at 42-43.
82. See Chase, supra note 78, at 342, 358-59.
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classification is the heart of the scientific component of law as a
discipline."
The idea that law involves classification is nothing new. Classification
is an important part of both the common and civil law traditions.84 Even
Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of Langdell's harshest critics,8" was eager to
provide a rational scheme of classification.86 Moreover, classification is
an important part of the jurisprudential movements that have shaped
current American legal academics.87
Classification is at the heart of Langdell's notions of law as a science
as described in the first two numbered quotations above.88 In this sense,
Langdell's efforts are commendable, and Gilmore is wrong to
characterize Langdell's ideas as "absurd" or "mischievous" or "rooted in
83. For an exhaustive and provocative account of classification in law, see Jay M. Feinman, The
Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1989).
84. For an overview of various schemes of legal classification, see 5 Roscoe Pound,
Jurisprudence 5-75 (1959).
85. Holmes called Langdell a "legal theologian." Book Review, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1880)
(reviewing Langdell, supra note 76). This review is unsigned, but Holmes is understood to be the
author. See Mark D. Howe, Introduction to Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law at xxii n.9
(Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881). Some of Langdell's students saw him as anything but a
theologian. See Franklin G. Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law School, 33 Harv. L. Rev.
493 (1920).
86. See Howe, supra note 85, at xiv; Wells, supra note 79, at 332.
87. This is most obviously true in work predating appeals to the social sciences. See James E.
Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: A History 1-116 (1990).
According to G. Edward White, the social science-based movements include: (1) the sociological
jurisprudence movement, (2) the legal realist movement, (3) the law, science, and policy movement,
(4) the legal process movement, and (5) the law and society movement. See G. Edward White, From
Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819 (1986); G.
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 Va. L. Rev. 279 (1973); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999 (1972).
These later movements embraced classification as well. See 5 Pound, supra note 84, at 21
(considering sociological jurisprudence movement); Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal
Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process 31 (1968) (considering legal realist
movement); Twining, supra note 74, at 26-40 (considering legal realist movement); Harold D.
Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public hIterest, 52 Yale L.J. 203, 243-89 (1943) (considering law, science, and policy movement);
Robert B. Yegge, President's Message: Law and Sociology, 4 L. & Soc'y Rev. 327-28 (1970)
(considering law and society movement); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process
141-60 (tentative ed. 1958) (considering legal process movement).
88. See Twining, supra note 74, at 12; Wells, supra note 79, at 332; Gary J. Aichele, Legal
Realism and Twentieth Century American Jurisprudence: The Changing Consensus 24 (1983)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia).
European thought may have influenced Langdell's thinking. See John H. Merryman, The Civil
Law Tradition 62, 66-67 (2d ed. 1985).
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error."89 Indeed, the stance taken in the third quotation, which
specifically distinguishes law from mathematics and the natural sciences,
may represent a realization that the nature of legal classification is subtle,
complex, and unique to law.
On the other hand, Langdell's views illustrate one of the potential
pitfalls in doing interdisciplinary work. In particular, to the extent that
his comments represent not merely an attempt to bring law within the
intellectual mainstream but a genuine adoption of what would be
described colloquially as the "scientific model,"9 they ind.icate a skewed
attitude that is typical of much recent intellectual history.9
IV. LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS IN
MATHEMATICS: A CASE STUDY
Traditional epistemology, with its belief in the existence of
transcendent, objective truth, has been replaced in the twentieth
century by a "new epistemology, " which rejects a belief in
objective truth and the claims of certainty that traditionally follow.
The new epistemology describes a broad shift in the theory of
knowledge; it has permeated such.., fields as mathematics.
Joan Williams'
Platonism dies very hard-and nowhere harder than among
mathematicians... Perhaps mathematics is actually in this sense
the least "modern " of modern endeavors.
Harry Grant93
89. See supra text accompanying note 59.
90. For an overview of possible such approaches to law, see Funk, supra note 16.
91. For a discussion of the geometry-based models of disciplines that were prevalent throughout
much of the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries, see Morris Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture
322-39 (1953). For a discussion of the natural science-based models that are typical of the period
since the early 19th century, see Tom Sorell, Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science
1-23 (1991). This shift in models tracks the larger intellectual shift from rationalism toward
empiricism. See Edward M. Bums, Western Civilizations: Their History and Their Culture 445-61,
637-49 (3d ed. 1949).
Langdell also has been criticized for focusing on law as a science to the ex .-lusion of law as a
technology. See Carrington, supra note 79.
92. Williams, supra note 12, at 430-31.
93. Harry Grant, What Is Modern About "Modern" Mathematics?, Mathematical Intelligencer,
Summer 1995, at 62, 65.
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A. Introduction
The problems with invocations of the current mathematical crisis stem
from a lack of attention to the intellectual history of the crisis.
Accordingly, section B provides this history. Using this history, section
B then presents a detailed discussion of the current crisis and the relevant
mathematics. Using this discussion, section B closes with an analysis of
the first of the three types of problems mentioned in the Introduction to
this Article--the accuracy of descriptions appearing in the legal
literature. Section B accomplishes one other task by emphasizing one
aspect of the interaction of the disciplinary and mathematical pieces of
this Article. In particular, it illustrates what is involved in overcoming
the first difficulty in doing meaningful legal interdisciplinary research:
gaining a sufficient understanding of what is often a foreign discipline.
Section C also accomplishes two tasks. First, it considers the other two
problems mentioned in the Introduction: the facile application of the
mathematics to law, and the use of the current crisis as support for a
general intellectual skepticism. Second, it develops the other aspects of
the interaction of the mathematical and disciplinary pieces of this Article.
In particular, section C uses the disciplinary framework to see how the
crisis initially made its way into the legal literature, and it illustrates the
second difficulty in doing meaningful interdisciplinary legal research:
employing another discipline in a manner that reflects both its relevance
to, and separateness from, law.
B. The Current Foundational Crisis in Mathematics
1. Preliminary Comments
Section B is the most difficult segment of the Article as it contains
almost all of the technical material. This subsection presents a synopsis.
It will not hurt to have the basic story repeated more than once. To
further facilitate understanding, the remaining subsections of section B
have been organized so that the text contains a discussion for the
educated lay reader, while the footnotes contain numerous references and
some technical details.
The mathematics is important for developing the disciplinary points of
the Article. Section B illustrates what is entailed in overcoming the first
hurdle in doing meaningful interdisciplinary work-namely, gaining an
understanding of what is often a foreign discipline. Such an
understanding also helps address the second hurdle because a detailed
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study of a part of another discipline often reveals that discipline's
relevance and separateness.
After studying section B, the reader should understand that the current
foundational crisis in mathematics is just the most recent in a sequence of
three such crises.94 These crises have framed the evolution of
mathematics for some 2500 years.95 The sequence of mathematical crises
can be described in a variety of ways. Section B provides a narration that
both reflects traditional discussions and is well suited for the purposes of
examining the foundational crises and their treatment by legal scholars.
More specifically, the crises are discussed in terms of three basic issues:
the (apparent) certainty of mathematics as a science; the (apparent)
soundness of mathematics as a technology; and the mystery of the
infinite.96 These issues are traditional starting points for the philosophy
of mathematics, 97 and the first two have made mathematics a central part
of the Western intellectual tradition." In telling the story, certain
shortcuts are unavoidable given that events span 2500 years.
The reader also should understand that these mathematical crises are
not isolated events but parts of much larger intellectual currents. The first
crisis was part of the maturation of Greek culture that took place in the
sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries before the common era. The second
crisis was part of the appearance of the Enlightenment, and the third
crisis is part of the comprehensive reevaluation of the Western
intellectual tradition described at the end of part II.
Moreover, the reader should understand that the evolution of
mathematics was shaped, not retarded, by these crises. Subsection 2
describes the first crisis. The Greeks were the first to undertake a
94. At this point, some readers may begin to wonder whether Thomas Kuhn's concept of
paradigm shift is applicable to mathematics. The debate rages! For a number of articles on the issue,
see Revolutions in Mathematics (Donald Gillies ed., 1992).
95. Some commentators assert that the use of the word "crisis" is misleading, if not inaccurate.
See Salomon Bochner, The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science 138-42 (1966).
96. Some readers may wonder why the third question is not, "What is the nature of mathematics
as an art?" As explained immediately below, the choice here is to reflect traditional discussions, and
traditional presentations do not describe the crises in artistic terms. From time to time, however, the
rudiments of such a treatment are indicated. See infra notes 113, 200; text accompanying notes 182-
83.
97. See Stephan Kdmer, The Philosophy of Mathematics 9-12 (1960). 'he philosophy of
mathematicsper se is discussed no more than is necessary for the purposes ofthis Article.
98. See Mary Tiles, Mathematics and the Image of Reason 1-6 (1991); Judith V. Grabiner, The
Centrality of Mathematics in the History of Western Thought, 61 Mathematics Mag. 221 (1988);
Philip Kitcher & William Aspray, An Opinionated Introduction, in History and Philosophy of
Modern Mathematics 3, 17 (William Aspray & Philip Kitcher eds., 1988).
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sustained investigation of mathematics, yet these very investigations
created a number of perplexing questions concerning the three basic
issues listed above. In trying to grapple with these questions, the Greeks
were led to a number of innovations, including the introduction of
axiomatics, the development of various techniques for dealing with the
infinite, and the formulation of some fundamental philosophical
positions. Subsection 3 describes the second crisis. During the post-
Renaissance development of the calculus, mathematicians encountered
many of the same questions faced by the Greeks. Once again the result
was a number of important developments, including a more robust
attitude towards the infinite and the further elaboration of philosophical
positions. Subsection 4 introduces the current crisis in *which the same
questions appeared yet again in the context of non-Euclidean geometry
and set theory. For the purposes of this Article, the most important
development to emerge from this crisis was the attempt to deal with the
basic issues in terms of well-delineated philosophies of mathematics.
Although such philosophies had the advantage of focusing discussion in
a way not theretofore possible, their diversity led to an internal turmoil
that actually threatened to tear the discipline apart. David Hilbert stepped
into this maelstrom and attempted to unite the then-contending
philosophic schools through the so-called Hilbert Program. This Program
involves a careful balancing of the various positions. Unfortunately,
Gdel's Theorems deal it a serious, if not fatal, blow. In essence, they
turn Hilbert's balancing against itself. The reader must understand that
this balancing is at the core of G del's Theorems. Indeed, the theorems
as stated are of limited scope and application. Moreover, attention to
their intellectual history is crucial for a full understanding of their
content, context, and relevance.
The stories of non-Euclidean geometry, Hilbert, and Gbdel comprise
the most difficult mathematical topics, and they are segregated into
subsection 5. That subsection also contains the analysis of the accuracy
of the invocations of the current crisis appearing in the legal literature.
St~bsection 6 has some final comments.
2. The First Crisis
The story begins with the Greeks. Earlier cultures had considered the
practical (i.e. technological) component of mathematics, but the
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consideration of mathematics as a science was largely a Greek
development.99 Carl Boyer describes it as follows:
[T]here is an obvious change in spirit in both science and
mathematics, as these developed in Greece. The human mind was
"discovered" as something different from the surrounding body of
nature and capable of discerning similarities in a multiplicity of
events, of abstracting these from their settings, generalizing them,
and deducing therefrom other relationships consistent with further
experience.'
Such a capability, however, creates the possibility of what Raymond
Wilder has called the "curious duality" of the world of mathematics and
the world of the senses.' This duality raises questions about the
relationship of mathematics as a science to mathematics as a technology.
Why, for example, would preeminently rational activities such as
abstraction and deduction yield information about the world of
immediate sense impressions?0 2
The Pythagoreans attempted to skirt this duality through an enigmatic
atomistic philosophy asserting that whole numbers (1, 2, 3, ... ) make up
the essence of being. Such a position might sound bizarre today, but it
was not so strange in an era in which philosophical speculations focused
on the nature, rather than the likeness of things, and in which
mathematics was perceived to be the basis of areas as diverse as trade
and music. 3 Two mathematical events, however, raised doubts about
such an approach.
First, the Pythagoreans themselves made the unsettling discovery that
whole numbers are inadequate to compare the diagonal of a unit square
with its sides. In modem terms, there is no rational number whose square
is two."' Indeed, the traditional story is that the Pythagoreans pledged
not to divulge this discovery, and the person who broke: his word was
murdered for his indiscretion.'
99. Carl B. Boyer, The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development 14-16 (1949).
100. Id. at 16.
101. See Raymond L. Wilder, Evolution of Mathematical Concepts 152-53 (1968).
102. See Margaret E. Baron, The Origins of the Infinitesimal Calculus 18 (1969).
103. For a discussion of the complex Pythagorean position, see Edward Maziarz & Thomas A.
Greenwood, Greek Mathematical Philosophy 10-23 (1968).
104. See Carl B. Boyer, A History of Mathematics 79 (1968). There is sorre doubt whether the
argument provided supra note 31 was the argument employed by the Pythagoreans themselves. For a
suggestion about the original argument, see Boyer, supra, at 80-81.
105. See Eli Maor, To Infinity and Beyond: A Cultural History of the Infinite ,16 (1987).
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At roughly the same time, the famous Zeno Paradoxes indicated other
difficulties with mathematical atomism. As a fundamental matter, the
Paradoxes were part of an overarching debate among certain pre-Socratic
philosophers about the fundamental nature of reality.10 6 In particular, the
Paradoxes supported the Parmenidian tenet of permanence by attacking
the opposing Heraclitian doctrine of change. The most well-known of the
Paradoxes were specifically aimed at exposing the illusory nature of
motion through reductios based on assumptions about the finite or
infinite divisibility of space and time.'07 In trying to separate the sensible
change from the rational permanence, however, these motion-based
Paradoxes also represented a general attack on the Pythagorean
metaphysics.'03
Both of these events raised serious issues about the infinite.' 9 The
discovery of the irrationals forced an awareness of the limitations of a
purely finite approach to describing magnitudes, and the Paradoxes
indicated the subtle difficulties that could result by too quickly
introducing notions of the infinite."0
The resulting intellectual shock is called the first foundational crisis in
mathematics."' Three developments emerged from this crisis.
First, the Greeks introduced the axiomatic method to mathematics."'
They hoped that axiomatization would provide a secure foundation and
106. For a brief introduction to the pre-Socratic debates, see Lavine, supra note 26, at 24-25.
107. For the purposes of this Article, perhaps the best discussion of this point is contained in
Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 34-37. At that time, there were two theories of motion. One,
based on the notion that time and space were infinitely divisible, described motion as continuous and
smooth. The other, based on the notion that time and space were made up of indivisible units,
described motion as a collection of small jerks. Zeno's Paradoxes attacked each of these theories
through a reductio. The "Dichotomy" was one of the Paradoxes aimed at the first theory: to travel
from A to B one had to reach the midpoint M between A and B, but to reach M one had to reach the
midpoint M' between A and M, and so forth, so that the very beginning of motion was impossible.
The "Arrow" was one of the Paradoxes aimed at the second theory: an arrow in flight is really at a
standstill because at each of the indivisible instants of time it occupies a definite position in space.
Zeno's extensive use of the reductio technique led Aristotle to credit him as the creator of the
dialectic method. See 1 Thomas Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics 273 (1921).
108. See Maziarz & Greenwood, supra note 103, at 63-64. But see 1 Heath, supra note 107, at
271-83 (asserting that Paradoxes had nothing to do with Pythagorean mathematical metaphysics).
109. See 2 Kramer, supra note 29, at 298.
110. Id. There is some controversy about the exact mathematical significance of the paradoxes.
See Baron, supra note 102, at 22-25 (describing assertion by some that paradoxes had no
mathematical significance).
I 1. See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 13; Wilder, supra note 101, at 109.
112. See Wilder, supra note 101, at 97-98. For a description of the Greek axiomatic approach, see
infra text accompanying note 186.
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make it easier to produce new results." 3 Algebra/arithmetic was
described largely in geometric terms," 4 and geometry was constituted as
a collection of propositions derived from specified assumptions and
definitions. The resulting system included techniques that apparently
avoided the most immediately troublesome of the mathematical
difficulties associated with irrationals and the paradoxes."';
Second, Greek mathematicians developed a bifurcated procedure for
working with the infinite. Results had to be established with geometric
techniques that used only so-called potential infinity, but the Greeks
were willing to use so-called actual infinity as an investigatory
heuristic."6 One mathematical commentator describes the difference
between potential and actual infinity as follows:
The former involves a process that can be repeated again and again
without end, but which, at any given stage, still encompasses only a
finite number of repetitions .... The actual infinite, on the other
hand, involves a process which has already acquired... an infinite
number of repetitions."'
Another describes it as follows:
113. See Stephen F. Barker, Philosophy of Mathematics 24-25 (1964); Richard J. Trudeau, The
Non-Euclidean Revolution 2-4 (1987). Some commentators see aesthetics at work here as well. See
Barker, supra, at 25.
114. See Boyer, supra note 104, at 84--85.
115. Seeid.at98-102.
116. See Baron, supra note 102, at 46. For a discussion of how Zeno's paradoxes led to the
exaltation of potential over actual infinity, see Mary Tiles, The Philosophy of Set Theory: An
Introduction to Cantor's Paradise 12-21 (1989).
117. Maor, supra note 105, at 54-55.
For a rough understanding of the bifurcation referred to in the text, consider the problem of finding
the area A of a plane region R. The typical application of the actual infinite heuristic begins with an
appropriately chosen region R' of known area A. The regions R and R' are each divided into an
infinite number of pieces. The R pieces are put in a one-to-one correspondence with the R' pieces in
such a way that when R and R' are compared piece by piece it is evident that the total areas of R and
R' differ by a multiplicative factor of c. That is, it is evident that A = cA'. Since this comparison
process consists of comparing all of the pieces, it involves the actual infinite. Once the number c is
thus obtained, the usual potential infinite approach consists of showing that the inequalities A < cA'
and A > cA' are impossible. For example, suppose that A < cA, say cA' - A = e. A contradiction
would be obtained by inscribing inside R a finite number of non-overlapping regions of known
characteristics whose total area is larger than cA' - e. This is a contradiction because there would be
inscribed in R a collection of non-overlapping regions whose total area is greater than cA' - e = A, the
area of R. The actual number of regions would depend, inter alia, on the purported difference
e = cA'- A, but would in every case be finite. Thus, this process involves only :he potential infinite.
A similar argument would be used to show that A > cA' is impossible. For a specific example, see
Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 110-14. See also Baron, supra note 102, at 34-50.
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[The Greeks] were prepared to accept that, given any number,
however large, there would always be a larger number, and that
given any line, however long, it could always be extended further.
They were not prepared to accept the concept of an infinite
collection of numbers nor that of a line of infinite magnitude, that
is, whilst the concept of something being "potentially" infinite was
acceptable to them, they carefully avoided ... objects that were
"actually" infinite."'
The hesitant attitude towards the infinite and the lack of a mature and
separate algebra/arithmetic had a number of specific consequences. The
development of analysis/calculus, for example, was postponed for 2000
years."'9 In addition, mathematics started down the path to non-Euclidean
geometry. This part of the story is described in more detail in subsection
5.a. below. For now, the reader should understand that the starting point
was parallelism. On the one hand, assertions about parallelism would be
suspect to the extent that they did not involve finite figures or finite parts
of figures; that is, such statements were problematic to the extent that
they conceived of a straight line as an infinite whole. On the other hand,
many results seemed to require some assumptions about parallelism.
Euclid's solution was to develop a framework that arguably dealt only
with potentially infinite figures. The cornerstone was his famous Fifth
Postulate. Even this framework caused immediate concern, and
mathematicians attempted to rework it. Efforts focused on replacing the
Fifth Postulate with something less objectionable or to derive it from the
remaining assumptions. None of these efforts were successful. Instead,
mathematicians were led to non-Euclidean geometry.
The third development to emerge from the first crisis was an
embracing of the mathematical dualism described above.2 Dualism,
however, raises two concrete issues: the certainty of mathematics as a
science and the soundness of mathematics as a technology. Greek
thought offered a variety of perspectives on these issues. For Plato,'
mathematics inhabited a world independent of perception, yet having a
118. See Graham Flegg, Numbers: Their History and Meaning 256 (1983).
119. See Boyer, supra note 99, at 59-60; Maor, supra note 105, at 3.
This episode suggests a synthesis of the objective and subjective in mathematics-namely, one can
accept the subjective forces that shaped the boundaries of Greek mathematics while simultaneously
appreciating the objectivity of its contents. For a general discussion of the forces that shape
mathematical evolution, see Wilder, supra note 101.
120. See Wilder, supra note 101, at 152-53.
121. For an introduction to Plato's mathematical views, see K6mer, supra note 97, at 14-18.
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real and eternal existence. The certainty of mathematics as a science
rested on truth apprehended by carefully enunciated reason. Thp
soundness of mathematics as a technology rested on a certain type of
approximation of the mathematical by the sensible. z Mathematical
objects had no such existence for Aristotle; 23 they represented mental
idealizations of the sensible world. As with Plato, the soundness of
mathematics as a technology rested on some kind of approximation, but
the certainty of mathematics rested on a rigorous notion of logical
necessity."' Euclid's Elements could be read with either a Platonic or
Aristotelian gloss.
25
This mathematical crisis did not exist in a vacuum. Western thought
itself was undergoing a profound reformulation with the maturation of
Greek culture that took place in the sixth, fifth, and fburth centuries
before the common era. 26 The emergence of, and reaction to, the first
foundational crisis was an integral part of this larger intellectual
current.
27
3. The Second Crisis
By the early 17th century, the mathematical obstacles to the
development of analysis/calculus had been removed. A more mature and
separate algebra/arithmetic appeared,'28 and the amalgamation of algebra
and geometry into analytic geometry allowed mathematicians to attack a
problem with both the symbolic, rote calculation approach of algebra and
122. There is some dispute as to whether the world of mathematics was part of Plato's world of
forms, or intermediate to it and the world of immediate sense impressions. Compare id. at 15 with
Maziarz & Greenwood, supra note 103, at 135.
123. For a brief introduction to Aristotle's views, see K6mer, supra note 97, at 18-21.
124. There is some question about how much the mathematical Aristotle in :act differed from the
mathematical Plato. See id. at 18-19; Francois Lasserre, The Birth of Mathematics in the Age of
Plato 32 (1966).
125. See Maziarz & Greenwood, supra note 103, at 229-30. There are marty editions of Euclid.
One of the more popular is by Thomas Heath.
126. See Bums, supra note 102, at 103, 121-31.
127. For an overview of the intellectual context of Greek mathematcs, see Maziarz &
Greenwood, supra note 103. See also Israel Kleiner, Rigor and Proof in Mathematics, 64
Mathematics Mag. 291,293 (1991) (describing emergence of axiomatic method in larger context).
128. This development was due in large part to Arab and Indian mathematicians. For an overview
of their contributions, see Boyer, supra note 104, at 229-69.
This algebra/arithmetic did not, however, take the axiomatic form of geometry. It was presented as
a collection of techniques of calculation. Axiomatization came much later. See Barker, supra note
113, at 56-57.
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the visual, intuitive approach of geometry.'29 Moreover, mathematicians
began to shed the hesitancy that characterized the Greek attitude towards
infinitary techniques.130 There is little wonder that the last half of the
17th century saw the development of the calculus.'
In the early 18th century, however, it became clear that there were
considerable problems with the calculus as a science despite its
astounding success as a technology. Greek rigor, as exemplified by the
axiomatic method, had not been carefully pursued. 32 A number of
conceptual questions arose that, as Boyer notes, were "in the last analysis
equivalent to those that Zeno had raised well over two thousand years
previously and were based on questions of infinity and continuity."' 33
The reappearance of these neo-Zenonic questions should not be
surprising given that much of the early calculus concerned the study of
motion. 34 Many mathematicians used technological success to deal with
129. For a brief look at analytic geometry, see Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 302-24.
The key, of course, is the use of a coordinate system to represent geometric points in terms of
numbers. In this way, geometric figures can be expressed in terms of numerical conditions satisfied
by the coordinates of their constituent points. Such a representation, for example, yields the
equations for lines, parabolas, ellipses, and circles.
130. See Boyer, supra note 99, at 186. For discussions of the infinitary techniques in the century
preceding the work of Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, see Baron, supra note 102, at 90-149;
Boyer, supra note 99, at 96-186.
131. See Boyer. supra note 99, at 187-88. For discussions of the evolution of the calculus, see
Boyer's work as well as Baron, supra note 102; Charles H. Edwards, Jr., The Historical
Development ofthe Calculus (1979).
132. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 383-89.
133. Boyer, supra note 99, at 267. See also Tobias Dantzig, Number: The Language ofScience
133-34 (1954); Dirk J. Struik, A Concise History ofMathematics 150 (3d rev. ed. 1967).
134. Suppose that a particle moves along in a straight line on which a coordinate system already
has been introduced. The instantaneous velocity of a particle is identified with the derivative of the
function representing its position in terms of time. Consider then George Berkeley's assertion that
Newton's approach to differentiation was flatly inconsistent. Suppose Newton wished to find the
velocity of a particle whose coordinate at time x is given by the function f where f(x) = x*x. In
essence, Newton's technique consisted of finding the derivative offat x in two steps. First, Newton
considered (fix+h)-.f(x))Ih, the average velocity over the time interval from x to x+h. He simplified
this expression by expanding (x+h)*(x+h) to x*x + 2*x*h + h*h, subtracting x'x, and dividing by h
to obtain the expression 2*x + h for the average velocity. In the second step, Newton treated h as an
"evanescent quantity" to obtain the value 2*x for the instantaneous velocity at time x. Berkeley
pointed out that the first step assumes that h is a non-zero quantity while the second step seems to
assume that it is zero. See Boyer, supra note 99, at 225-27. In Berkeley's criticism, one sees the
ghosts of Zeno's old problems with the nature of the divisibility of time. Given Berkeley's critique,
the reader may wonder how mathematicians were able to avoid widespread inconsistencies in their
results. For a discussion of this point, see Judith V. Grabiner, The Origins of Cauchy's Rigorous
Calculus 22 (1981).
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or even ignore these questions,"3' but there was increasing concern about
the foundations of the calculus. 36 Indeed, in 1784 the Berlin Academy
proposed the question of the foundations of the calculus as one of its
celebrated mathematical prize problems.
37
The resulting intellectual shock has been called the second
foundational crisis. 38 Three developments emerged from this crisis.
First, mathematicians began to pay more attention to mathematical
rigor. In particular, the early 19th century development of the limit
concept dealt with the most immediately troublesome o1' the difficulties
associated with the neo-Zenonic criticisms. 139  In this sense, the
introduction of limits was analogous to the techniques the Greeks
introduced to overcome the most immediately troublesome of the
mathematical difficulties associated with irrationals and the paradoxes. 4 '
Second, some mathematicians relaxed the strict bifurcated approach to
infinity. Nineteenth century mathematicians viewed the limit concept as
involving potential as opposed to actual infinity. 4' Nonetheless, a
number of mathematicians openly had embraced the use of actual infinity
before the limit concept was formulated. 42
For general discussions of problems with the foundations of the calculus, see Boyer, supra note
99, at 224-67; H.J.M. Bos, Newton, Leibniz, and the Leibnizian Tradition, in From the Calculus to
Set Theory 1630-1910: An Introductory History 49, 86-89 (1. Grattan-Guinness ed., 1980).
135. See Grabiner, supra note 134, at 16-17: Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 618,
136. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 947. For a discussion of early non-technological
approaches, see Grabiner, supra note 134, at 31-37.
137. See Grabiner, supra note 134, at 40-43.
138. See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 13; see also Howard Eves & Crroll V. Newsom, An
Introduction to the Foundations and Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics 296 (rev. ed. 1965);
Wilder, supra note 101, at 109.
139. With respect to Berkeley's criticism of differentiation, the limit concept made it clear that the
second step in the differentiation described supra note 134 did not treat h as zero. For a thorough
discussion of the development of the limit concept, see Grabiner, supra note 134.
140. See Struik, supra note 133, at i49. Indeed, the limit concept itself cart be traced to some of
these earlier techniques. See Boyer, supra note 99, at 271.
141. See Boyer, supra note 99, at 267, 274-75 (describing views of Augustin-Louis Cauchy);
Ettore Carruccio, Mathematics and Logic in History and Contemporary Thought 238 (1964) (same);
Joseph W. Dauben, Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite 96-97 (1979)
(describing views of Cantor); Maor, supra note 105, at 55 (describing views of Carl Friedrich
Gauss).
Philosopher Alexander George has asserted that from a modem perspectve, the limit concept
cannot be said to choose between potential and actual infinity. Telephone Interview with Alexander
George, Professor of Philosophy, Amherst College (1994).
142. See Boyer, supra note 99, at 239-42. Such an attitude was presaged by certain late medieval
philosophers. See Boyer, supra note 104, at 292-93.
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Third, dualist stances were further elaborated. In particular, Gottfried
Leibniz and Immanuel Kant advanced important new positions. Leibniz
disagreed with both Platonic and Aristotelian views and held that
mathematics as a science had nothing to do with eternal objects,
idealized objects, or objects of any kind.'43 The certainty of mathematics
was due to the tautological nature of mathematical propositions
themselves. This, however, opened a huge gap between mathematics as a
science and mathematics as a technology. Leibniz filled this gap with a
problematic theological approach.'" For Kant, on the other hand, the
certainty of mathematics as a science did not involve tautologies but the
structure of space and time as revealed in terms of an a priori intuition.'45
Kant's view would explain the soundness of mathematics as a
technology insofar as it deals with this structure. Both Leibniz and Kant
reflected the bolder mathematical attitudes towards infinity. Aristotle had
asserted that instances of actual infinity did not exist in the world of
sense impressions; indeed, it was logically impossible that they would
exist. "'46 Kant agreed with the first assertion but not the second. For Kant,
actual infinity was a so-called Idea of Reason-an internally consistent
concept not applicable to sense experience. 4 7 The views of Leibniz were
not always consistent, but at times he seemed to go even further than
Kant, making a distinction between actual infinity, which could indeed
be said to exist in nature, and the ability to conceptualize and work with
this infinity, which belonged only to God. 4 ' Then existing mathematics
could be viewed from Platonic, Aristotelian, Leibnizian, or Kantian
positions.
Once again, this crisis did not exist in a vacuum. Western thought was
undergoing a profound reformulation with the appearance of the
Enlightenment. 49 The development of the calculus and the emergence of,
143. For general discussions of the views of Leibniz, see 4 Copleston, supra note 45, at 273-94;
Komer, supra note 97, at 21-25.
144. Stephan K6mer gives an indication of Leibniz's position as follows:
According to [Leibniz] "1 + 1 = 2" (as a statement of pure mathematics) is true on the basis of
the law of contradiction, and thus in all possible worlds; whereas "1 apple and I apple make 2
apples" (as a statement of physics) is true in this world which God was bound to create ... if it
was to be the best of all possible worlds.
Kdmer, supra note 97, at 24.
145. For general discussions of the views of Kant, see 6 Copleston, supra note 45, at 235-76;
K5mer, supra note 97, at 25-31.
146. See K6rmer, supra note 97, at 30.
147. Seeid. at 29-31.
148. See Dauben, supra note 141, at 123-24.
149. See Bums, supra note 91, at 445-46.
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and reaction to, the second foundational crisis was an integral part of this
larger intellectual context. 5 '
4. The Current Crisis
Euclid's Fifth Postulate had remained a problem.'5 ' For 2000 years,
mathematicians had attempted either to replace it with something less
objectionable or to derive it from the remaining assumptions. All such
efforts had ended in failure. In the 18th century, a reductio approach was
tried that in essence consisted of replacing the Fifth Postulate with its
negation in hopes of deriving a contradiction. This approach did not
work, but mathematicians were led to a number of counter-intuitive
results that were interpreted as some sort of confirmatian of the Fifth
Postulate. It remained for the mathematicians of the first half of the 19th
century to make the leap to the conclusion that these results in fact
indicated the existence of non-Euclidean geometry.
Yet the jump to non-Euclidean geometry raised se:.ious questions
about the certainty of mathematics as a science and the soundness of
mathematics as a technology. With respect to certainty, mathematicians
were able to show that non-Euclidean geometry is no less consistent than
Euclidean geometry; that is, if Euclidean geometry has no contradictions,
then neither does non-Euclidean geometry. But in what scientific sense
can these geometries stand side by side? And what do they say about the
soundness of mathematics as a technology?
Meanwhile, work in analysis led to still more problems. The limit
concept answered most of the immediate concerns that had been raised
by criticisms of the calculus, but this was not the end of the story.
Mathematicians had chosen to rest the limit concept on an arithmetic as
opposed to a geometric basis, perhaps due in part to the uncertainties
created by non-Euclidean geometry.'52 It became clear that this basis
required a careful elaboration of the real number system.'53 Every
approach developed in the latter part of the 19th century, however,
150. See id. at 445-56; Grabiner, supra note 134, at 26; Kline, supra note 91, at 234-86.
151. The discussion in this and the preceding paragraph is developed nore fully infra part
IV.B.5.a.
152. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 947-49. For other reasons, see id.; Tiles, supra
note 116, at 68-84.This arithmetic basis was part of the larger so-called "arithmetization of
analysis." See Boyer, supra note 104, at 598-619.
153. See Boyer, supra note 104, at 606.
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required the explicit use of infinite sets.'54 In addition, other work in
analysis naturally focused on various sets of numbers, many of which
were infinite. 55 Thus many mathematicians, most notably Georg Cantor,
were led to conceptualize and work with the actual infinite, and they felt
that this could be done in such a way so as to deal once and for all with
Zeno-type Paradoxes.'56 Unfortunately, the introduction generated more
paradoxes. 57
Language barriers may have prevented a full discussion of the issues
raised by non-Euclidean geometry until the late 19th century, at which
time the discussion was folded into discussions of the set-theoretic
paradoxes.s The resulting turmoil is the current or third foundational
crisis. 5 9 Three developments have emerged from this crisis.
First, mathematicians of the early 20th century attempted to deal with
the lack of any focused philosophy of mathematics. 6 Most important for
the purposes of this Article are the three competing approaches that
appeared around the turn of the century and that still shape the contours
of the philosophic discussion: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism.
154. In fact, such approaches involved infinite sets of natural numbers. See Davis & Hersh, supra
note 34, at 331.
155. See Dauben, supra note 141, at 6-46.
156. See 2 Kramer, supra note 29, at 319.
157. See id. One of the easiest to understand is the Cantor Paradox that is described by Howard
Eves and Carroll Newsom in non-technical terms as follows:
In his theory of sets, Cantor had succeeded in proving that for any given [infinite] number there
is always a greater [infinite] number, so that just as there is no greatest natural number, there
also is no greatest [infinite] number. Now consider the set whose members are all possible sets.
Surely no set can have more members than this set of all sets. But if this is the case, how can
there be a[n] [infinite] number greater than the [infinite] number of this set?
Eves & Newsom, supra note 138, at 296-97.
It soon became clear that the Cantor Paradox is only one of a larger collection of troublesome
"self-referential" paradoxes, some of which were known to antiquity. See Fraenkel et al., supra note
3, at 5-12; see also Evert W. Beth, The Foundations of Mathematics 481-94 (1959). Some scholars
note that not all of these paradoxes are intrinsically related to problems concerning infinity. See G.
Kreisel, Two Notes on the Foundations of Set-Theory, 23 Dialectica 93, 102 n.1 (1969).
158. See Hans Freudenthal, The Main Trends in the Foundations of Geometry in the 19th
Century, in Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy
of Science 613, 616 (Ernest Nagel et al. eds., 1962).
159. See Beth, supra note 157, at 640-41. Some commentators restrict the current crisis to the set-
theoretic paradoxes. See Eves & Newsom, supra note 138, at 296; Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at
14.
160. See Michael Dummett, Elements ofintuitionism I (1977); Wilder, supra note 101, at 192.
Washington Law Review
The Logicist school believes that the correct philosophical tack lies in
viewing mathematics as a part of logic. 161 Their program involves a
reduction of all mathematical concepts, including the actual infinite, to
purely logical notions in such a way that mathematical "truths" can be
developed within logic without the appearance of paradoxes. This
approach represents the confluence of two developments.'62 One
development involved a reductive approach to mathematical concepts. In
broad outline, this reduction began with the amalgamation of algebra and
geometry to form analytic geometry, continued with the arithmetization
of the limit concept, and reached fruition with descriptions of real
numbers in terms of sets of natural numbers. The second development
involved the search for a symbolic notation for the laws of logic.'63 Such
a notation had been contemplated as early as Leibniz, but the first
substantial success was obtained by George Boole in the middle of the
19th century. The link between these two developments was Gottlob
Frege, who attempted to take reductionism one step further and analyze
the notion of natural number in terms of more primitive logical notions
and to develop a notation for a system that was far more detailed and
general than Boole's relatively primitive system. Although Bertrand
Russell discovered serious flaws in Frege's efforts,"6 his work had a
161. For expositions of the Logicist position, see K6mer, supra note 97, at 32-51; Rudolph
Carnap, The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics, in Philosophy of Mathematics 41 (Paul
Benacerraf& Hilary Putnam eds., 2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter Benacerraf& Putnam].
162. See Leon A. Henkin, Are Logic and Mathematics Identical?, in The Chauvenet Papers: A
Collection of Prize-Winning Expository Papers in Mathematics 353, 354-55 (James C. Abbott ed.,
1978).
163. For a general discussion of this development, see William Kneale &. Martha Kneale, The
Development of Logic 404-34 (1962).
164. See Letter from Bertrand Russell to Gottlob Frege (June 16, 1902), in From Frege to Gadel:
A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, at 124 (Jean van Heijenoort ed., 1967)
[hereinafter van Heijenoort] (describing so-called Russell Paradox). The reader should consider
carefully Frege's response to Russell. See Letter from Gottlob Frege to Bertrand Russell (June 22,
1902), in van Heijenoort, supra, at 126. In Russell's words:
As I think about acts of integrity and grace, I realise that there is nothing in my knowledge to
compare with Frege's dedication to truth. His entire life's work was on the verge of completion,
much of his work had been ignored to the benefit of men infinitely less capable, his second
volume was about to be published, and upon finding that his fundamental assumption was in
error, he responded with intellectual pleasure clearly submerging any feelings of personal
disappointment. It was almost superhuman and a telling indication of thai of which men are
capable if their dedication is to creative work and knowledge instead of cruder efforts to
dominate and be known.
Letter from Bertrand Russell to Jean van Heijenoort (Nov. 23, 1962), in van Heijenoort, supra, at
127.
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substantial influence on the great early Logicist effort-Alfred North
Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica.
165
There are a number of problems with the Logicist approach. 16 6 Even if
the program can be carried out, it merely substitutes logical for
mathematical questions, a fact illustrated by philosophical divisions
within the Logicist camp itself.67 The issue of mathematics as a science,
for example, is dependent on a particular Logicist account of logic. A
Logicist account of mathematics as a technology must somehow explain
the relation between the empirical and the logical. Furthermore, Logicists
always have had trouble explaining how their machinery for dealing with
actual infinity is logical in nature at all. On the other hand, their early
work did suggest the possibility of introducing the actual infinite in such
a way as seemingly to avoid paradoxes.
6 1
The Intuitionists trace their roots to Kant and believe that the correct
approach is based on a mental faculty of intuition that is more basic than
any logical, or even linguistic, ability.169 According to this school,
mathematics involves mental construction rather than the discovery of
"truths." As Arend Heyting puts it, "[T]he intuitionist mathematician
proposes to do mathematics as a natural function of his intellect, as a
free, vital activity of thought. For him, mathematics is a production of
the mind."'170 Stephan Krner, however, reminds us that "[t]he subject-
matter of intuitionist mathematics ... is intuited non-perceptual objects
and constructions which are introspectively self-evident."' 7' It is
important to understand what the attitude described by Krrner entails.
Stephen Kleene explains the essential implication for the purposes of this
Article as follows:
The familiar mathematics ... as developed prior to [the
Intuitionist] critique or disregarding it, we call classical; the mathe-
165. Alfred N. Whitehead & Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica (1st ed. 1910).
166. See K mer, supra note 97, at 52-71; see also Camap, supra note 161.
167. See Beth, supra note 157, at 363-64; Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 335; K6mer, supra note
97, at 34-38; Penelope Maddy, Realism in Mathematics 26-27 (1990).
168. In essence, one asserts that the universe of sets occurs in levels. A set at one level only has
members from previous levels. Thus, Cantor's Paradox seemingly is avoided by precluding the set of
all sets. For an intuitive description, see Herbert B. Enderton, Elements of Set Theory 7-9 (1977).
See also Tiles, supra note 116, at 154-58.
169. For expositions of the Intuitionist position, see Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 210-74;
K6mer, supra note 97, at 119-34; Arend Heyting, The Intuitionist Foundations of Mathematics, in
Benacerraf& Putnam, supra note 161, at 52-61.
170. Heyting, supra note 169, at 52.
171. Kbmer, supra note 97, at 120.
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matics... which [the Intuitionists] allow, we call intuitlonistic. The
classical includes parts which are intuitionistic and parts which are
non-intuitionistic.
The non-intuitionistic mathematics which culminated in the
theories of [Cantor and others], and the intuitionistic mathematics
•. differ essentially in their view of the infinite. In the former the
infinite is treated as actual or completed or extended or existential.
An infinite set is regarded as existing as a completed totality, prior
to or independently of any human process of generation or
construction, and as though it could be spread out completely for
our inspection. In the latter, the infinite is treated only as potential
or becoming or constructive. 1
72
But now, more than two millennia after the dilemma first arose, the
implications of a narrower attitude towards infinity can be much more
starkly described. Although the Intuitionist attitude apparently does
dispose of the paradoxes, it leads this school to reject so much of the
classical perspective that the result "has turned out to be considerably
less powerful than classical mathematics, and in many ways ... much
more complicated to develop. . . .This is the fault found with the
intuitionist approach--too much that is dear to most mathematicians is
sacrificed."' 17
3
There are other problems with Intuitionism. 74 With respect to the
certainty of mathematics as a science, the position is subject to the
standard intersubjectivity problems of theories that analyze validation in
terms of self-evident experiences. Moreover, the problems for
mathematics as a technology raised by the separation of intuition and
perception have been exposed more fully in an era of developments in
physics not imagined in Kant's time. As with Logicism, the Intuitionist
school embraces a range of positions.
75
The heart of the Formalist position is an interest in formal deductive
systems. Subsection 5 discusses this school in greater detail. For now, the
reader should be aware of the following. One group of Formalists takes
the position that mathematics is preeminently syntactic--merely an
empty game of symbol manipulation. Others allow for more semantic
172. Stephen C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics 48 (1952).
173. Eves & Newsom, supra note 138, at 304. For a more technical discussion of this point, see
Kleene, supra note 172, at 46-53. See also Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 210-74.
174. For a general discussion of these problems, see K6mer, supra note 97, at 135-55.
175. See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 214-20.
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content by asserting that certain of these systems also can be viewed in
terms of a type of mathematical if-thenism that studies which
mathematical conclusions follow semantically from given mathematical
premises. Both of these positions differ widely from the Logicist and
Intuitionist views. In its most mature form under Hilbert, however,
Formalism holds out hope for a reconciliation with the other two schools.
There are problems with each of these Formalist approaches. In
particular, Hilbert's dreams have been dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow
by the work of G6del.
The second development to emerge from the current crisis is a new
embracing of the axiomatic method.' This has occurred despite the
failure of any of the three schools to provide a generally acceptable
philosophy of mathematics. 7 At one level, the axiomatic method
involves careful elaboration of the various branches of mathematics and
their underlying logic.'78 The axiomatic method, however, also involves
studying the resulting systems as objects per se in terms of properties
such as consistency. ' Thus, mathematicians once again have come to
appreciate the importance of the axiomatic method both as a tool for
doing mathematics.80 and as a prelude to dealing with foundational
issues.' 8 ' In this sense, mathematics has returned to its Greek origins.
The final development is a growing awareness of mathematics as an
art. The notion of an elegant proof dates back at least to Aristotle,182 but
mathematicians now also see their systems in terms of works of art.8 3
Once again, this mathematical crisis does not exist in a vacuum. The
past 150 years have seen a complex and comprehensive reevaluation of
the Western intellectual tradition, and the current foundational crisis is an
integral part of this larger intellectual context. 8 '
176. Even the Intuitionists, who are generally hostile to formalizations, have found axiomatics
useful. See Beth, supra note 157, at 433-34; Dummett, supra note 160, at 300; Fraenkel et al., supra
note 3, at 239-40.
177. See Davis & Hersh, supra note 34, at 346.
178. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 1026-27.
179. See id.
180. See Wilder, supra note 101, at 101-02.
181. See 2 Kramer, supra note 29, at 444-45; Raymond L. Wilder, Introduction to the
Foundations of Mathematics 278 (2d ed. 1965).
182. See Boyer, supra note 104, at 117.
183. See Sullivan, supra note 32.
184. See Purcell, supra note 51, at 47-73; Tiles, supra note 98, at 1-6, 166-74; Williams, supra
note 12, at 432-69; cf Stephen G. Simpson, Partial Realizations of Hilbert's Program, 53 J.
Symbolic Logic 349, 358 (1988).
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5. Mathematical Interlude
This subsection presents most of the mathematical details contained in
this Article. The first part provides a brief discussion of non-Euclidean
geometry, and the second part describes Formalism and G6del's
Theorems.
a. Non-Euclidean Geometry'
85
Practical geometry was known to civilizations pre-dating the Greeks.
The Egyptians and Babylonians had developed solutions to a wide range
of problems, but these solutions were obtained by a mixture of
experimentation, guessing, analogy, and intuition. The Greeks were
familiar with these results, but required that they be established by a type
of deductive reasoning.
This Greek innovation has been called material axiomatics. Howard
Eves describes it as follows:
(A) Initial explanations of certain basic technical terms of the
discourse are given, the intention being to suggest to the reader
what is to be meant by these basic terms.
(B) Certain primary statements concerning the basic terms, and
which are felt to be acceptable as true on the basis of properties
suggested by the initial explanations, are listed. These primary
statements are called the axioms, or the postulates, of the discourse.
(C) All other technical terms of the discourse are defined by
means of previously introduced terms.
(D) All other statements of the discourse are logically deduced
from previously accepted or established statements. These derived
statements are called the theorems of the discourse.186
Euclid's Elements is the archetype of this form of reasoning. The
Elements contain several basic technical terms, including point, straight
line, and plane surface. There are axioms or assumptions common to all
mathematical reasoning, including the assumption that ec uals added to
equals yield equals. There are postulates or assumptions specific to
185. The discussion in this section is based largely on Howard Eves, A Survey of Geometry 1-11,
282-88, 375-79 (rev. ed. 1972). Many details can be found in Marvin J. Greenterg, Euclidean and
Non-Euclidean Geometries: Development and History (1974); Trudeau, supra no:e 113.
186. Eves, supra note 185, at 11.
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geometric reasoning, including the assumption that two points determine
one and only one straight line.'87 There are numerous derived terms such
as right angle. Postulates mentioning derived terms are in essence
postulates about the basic terms. Finally, the rules of deduction are not
spelled out but are indicated by the methods of proof employed in the
Elements.'88
Parallelism caused trouble from the beginning. As has been described
above, Greek mathematicians shunned direct appeals to the infinite., 89 As
a result, assertions about parallelism would be suspect to the extent that
they did not involve finite figures or finite parts of figures; that is, such
statements would be problematic to the extent that they conceived of a
line as an infinite whole.' On the other hand, many results seemed to
require some assumptions about parallelism.' 9'
Euclid proposed a framework emphasizing potential rather than actual
infinity. 92 Euclid's definition of a "straight line" actually aims at what
today would be called a line segment. The Second Postulate then asserts
that straight lines can be extended indefinitely in either direction.'93
Parallelism is defined by saying that parallel straight lines are coplanar
straight lines such that no extensions intersect. 94 The cornerstone of
Euclid's framework is the famous Fifth Postulate:
If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior
angles on the same side less than two right angles, then the two
straight lines are not parallel. In particular, there are extensions
meeting on that side on which the angles are together less than two
right angles.1
9 5
187. On the varying usages of the terms axiom and postulate, see Howard Eves, An Introduction
to the History of Mathematics 124-25 (4th ed. 1975).
188. A number of"gaps" in the Elements were discovered and fixed over time, but these gaps are
not relevant for the purposes of this Article. See Greenberg, supra note 185, at 57.
189. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
190. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 175.
191. See Trudeau, supra note 113, at 44-99.
192. See Flegg, supra note 118, at 256; Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 175.
193. See Trudeau, supra note 113, at 30-32, 39-40.
194. Seeid. at39.
195. Trudeau describes this as follows:
In [the figure], EF is a straight line "falling" on two straight lines AB and CD. (Modem
textbooks would call EF a "transversal.") There are two pairs of "interior angles on the same
side": angles I and 2, and angles 3 and 4. Postulate 5 says that if either pair adds up to less than
1800 then AB and CD, if extended far enough, will intersect on the same side of EF.
Specifically, if [angles 1 and 2 add up to less than 1800] then AB and CD will meet to the right
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Even this framework made Greek mathematicians uncomfortable. As
an immediate matter, the Fifth Postulate deals only with potentially
infinite figures. 196 Nonetheless, the Greeks were hesitant to accept as self
evident such a statement about the potentially infinite. 197 This concern is
understandable given the earlier problems Greeks had faced with the
infinite.' 98 As a result, mathematicians attempted to rework the
framework. 199 Efforts focused on trying to replace Euclid's Fifth
Postulate with something less objectionable or to derive it from the
remaining assumptions."0 None of these efforts was successful.2"'
In the 18th century, attempts to apply the method of proof by
contradiction to derive the Fifth Postulate led not to contradictions but
instead to a strange collection of what is now known to be the theorems
of one type of non-Euclidean geometry.0 2 The work of Girolamo
Saccheri is typical.0 3 He could show without the Fifth Postulate that if,
in a quadrilateral ABCD, angles A and B are right angle3 and sides AD
of EF .... and if [angles 3 and 4 add up to less than 180'] they will meet to the left. Before
Euclid makes use of Postulate 5 he will pro-e that it is impossible for [the pairs of angles] to
both be less than 180'.
E
A B
3/1
C 4 2 D
F
Id. at 42.
196. The use of potential infinity in the Fifth and Second Postulates, howvever, did raise the
question of whether physical space is infinite. See Kline, Mathematical, supra note 29, at 177.
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
199. Some went so far as to try to use a different definition of parallel. See I Heath, supra note
107, at 358.
200. See Greenberg, supra note 185, at 19. Some commentators find the artistic dimension of
mathematics at work here as well. As far back as Aristotle, there was a notion that a proof would be
more elegant if it used fewer or simpler assumptions. See Boyer, supra note 104, at 117. Also, the
Fifth Postulate looked and felt more like a theorem than a postulate; thus, its elimination was a
matter of aesthetics. See Trudeau, supra note 113, at 118; Wilder, supra note 101, at 9, 99-99.
201. See Roberto Bonola, Non-Euclidean Geometry 1-21 (H.S. Carslaw tran:s., 1911); Greenberg,
supra note 185, at 19-21, 122-27; Trudeau, supra note 113, at 119-31.
202. See Bonola, supra note 201, at 22-51; Greenberg, supra note 185, at 12°7-29.
203. For a brief discussion of Saceheri, see Eves, supra note 185, at 284--85.
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and BC are equal, then angles D and C are equal.2" There are thus three
possibilities: D and C are equal acute angles (measure less than 90
degrees), D and C are right angles, and D and C are equal obtuse angles
(measure greater than 90 degrees). The second possibility implies (in fact
is equivalent to) the Fifth Postulate, and thus Saccheri hoped to derive
contradictions from the other two cases. He could do this easily for the
third case, but not the first. Instead, he derived many of what we know
now to be the theorems of one type of non-Euclidean geometry.
Mathematicians, however, were unable to conceive of this interpretation
of their work. 5 Saccheri, for example, tried to assert a contradiction
based on vaguely described ideas of the nature of a line.0 6
It remained for the mathematicians of the early 19th century to realize
that such results evidenced a non-Euclidean geometry.0 7 Indeed,
mathematicians were able to show that the consistency of this system
followed from the consistency of Euclidean geometry. This result was
established by providing within Euclidean geometry a model of non-
Euclidean geometry in such a way that any inconsistency in non-
Euclidean geometry could be translated into an inconsistency in
Euclidean geometry. Towards the end of the 19th century,
mathematicians realized that the contradiction in Saccheri's third case
could be removed by modifying some of Euclid's other assumptions. The
204.
D C
A B
205. See Bonola, supra note 201, at 43, 49-50; Greenberg, supra note 185, at 129. This inability
might be explained by Kant's influence. See Bonola, supra note 201, at 64, 92-93, 121.
206. See Bonola, supra note 201, at 43; Greenberg, supra note 185, at 129; Trudeau, supra note
113, at 142.
207. See Bonola, supra note 201, at 64-113; Greenberg, supra note 185, at 131, 143-50; Trudeau,
supra note 113, at 157-59.
The exact path from 18th century mathematicians like Saccheri to early 19th century
mathematicians like Carl Friedrich Gauss, John Bolyai, and Nicholas Lobachevski is not easy to
trace. For one attempt, see Bonola, supra note 201, at 66-113.
208. See Greenberg, supra note 185, at 181-84. In fact, one can produce a model of Euclidean
geometry within non-Euclidean geometry so that the two geometries are "equiconsistent." See id. at
248.
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resulting (different type of) non-Euclidean geometry is once again no
less consistent than Euclidean geometry.2" 9
Some idea of the difference in these geometries can be obtained by
considering the so-called Euclidean Parallel Postulate version of Euclid's
Fifth Postulate.2"0 Take a straight line I and a point P not on I or any
extension of 1. The Euclidean Parallel Postulate states that there exists a
straight line through P and parallel to 1, and that there is "only one" in
the sense that any two straight lines through P and parallel to I are
collinear (i.e. lie in a common straight line).21 In the presence of Euclid's
other assumptions, the Euclidean Parallel Postulate is equivalent to
Euclid's Fifth Postulate.2 2 In fact, many readers may have been
introduced to an axiomatization that used the Euclidean Parallel
Postulate rather than Euclid's Fifth.2"' In Saccheri's first case, however,
there exist straight lines through P and parallel to I that are not collinear.
In fact, an axiomatization of this type of geometry can be obtained by
replacing the Euclidean Parallel Postulate with this state ment.214 In the
geometry resulting from Saccheri's third case, there are no straight lines
through P and parallel to I.25 As Saccheri's work shows, one cannot
simply replace the Euclidean Parallel Postulate with such a statement; the
result is an inconsistent system. Modifications must be made in some of
the other assumptions as well. 26
Some descriptions of non-Euclidean geometry in the legal literature
are what can only be described as confused. One commentator, for
example, tells us that "[n]on-Euclidean geometry postulates the
intersection of parallel lines."2 7
209. Once again, mathematicians constructed a model within Euclidean georretry. See id. at 275-
80.
210. The postulate was popularized by John Playfair's 18th century presentation of Euclidean
geometry, although the postulate itself is much older. See id. at 17.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. One also sees the so-called Hilbert Parallel Postulate, which states that any two parallel
straight lines through P and parallel to I are collinear. See id. at 84. The part of the Euclidean Parallel
Postulate asserting the existence of a parallel straight line follows from the other assumptions. See id.
214. See Trudeau, supra note 113, at 159, 173, 177.
215. The elementary treatment sketched here can be significantly generalized. See H.S.M.
Coxeter, Non-Euclidean Geometry (5th ed. 1957); Greenberg, supra note 185, at 280-88.
216. See Eves, supra note 185, at 287-88; Greenberg, supra note 185, at 275--0.
217. George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth of Magisterial
Discretion, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.9 (1990). See also Rudolph I. Peritz, The Predicament of
Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument,
1984 Duke L.J. 1205, 1251 n.267 ("[T]hey are all parallel yet they all meet."). For a better attempt,
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Two of the most common misstatements in describing non-Euclidean
geometry are: (1) one obtains Saccheri's third case geometry merely by
replacing Euclid's Fifth Postulate with the assumption that "there are no
parallels," and (2) the great circles on a sphere form a model of
Saccheri's third-case geometry."' Legal scholars do not appear to be
immune from such descriptive mistakes.219
It has been noted that if Euclidean geometry is consistent, then so is
the type of non-Euclidean geometry resulting from Saccheri's first case.
With a little work, it follows from this result that if Euclidean geometry
is consistent, then Euclid's Fifth Postulate can neither be derived from,
nor refuted by, the other assumptions.' 0 That is, if Euclidean geometry is
consistent, then these other assumptions form an "incomplete system" in
the sense that Euclid's Fifth Postulate is "undecidable" with respect to
these assumptions."' Thus, non-Euclidean geometry provided an early
example of an incompleteness result. The results known as Grdel's
Incompleteness Theorems therefore must derive their significance from
something other than such an incompleteness per se. This significance is
due to their context.
b. Gtdel's Theorems
Providing a specific context for G6del's Theorems is as important to
understanding them as a description of the work itself.222 An appropriate
context can be developed from a number of perspectives. The choice
here is to tell the story in terms of the mathematical Formalists. 3
In outline, the story is as follows. The earliest incarnations of
Formalism largely were self-contained competitors of the Logicist and
Intuitionist schools. As such, there were a number of criticisms of these
early Formalist approaches. More importantly, the competition among
correct as far as it goes, see Burton M. Leiser, Threats to Academic Freedom and Tenure, 15 Pace L.
Rev. 15, 60 n.247 (1994) ("Non-Euclidean geometries have been constructed on the premise that no
such parallels can be drawn, and also on the premise that more than one such parallel can be
drawn.").
218. For a discussion of why these are errors, see Greenberg, supra note 185, at 275-80.
219. Foran example, see Peritz, supra note 217, at 1251 n.267.
220. See Greenberg, supra note 185, at 183-84.
221. These terms will be defined more precisely in the discussion of G6del's Theorem
immediately below.
222. See Dow, supra note 4, at 713.
223. The discussion is based on the views of Maddy, supra note 167, at 23-26. For a similar
view, but one that is different in important respects, see Michael D. Resnik, Frege and the
Philosophy of Mathematics 54-137 (1980).
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the three schools eventually threatened to tear mathematics apart.
Through his so-called Hilbert Program, David Hilbert reformulated
Formalism in an attempt to deal with general critiques of Formalism and
to unite the competing schools. This reformulation involves a careful
balancing of the various positions. Unfortunately, Grdel's Theorems deal
Hilbert's Program a serious, if not fatal, blow. In essence, Grdel's
Theorems turn Hilbert's balancing against itself. This balancing is at the
core of Grdel's Theorems. Indeed, the theorems themselves have
specific hypotheses and conclusions and therefore are cf limited scope
and application. In particular, they do not apply to all formal systems. It
is ironic that G6del himself did not set out to destroy Hilbert's dreams. In
fact, he was led to his results through attempts to carry out the Hilbert
Program! Now for some details.
The core of the Formalist heritage is the study of formal as opposed to
material systems. That is, in step (A) above.24 the basic terms are self-
consciously viewed as undefined, and in step (B) the assumptions are
self-consciously viewed as unjustified.22 More specifically, a formal
system consists of three parts: a formal language, a set of axioms, and a
set of rules of inference.226 The latter two comprise the deductive
apparatus of the formal system. A formal language is given by specifying
an alphabet (i.e. a particular collection of symbols) together with the
collection of formulas over that alphabet (i.e. a particular collection of
sequences of symbols). The axioms are given by specifying some subset
of these formulas. In essence, rules of inference tell us that one formula,
called the conclusion of the rule, can be inferred from certain other
formulas, called the hypotheses of the rule. Given a formal system, one
can define a notion of proof for that formal system. A pro af is a sequence
of formulas such that each formula is either an axiom or the conclusion
of a rule of inference whose hypotheses precede the formula in the
sequence. The last formula in a proof is called a theorem of the system or
of the axioms, and we say that the proof is a proof of the theorem.27 The
reader must realize that a formal system is preeminently syntactic. The
language of a formal system is not asserted to have any semantic content
per se, although semantic considerations may have influenced the exact
224. See supra text accompanying note 186.
225. See Eves, supra note 185, at 338.
226. See Joseph K Shoenfield, Mathematical Logic 1-5 (1967).
227. For the purposes of this Article, a formula is a finite sequence of symbols, a rule of inference
has a finite number of hypotheses, and a proof is a finite sequence of formulas. An alphabet or a set
of axioms can, however, be infinite, but not "too infinite." What "too infinite' means is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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form of the alphabet and formulas. The notion of consequence given by
the deductive apparatus of a formal system similarly is preeminently
syntactic. From this perspective, to say that a formula is a consequence
of a set of hypotheses is to say in essence that there is a sequence of
chicken scratches satisfying certain rules of syntactic manipulation.
A footnote illustrates these ideas in the context of a particular
elementary formal system that can be called the basic propositional logic
system.228 Obviously, more complicated systems are utilized for more
228. For pedagogical reasons only, the reader is encouraged to think of this system as having
some semantic content: the semantics of "and," "or," "not," "if-then," and "if and only if." The
formal system qua formal system, however, is preeminently syntactic and consists merely of the
language, axioms, and rules of inference-even though, as in this example, their specifications may
have been influenced by semantic considerations.
The alphabet of the language consists of three parts. First, an infinite set of propositional variables
P1, P2 ..... Second, a set of five propositional connectives: A (the formal counterpart of "and" or
"conjunction"), v (the formal counterpart of "or" or "disjunction"), -' (the formal counterpart of
"not" or "negation"), -), (the formal counterpart of "if-then" or "one-way implication"), <-> (the
formal counterpart of "two-way implication" or "if and only if' or "iff"). Third, a set of two
punctuation symbols ( and ). Before proceeding, note that the formal system is described from the
outside; that is, it is described in terms of a so-called metatheory. The alphabet, for example, is just a
set, but it is described from the outside (say in mathematical english) by listing its members.
The formulas are specified according to the following rules: (I) any propositional variable is a
formula, and (2) if a and 3 are propositional formulas, then so are the following five: (a A 13),
(a v 1)' (-a), (ax -> 13), and (a <-> 13). For example, P, is a formula by (I). P2 is a formula by (1).
Hence (PI -> P2) is a formula by (2). (For pedagogical reasons, the reader might wish to think of this
as saying, "If P1, then P2.") Hence (-(P -- P2)) is a formula by (2). (The reader might wish to think
of this as saying, "It is not the case that P
, 
implies P2.") Note that the set of formulas has not been
described by listing its members directly, but in terms of a so-called metatheoretical formation rule.
Note the use of the metatheoretical symbols a and 13 to denote formulas of the formal system.
For any formulas a, 13, y, the following fourteen formulas are axioms. That is, each of (1)-(14)
represents a so-called metatheoretical schema that provides a general template for the collection of
the schema's instances. The set of axioms, like the set of formulas, is not described by listing its
members. It is the collection of the instances of the schemas that is the set of axioms. For
pedagogical purposes, the reader may want to think of these schemas as statements about the
propositional connectives. For example, the reader may want to think of the first two as statements
describing when "or" holds, and the third as a statement describing when "or" fails to hold. (For
example, the reader might wish to think of(1) as saying "a implies (a or 13).")
(1) (a- (a v 13))
(2) (13- (av 1))
(3) (('a) -c ((-13) -+ ((a v 13))))
(4) (a -) (13-4 (a A 1)))(5) ((-a) (-(a ^A3)
(6) (-13) - (-a A 1)))
(7) (a- (13 -+ a))
(8) ((-a) ( - 13))
(9) (a -)( (1P) -+ (-, -+P))))
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complicated forms of reasoning, and the reader should pause now and
examine this "elementary formal system" to gain some understanding of
what it might mean to put law in a syntactic framework that can be
described and analyzed mathematically.
For the early Formalists, a formal system depicted a part of
mathematics as a game whose pieces are the formulas and whose moves
are the rules of inference.229 The object of this game is to produce proofs
in the system; classification is largely syntactic in natue. Such a view,
however, is subject to a number of criticisms." With little room for
semantics, this view is a total break with every precedirg description of
(10) ((x- 13) -* ((13-> ) (a-> 13)))(11I) (cc -> ((-P1) -> (-(a <-1)))
(12) (1P - ((-a) -> ((a <->13))))
(13) ((t -- (13 -+y)) -- ((cc -13)--> ( -- y)))
(14) ( (a -* 13) -> ( ((-'a) - )-> 13) )
What about the set of rules of inference? The propositional logic system has only one rule of
inference-modus ponens. A metatheoretical template is given by saying that if a and 13 are any two
formulas, then from the two hypotheses a and (a -4 13), we may conclude 1. This metatheoretical
description completes the specification of the formal system. (Technically, modus ponens is a so-
called 3-place relation on the set of formulas. See Elliott Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical
Logic 29 (1964).)
Let's consider an example of a proof. The following sequence of five formulas is a proof:
((-PI) -- > (PI "-> ('-("P[))) ),
(-(-P[)) - (PI -> (-'(-'lP))),
( (('P) "--+ (P] "-> ("("P,))) )- ( ( ("("P,)) --+ (Pi -> (--('-P,)))) - (P] "> ("('7P,)))),
(((-(-Pi)) -4 (P, -> (-("Pi)))) (P, --+ (-("P,))))
(P, (-,(-,P,))).
The first formula is an instance of schema (8) with P, in place of a and ('('?P)) in place of 13. The
second formula is an instance of (7) with ("(-Pi)) in place of a and P, in place of 13. The third
formula is an instance of(14) with (-P) in place of ac and (P -). (-(-iP))) in place of 3. The fourth
formula results from an application of modus ponens to the first and third formulas with
((-PI) -> (PI -> (-{'P))) ) in place of a and ( ( (("Pl)) -> (Pt - (-("P,)))) --. (Pi -> (-PD))
in place of 3. The fifth formula results from an application of modus ponens to the second and fourth
formula with (('n('Pi)) -> (P -> (' ("P)))) in place of a and (PI -> (-('Pi))) in place of 13. Thus,
(PI -- ('(-P1))) is a theorem. The reader may wish to think of this as a proof of the statement "P,
implies not(not(Pi))."
What about other systems of propositional logic? The system just described is so basic that the
other propositional logic systems are obtained by adjoining a set of formulas r to the axioms of the
basic propositional logic system. It is so basic that if a is a theorem in the resulting system, we say
that a is a syntactic consequence of r even though the proof may use some of the basic system.
229. See Maddy, supra note 167, at 23.
230. For an overview of these criticisms, see Resnik, supra note 223, at 55-65.
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mathematics as a science. In any case, the view is hardly an appealing
conception of mathematics as a science. Moreover, Frege pointed out
early on that the view poses serious problems for mathematics as a
technology. What could such syntactic manipulations have to do with the
success enjoyed by applied mathematics?23' Finally, the view has little to
offer in the way of coming to grips with the infinite.
For the next wave of Formalists, formal systems described
mathematics as a species of if-thenism. 22 This view offers more room for
semantics. Recall that a formal system is preeminently syntactic. How
does one introduce semantics explicitly? Semantic content for a formal
language can be given through an assignment of meaning to the alphabet
and/or formulas of the language. Of course, different assignments might
give different meanings. One also can develop a semantic notion of
consequence. Roughly speaking, a formula is a semantic consequence of
a set of hypotheses if the formula is true whenever the hypotheses are
true. That is, a formula is a semantic consequence of a set of hypotheses
if every assignment of meaning making the hypotheses true also makes
the formula true. Critical for the if-thenist approach was the discovery of
results relating the syntactic and semantic notions of consequence in
specific settings. Once again, the reader is encouraged to look at a
footnote developing these ideas in the context of the propositional logic
system referred to above. 3
231. See Maddy, supra note 167, at 23--24.
232. See id. at 25.
233. Consider the system for propositional logic described supra note 228. The connective and
punctuation symbols are always given their intended meanings, so the choice comes in assigning the
meanings to the propositional variables. A propositional variable is given a meaning by assigning to
it the meaning TRUE or the meaning FALSE. An interpretation is an assignment of TRUE or FALSE
to each propositional variable. Under an interpretation, every formula in the language is given
meaning through the use of the meanings of the connectives--that is, through the truth tables for the
propositional connectives. For example, in the interpretation in which all variables are assigned
TRUE, the formula (Pi v P2) has meaning TRUE. Consider a set r of propositional logic formulas.
Let cc be a formula. If c is true in every interpretation making all the formulas in r true, we say that
cc is a semantic consequence of r. Roughly speaking, to say that a is a semantic consequence ofr is
to say that a is true whenever F is. The key result is the so-called Propositional Completeness
Theorem which says that a is a syntactic consequence of F if and only if it is a semantic
consequence of r. For a general overview, see Geoffrey Hunter, Metalogic: An Introduction to the
Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic 91-116 (1971). With such a result, there is more room for
semantics in a formalist approach to propositional logic.
It must be admitted that until about 1930 most mathematicians tended to slide back and forth
between syntactic and semantic statements with only a general understanding of the distinction and
connection. See Gregory H. Moore, Zermelo's Axiom of Choice: Its Origins, Development, and
Influence 256-57 (1982); R.L. Vaught, Model Theory Before 1945, in 25 Proc. Symp. Pure
Mathematics 153, 160-61 (1974).
Washington Law Review
While there is more room for semantics under such a view,
mathematics as a science is still at most the study of which mathematical
conclusions follow semantically from given mathematical premises. This
version of Formalism can find inspiration in some of the thoughts of
Aristotle and Leibniz. Nonetheless, it also lacks a certain descriptive and
normative appeal. Penelope Maddy puts it as follows:
[W]hich... language is appropriate for the statement of premises
and conclusions? . . . [F]rom among the vast range of arbitrary
possibilities, why do mathematicians choose the particular axiom
systems they do to study? [W]hat were historical mathematicians
doing before their subjects were axiomatized? [W]hat are they
doing when they propose new axioms?234
Moreover, there is still the issue of mathematics as a technology.
Maddy describes the Frege problem for this version of Formalism as
follows:
The general thrust of the if-thenist's [account] seems to be that the
antecedent of a mathematical if-then statement is treated as an
idealization of some physical statement. The [technologist] then
draws as a conclusion the physical statement that is the
unidealization of the consequent.
Notice that on this picture, the physical statements must be
entirely mathematics-free; the only mathematics involved is that
used in moving between them .... In other words [this account]
requires that natural science be wholly non-mathematical, but it
seems unlikely that science can be so purified.235
Finally, although if-thenism might offer a view of the consequences of
adopting infinitary reasoning, it does not provide other means of dealing
with the underlying arguments over its use.
Formalism assumed its most complex incarnation with David Hilbert.
By any measure, Hilbert was one of the most important mathematicians
of modem times. He obtained significant results in a variety of fields,
and his famous list of twenty-three problems had a major influence on
the development of 20th century mathematics.236 His foundational stance
234. Maddy, supra note 167, at 25.
235. Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
236. For a translation of the problems, see David Hilbert, Mathematical Problems, 8 Bull. Am.
Mathematical Soc'y 437 (1902).
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has framed much of the subsequent debate. This Article is concerned
with Hilbert the foundationalist.
The early Hilbert made several significant contributions to Formalism.
Important for the purposes of this Article is his work on the consistency
and syntactic completeness of formal systems.
There are a number of possible definitions of the consistency of a
formal system. Perhaps the most natural for the framework of this Article
is the statement that (1) there is a formula that is not a theorem. This
statement makes it clear why inconsistent systems hold little interest. All
formulas are theorems, so that the system offers no syntactic
classificatory ability." In the terminology of this Article, such a system
holds little scientific interest. Perhaps the most intuitive formulation of
consistency for the situations Hilbert proposed to consider is the
statement that (2) there is no formula such that both the formula and its
negation are theorems."5
As indicated above, 19th century mathematicians worked with
material axiomatic systems.239 Kleene describes the shortcomings in 19th
century consistency arguments as follows:
[The 19th century technique] was to give a "model." A model for
[a material axiomatic theory] is simply a system of objects, chosen
237. Given this, one might wonder what possibly could be meant by an assertion that an
inconsistent system can be of real interest. For such an assertion, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion
Question, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 559, 576 (1994) (reviewing Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An
Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (1993)).
238. That is, the formal systems of interest have a syntax of negation. For such systems, clearly
(2) implies (1). The systems of interest also employ analogues of propositional schema (8) and
modus ponens. See supra note 228. Using the schema and modus ponens, it is clear that the negation
of(2) implies the negation of(1). For a general discussion of these two notions of consistency, see 1
Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic 108-09 (1956); Hunter, supra note 233, at 78--
79.
One might also consider for each formula f3 the following statement: (3 )p It is not the case that
both 13 and (-13) are theorems. For any formula 13, clearly (2) implies (3)p, and (3 )p implies (I).
Although inconsistency initially was semantic in character, the approach described here is
syntactic and "therefore applicable to a logistic system independently of the interpretation adopted
for it." I Church, supra, at 108. See also Hunter, supra, at 78.
Indeed, this was why the Formalists adopted it! Thus, the following statement by Brown and
Greenberg is problematic:
It should be noted that it is meaningless to state that two propositions are inconsistent until one
imposes an interpretation upon them.... It is only in light of a given symbolic interpretation
that the notion of formal consistency has meaning.
Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1448 n.48 (citation omitted).
239. See supra text accompanying note 186.
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from some other theory and satisfying the axioms. That is, to each
object or primitive notion of the axiomatic theory, an object or
notion of the other theory is correlated, in such a way that the
axioms become (or correspond to) theorems of the other theory. If
this other theory is consistent, then the axiomatic theory must be.
For suppose that, in the axiomatic theory, a contradiction were
deducible from the axioms. Then, in the other theory, by
corresponding inferences about the objects constituting the model,
a contradiction would be deducible from the corresponding
theorems.
Consistency proofs by the method of a model are relative. The
theory for which a model is set up is consistent, if that from which
the model is taken is consistent.
Only when the latter is unimpeachable does the model give us an
absolute proof of consistency....
For proving absolutely the consistency of classical [arithmetic],
of analysis, and of set theory..., the method of a model offers no
hope. No mathematical source is apparent for a model which would
not merely take us back to one of the theories previously reduced
by the method of a model.to these.
The impossibility of drawing upon the perceptual or physical
world for a model [was also argued by Hilbert].240
Hilbert suggested a direct method that focuses on formal systems.
Kleene describes Hilbert's idea as follows:
This direct method is implicit in the meaning of consistency (at
least as we now think of it), namely that no ... contradiction (a
proposition A and its negation not A both being theorems) can arise
in the theory deduced from the axioms. Thus to prove the
consistency of a theory directly, one should prove a proposition
about the theory itself, i.e., specifically about all possible proofs of
theorems in the theory. The mathematical theory whose! consistency
it is hoped to prove then becomes itself the object of a
240. Kleene, supra note 172, at 53-54.
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mathematical study, which [study] Hilbert calls "metamathematics"
or "proof theory.""24
Hilbert also was interested in the syntactic completeness of certain
formal systems. "Ignoramus et ignorabimus"--we are ignorant and we
shall remain ignorant. This was the catch phrase of Emil duBois-
Reymond who, in asserting that certain problems (such as the nature of
matter and force) were unsolvable in principle, represented a pessimistic
assessment of the ultimate power of the human intellect.242 As a
mathematician, Hilbert found duBois-Reymond's position abhorrent.243
In Hilbert's words:
[The] conviction of the solvability of every mathematical problem
is a powerful incentive to the worker. We hear within us the
perpetual call: There is the problem. Seek its solution. You can find
it by pure reason, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus.
244
Moreover, Hilbert had definite ideas about what this means:
Occasionally it happens that we seek the solution under
insufficient hypotheses... and for this reason do not succeed. The
problem then arises: to show the impossibility of the solution under
the given hypotheses .... [E]very definite mathematical problem
must necessarily be susceptible of an exact settlement, either in the
form of an actual answer to the question asked, or by the proof of
the impossibility of its solution. 245
In contrast to duBois-Reymond's pessimism, Hilbert's beliefs were
much more optimistic. A so-called mathematical sentence is a formula
with the syntactic structure of a "definite mathematical problem. 2 46
Hilbert believed that given any formal system employed by
mathematicians and any sentence of that system, mathematicians
eventually would be able to determine that the sentence is undecidable
(neither it nor its negation is provable) or determine what is decided.
This belief was his general response to duBois-Reymond. It is clear from
the quotation above that Hilbert did not expect all formal systems to be
what is called syntactically complete (all sentences are decidable).
241. Id. at 55.
242. See Constance Reid, Hilbert 13 (1970).
243. Id.
244. Hilbert, supra note 236, at 445.
245. Id. at 444.
246. For a discussion of sentences in some of the systems Hilbert proposed to study, see infra note
278.
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Nonetheless, the syntactic completeness of a particular system would be
a type of specific response to duBois-Reymond's brand of pessimism in
so far as that system is concerned. Moreover, a syntactically complete
system has a nice mathematical property-it answers every definite
question put to it, so that no more axioms need be considered.247 If the
system also is consistent, then its answers are consistent.
For the purposes of this Article, the early foundational Hilbert was an
if-theniset4 concerned with the consistency and syntactic: completeness
of various formal systems. By the 1920s, however, Hilbert could not
maintain such a narrowly circumscribed position. In addition to the
criticisms of Formalism described above, other developments forced him
to posit what were in effect new and more sophisticated interpretations of
his earlier concerns. The two previous foundational crises had spawned a
variety of perspectives on mathematics. To mathematicians, however,
these diverse approaches had seemed largely compatible with the then-
existing mathematics. This was not the case with the third crisis.
Arguments were becoming increasingly divisive,249 and Hilbert believed
247. See Tiles, supra note 98, at 95. For many of the formal systems Hilbert proposed to study,
syntactic completeness had another nice implication.
Hilbert not only believed in the "solvability of every mathematical problem" as discussed in the
text, he also hoped that for certain systems the relevant determinations could be performed in some
sort of uniform manner. This hope led him to consider the so-called decision problem for a formal
system: the general problem of whether an arbitrary sentence of the system is a theorem of the
system. For the purposes of this Article, a uniform solution to the decision problem can be thought of
in terms of a certain type of oracle. When given any sentence, the oracle correctly answers "yes" if
the sentence is a theorem and "no" if it isn't. By asking the oracle about any particular sentence and
its negation, one can determine that the sentence is undecidable or determine what is decided.
In the time of the early Hilbert, such a problem could be imagined as being solved only by actually
providing an algorithm for solving it. That is, the oracle must represent some sort of mechanical
procedure. See Martin Davis, Computability and Unsolvability 102 (1958); cf. Hilbert, supra note
236, at 458. Such an oracle would provide a complete refutation of duBois-Re3ymond as far as that
system is concerned. For many of the formal systems Hilbert proposed to study, syntactic
completeness implies that the decision problem is algorithmically solvable. For a discussion of this
implication, see Herbert B. Enderton, Elements of Recursion Theory, in Handbcok of Mathematical
Logic 527, 546-48 (Jon Barwise ed., 1977) [hereinafter Handbook]. It is net clear that Hilbert
realized this implication, although some of his disciples apparently did. See Hao Wang, Reflections
on Kurt Gddel 55 (1987).
Hilbert did realize that there is a particular formal system such that an algorithmic solution of its
decision problem could be used to produce algorithmic solutions to the decision problems of a wide
range of formal systems. Hilbert called the decision problem for this particular system the
Entscheidungsproblem. Thus, he was interested in showing that the Entscheidungsproblem is
algorithmically solvable. See Davis, supra, at 134. It isn't. See infra note 297.
248. See Maddy, supra note 167, at 25.
249. For a general discussion of their divisiveness, see Reid, supra note 242, at 148-57.
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that they threatened to "chop up and mangle the science," and in doing
so, "run the risk of losing a great part of our most valuable treasures!""25
These problems led Hilbert to sketch what he believed to be an
approach that would continue the Formalist emphasis on the study of
formal systems, preserve the existing mathematics as much as possible,
and appeal to devotees of the other two schools, especially the
Intuitionists. He would "eliminate once and for all the questions
regarding the foundations of mathematics."25' The exact nature and scope
of his ideas were never entirely clear,252 however, and the description
chosen here is suitable for this Article 3
For present purposes, one can say that Hilbert kept in mind three types
of systems. First, there are the informal systems of reasoning used by
mathematicians in their daily work. Second, there are the formal systems
that are the counterparts of the informal systems. Finally, there is the
metatheory used to describe and establish Hilbert's approach. The word
"meta" is used because this third type of theory generally would be
talking about the two other types of systems. 4 For example, the
metatheory would deal with statements concerning the consistency and
syntactic completeness of a formal system.
250. See id. at 155.
251. David Hilbert, Foundations of Mathematics, in van Heijenoort, supra note 164, at 464, 464.
252. See Tiles, supra note 98, at 118.
253. This discussion is based on Kleene, supra note 172, at 53-65; Stephen C. Kleene & Solomon
Feferman, Foundations of Mathematics, in 11 Encyclopaedia Britannica 630 (15th ed. 1974); Georg
Kreisel, Hilbert's Programme, in Benacerraf & Putnam, supra note 161, at 207. For other
discussions of Hilbert's ideas from a mathematical perspective, see Paul Bemays, David Hilbert, in 4
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 496 (1972); Charles Parsons, Foundations of Mathematics, in 5
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 188 (1972); Dag Prawitz, Philosophical Aspects of Proof Theory, in 1
Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey 235 (1981); C. Smorynski, The Incompleteness Theorems,
in Handbook, supra note 247, at 821. For discussions from a more philosophical perspective, see
Michael Detlefsen, Hilbert's Program (1986); Resnik, supra note 223, at 76-107; Tiles, supra note
98, at 89-128.
254. What things would be included in such a metatheory? As indicated above, Hilbert's
consideration of the deductive aspects of formal systems led to the development of what he called
metamathematics or proof theory. See text accompanying supra note 241. Mathematicians also were
interested in the idea of algorithmic computability, and this interest eventually led to the
development of recursion theory. See supra note 247; infra note 297. The interest in the semantics
underlying informal systems led to the development of model theory-the study of the semantics of
formal languages. See Chen Chung Chang & H. Jerome Keisler, Model Theory 1-4 (3d ed. 1990).
Elaborations of Cantor's work with sets eventually led to set theory. See infra note 394. These four
areas comprise what is commonly referred to as mathematical logic. There are many overlaps. For a
detailed overview, see Handbook, supra note 253. For the purposes of this Article, one can more or
less identify the metatheory with mathematical logic.
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As indicated in the Kleene quotation above,2" Hilbert was interested
in various classical informal systems." 6 Hilbert distinguished two parts
of these systems: real and ideal. Although Hilbert was not entirely clear
on his definitions of these parts,257 one may say for the purposes of this
Article that the real portion was meant to correspond in some sense to the
Intuitionistically acceptable portion and the ideal portion to the
remainder.258 For example, statements treating the infinite as actual are
ideal. Though a Formalist, Hilbert was willing to agree with the Logicists
and the Intuitionists that the real part was meaningful. He could not
accept, however, the Logicist position that this meaning came from a
reduction of mathematics to logic. He believed that logic and
mathematics had to be developed jointly. If anything, Hilbert's position
on the meaningfulness of real mathematics was much closer to the
Intuitionists. 2 1
9
The biggest challenge for Hilbert was with respect to the ideal part
because the Logicists embraced the actual infinite and the Intuitionists
rejected it. Like the Logicists, Hilbert was unwilling to jetlison infinitary
reasoning: "No one will drive us out of this paradise that Cantor has
created for us."26 On the other hand, he was willing to agree with the
Intuitionists that statements about the actual infinite were not
meaningful.26' Kleene puts it as follows:
The delicate point in [Hilbert's] position is to explain how the
nonintuitionistic classical mathematics is significant, after having
initially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems lack a real
meaning in terms of which they are true.262
To deal with this delicate point, Hilbert made both phi' osophical and
mathematical appeals to the Intuitionists. Philosophically, Hilbert echoed
some of Kant's ideas on the infinite,263 thus invoking the intellectual
255. See supra text accompanying note 240.
256. For the connotation of the word "classical," see supra text accompanying note 172.
257. See Smorynski, supra note 253, at 823.
258. See Kleene, supra note 172, at 55.
259. See Tiles, supra note 98, at 104-05, 155.
260. Reid, supra note 242, at 177. Hilbert also said that a rejection "would be the same, say, as
proscribing the telescope to the astronomer or to the boxer the use of his fists. To prohibit [infinitary
reasoning] is tantamount to relinquishing.., mathematics altogether." Hilbert, supra note 251, at
476. For a discussion of what this latter quotation means in the context of arithmetic, see Tiles, supra
note 98, at 104-07.
261. See Hilbert, supra note 25 1, at 470; see also Kleene, supra note 172, at 5".
262. Kleene, supra note 172, at 57.
263. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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roots of Intuitionism itself.2" His mathematical appeal--the so-called
Hilbert Program-was more subtle and complex.
In the first step of his Program, Hilbert hoped to provide formal
systems that captured both the real and ideal parts of each of the classical
informal systems he proposed to study.26 This capturing would preserve
existing mathematics, and it also would appeal to the Logicists. Rudolph
Carnap puts it as follows:
[L]ogicism has a methodological affinity with formalism. Logicism
proposes to construct the logical-mathematical system in such a
way that, although the axioms and rules of inference are chosen
with an interpretation of the primitive symbols in mind,
nevertheless, inside the system the chains of deductions and of
definitions are carried through formally as in a pure calculus, i.e.,
without references to the meaning of the primitive symbols.266
In the second step, Hilbert hoped to convince the Intuitionists that
infinitary reasoning is "conservative"-that real statements produced
with ideal reasoning can be produced with real reasoning alone.
Infinitary reasoning therefore could be justified as purely instrumental.267
In essence, this would provide a unitary version of the Greek bifurcated
approach to the infinite. He would accomplish this by providing so-
called finitistic metatheoretical arguments that the formal systems
resulting from his first step are consistent.26 Hilbert argued that this
traditional Formalist consistency goal, if implemented through suitable
(i.e. finitistic) means, would establish the conservation goal.269 Moreover,
Maddy argues that Hilbert's Program might simplify the problem of
mathematics as a technology by treating infinitary reasoning as a
justified heuristic. 7
Although such a program may sound both distressingly vague and
hopelessly ambitious, there were signs that it could be implemented.
Some work showed that formal systems could capture various informal
264. David Hilbert, On the Infinite, in van Heijenoort, supra note 164, at 367, 392. This appeal
was never fully developed. For a modem attempt to do so, see Tiles, supra note 98, at 129-74.
265. See Kleene, supra note 172, at 53.
266. Camap, supra note 161, at 41, 52.
267. See Maddy, supra note 167, at 24.
268. These arguments were to be metamathematical or proof-theoretic arguments of a type that are
not too complex. See Kleene, supra note 172, at 59-65.
269. See Hilbert, supra note 251, at 474; see also Tiles, supra note 98, at 104-07; Prawitz, supra
note 253, at 258; Smorynski, supra note 253, at 823-25, 846.
270. See Maddy, supra note 167, at 24.
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systems.2 7' Other work indicated that the requisite arguments for
consistency might be found.272 Moreover, certain Intuitionists held out
hope that some accommodation was possible if Hilbert's ideas could be
implemented.273
Unfortunately, the metatheoretical results known as G6del's
Incompleteness Theorems274 indicate serious, if not insurmountable,
difficulties for Hilbert's dreams. There are a variety of results
encompassed by each of these theorems, and the versions chosen here are
appropriate for the purposes of this Article.275 G6del's so-called First
Incompleteness Theorem raises questions about the first step in Hilbert's
Program.
276
To understand the First Theorem, consider how one might try to
capture a sophisticated system of classical informal reasoning with a
formal system in such a way that the formal system is amenable to a
suitable metatheoretical analysis. For the purposes of this Article, an
appropriate formal system has several characteristics.
Certainly, the language should be simple yet have enough expressive
power. That is, the syntax provided by the alphabet and formulas should
be easy to analyze yet be capable of encompassing the requisite classical
expression under the appropriate semantic interpretations As a footnote
example for the ordinary high school arithmetic of the natural numbers
271. See Hunter, supra note 233, at 259-60 (listing some early capturing results); Wang, supra
note 247, at 55-56.
272. See Wang, supra note 247, at 54; Kleene & Feferman, supra note 253, at 636; Wilfied Sieg,
Hilbert's Program Sixty Years Later, 53 J. Symbolic Logic 338, 342 (1988).
273. See C. Smorynski, Self-Reference and Modal Logic 1 (1985).
274. G6del's 1931 paper was originally published in German. For a translation approved by
G6del himself, see Kurt G6del, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Prncipia Mathematica
and Related Systems I, in van Heijenoort, supra note 164, at 596.
At this point, comments on some of the more common sources cited by legal !;cholars are in order.
The traditional lay introduction to G6del's work is Ernest Nagel & James R. Newman, Gi5del's Proof
(1958). This book has been much praised since its publication, but it has its critics. See John Myhill,
Book Review, 58 J. Phil. 209 (1961); Hilary Putnam, Book Review, 27 PHI. Sci. 205 (1960).
Another commonly cited source is the Pulitzer Prize-winning Hofstadter, supra note 11. Reviews of
this book tended to run to the extremes. See H.H. Pattee, Book Review, Int'l Stud. Phil., Spring
1983, at 87, 87. In any case, I would not recommend it for a focused analysis o'G6del's results and
their context. There also are citations to Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty (1980).
This book must be evaluated in the light of some penetrating critiques. For one such critique, see J.
Corcoran, Book Review, Mathematical Reviews 82e:03013 (1982).
275. For example, they encompass the versions discussed by legal scholars.
276. See Kleene & Feferman, supra note 253, at 637.
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indicates, this is not a major obstacle for the situations Hilbert proposed
to consider.277
In addition, one would want to include enough axioms and rules of
inference so that the resulting formal system satisfies two properties.
First; the system should be what is known as sound with respect to the
intended (i.e. classical) semantics; that is, all provable sentences278 are
277. This footnote considers a language appropriate for attempts to formalize the ordinary high
school arithmetic of the natural numbers.
The alphabet includes punctuation symbols, variable symbols, and propositional connective
symbols, as well as operation symbols (such as + for addition), constant symbols (such as 0 for zero),
and relation symbols (such as < for less than). Moreover, to express general statements of the type
"there exists something with property P," it includes "quantification" symbols (such as 3 for "there
exists"). More formally, the alphabet contains the following: (1) a collection of variable symbols x1,
x2 .... ; (2) the five propositional connectives A, V, , --., and -+; (3) the quantifiers 3 (the formal
counterpart of "there exists" or "existential quantification"), and V (the formal counterpart of "for
all" or "universal quantification"); (4) the arithmetic function symbols + (the formal counterpart of
"addition"), * (the formal counterpart of "multiplication"), and s (the formal counterpart of
"successor"---the successor function applied to a natural number yields that number's successor); (5)
the constant symbol 0 (the formal counterpart of "zero"); (6) the arithmetic relation symbols < (the
formal counterpart of "is less than") and = (the formal counterpart of "is equal to"); and (7) two
punctuation symbols (and).
The rules for forming formulas should correspond to the rules of mathematical syntax taught in
high school. More formally, one first describes the rules for forming "terms," which are the formal
counterparts of "arithmetic expressions." The terms are specified by the following rules: (1) 0 is a
term; (2) any variable is a term; and (3) if -rn a d t2 are terms, then so are s( 1 ), (ri + r2), and (rI * T2).
For example, 0 is a term by (1). (0 is often called the numeral for zero.) Hence s(0) is a term by (3).
(s(0) is in fact the numeral for the number one. Similarly, s(s(O)) is the numeral for the number two,
and so on.) Hence (s(0) +xi) is a term by (3).
The formulas are then specified by the following rules: (1) if T, and T2 are any two terms then
(TI = T2) and (r1 < r 2) are formulas; (2) if a and 03 are any two formulas then so are (a A f3), (at v P),
(-a), (a -> 3), and (at u 3); and (3) if a is any formula andx, is any variable, then (-xrx) and (Vx,,a)
are formulas. For example, x, is a term and 0 is a term, so (0 < xi) is a formula by (1). So
(Hxi(O <xl)) is a formula by (3). Similarly, (3x(x1 < 0)) is a formula.
Semantic content can be given to a formula in the language described above by interpreting the
symbols in the classical manner. That is, + is interpreted as addition, etc. A full discussion of
semantics is beyond the scope of this Article, but for some more details, see infra note 278.
278. This footnote continues the arithmetic discussion. Sentences have the form of a definite
mathematical proposition. For the purposes of Hilbert's first step, non-variable symbols would have
their intended classical informal interpretations. But what about the variable symbols? This is where
sentences become important. In a sentence, all instances of variables are modified by quantifiers. For
example, (x 1(0 < xi)) ("There is something greater than zero.") is a sentence, but (0 < x1) ("Zero is
less than xl.") is not a sentence. What is the importance of this distinction? Since all variables in a
sentence already are explained by their quantifiers, the sentence's semantic content is determined as
it stands, given the aforementioned interpretations of the non-variable symbols and the range of
possible values for the variables. For other formulas, we will have to go further in general and assign
values to the variables. For example, the sentence (-x1(0 < x)) is true or false as it stands, but the
semantic content of(0 <xi) requires more information about the value of x1. In this sense, sentences
have the syntactic structure of a definite mathematical statement.
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(classically) true. Second, the system should be what is known as
semantically complete with respect to the intended semantics; that is, all
true sentences are provable. Now Hilbert's original concern about
syntactic completeness (all sentences are decidable) takes on a new
importance because for the situations he proposed to consider: (1) a
sound, syntactically complete system is semantically complete,279 and (2)
a syntactically incomplete system is semantically incomplete.28
A sound, semantically complete formal system for a classical informal
system can be easily obtained by taking the axioms to be the true
sentences. One doesn't need any rule of inference! Such a system,
however, might well be too complex to analyze metatheoretically in what
Hilbert felt to be a suitable manner for his conservation goal. This
indicates that there must be a proper balance for the collections of
axioms and rules of inference. On the one hand, they should be rich
enough to capture the informal reasoning. On the other hand, the
collections should be simple enough so that the resulting formal system
is amenable to an acceptable metatheoretical analysis. It turns out that an
appropriate set of rules of inference is not difficult to delineate.2 '
Moreover, the axioms appropriate for the type of formal system sketched
here will have some technical (sometimes called logical) axioms." 2
These rules of inference and logical axioms are simple. In particular, the
set of logical axioms is what is called recursive: simple enough that the
question whether an arbitrary formula is a logical axiom can be answered
algorithmically. Given this and the fact that an appropriate language is
More formally, a sentence is a formula in which there are no so-called free variables. What is a
free variable? Any variable occurring in a formula of type (1) is free. A variabl. is free in a formula
of type (2) if it is free in a or 3. A variable is free in a formula of type (3) if it is free in a and is
not x,.
279. Take any true sentence a. By syntactic completeness, either a or its negation is provable. But
the negation, which is false, can't be provable because the system is sound.
280. A syntactically incomplete system is semantically incomplete since the informal system
embraces the law of the excluded middle. See A.G. Hamilton, Logic for Mathematicians 119 (rev.
ed. 1988). For the purposes of this Article, the law states that "for every proposition A. either A or
not A." Kleene, supra note 172, at 47.
281. The rules of inference appropriate for the type of formal system s'cetched here should
certainly include modus ponens. In fact, it turns out that there are several other more technical rules
of inference that would be included because of the use of quantifiers. A discussion of these rules is
beyond the scope of this Article. (For the purposes of this Article, quantification takes place over
individuals, as indicated supra note 277, not over relations or functions. That i;, we are considering
so-called first-order systems. For more on the implications of the phrase "first-order," see infra note
413.)
282. A discussion of the set of logical axioms is beyond the scope of this. Article, but the set
would include, for example, the instances of the schemas described supra note 228 for propositional
logic. There would be others because of the use of quantifiers.
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not a problem, the main balancing at issue in Hilbert's Program comes in
the choice of the so-called non-logical axioms.
G6del's First Incompleteness Theorem indicates the difficulties in
balancing the needs for a simple yet rich set of non-logical axioms.
Roughly speaking, what G6del's result says is the following: Let S be
any consistent formal system with a language, logical axioms, and rules
of inference of the type indicated above that has a collection of non-
logical axioms that is (1) rich enough to contain the formal counterparts
of certain elementary arithmetic assertions about the natural numbers,
and (2) simple enough to be recursive.283 Then S is syntactically
incomplete. More can be done, however. Given S, one can explicitly
produce an undecidable arithmetic sentence.284
This result casts doubt on the first step of Hilbert's Program because it
follows as a corollary, indeed it is often made part of the statement of
G~del's First Theorem, that such an S is semantically incomplete with
respect to classical arithmetic!285
On seeing G6del's First Theorem for the first time, many readers say
the following: "OK, so there's an undecidable sentence. Just add it (or its
negation) into S as one of the non-logical axioms. Now that sentence is
decidable; in fact, it is trivially provable." It is the case that the sentence
is provable in the newly created system. However, this new system also
is subject to G~del's First Theorem so that there now is a sentence
283. The non-logical axioms must be rich enough to include, for example, the formal counterparts
of various assertions about the properties of addition, multiplication, etc. A full elaboration is beyond
the scope of this Article.
284. Note that if 0 is an undecidable sentence with respect to this S, then so is (0 A c), where x
is any sentence that is a theorem of S. (This is because 0 is a theorem if (0 A a) is, and (-19) is a
theorem if (-'(0 A a)) is.) Given this and the fact that an undecidable sentence can be explicitly
produced given S, the following statement is problematic:
[M]athematical undecidables are not easy to find ....
* * . Theoretically it follows from Godel's proof that there are an infinite number of
undecidable mathematical statements, hard though they may be to discover. . . . Legal
undecidables are demonstrably denser with respect to all the legal propositions we know than
discovered mathematical undecidables are dense with respect to all the mathematical theorems
that we know.
Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 148, 173 n.80 (1990).
285. Because the various versions of the First Theorem cover the system developed in the
Logicist Principia Mathematica, the result casts grave doubts on this approach to Logicism as well.
See Tiles, supra note 98, at 116; 1. Grattan-Guinness, On the Development of Logics Between the
Two World Wars, 88 Am. Mathematical Monthly 495, 497-98 (1981); Henkin, supra note 162, at
356.
Washington Law Review
undecidable with respect to this new system!2 6 The reader may then
wonder if one can't iterate some type of addition process to avoid the
syntactic incompleteness while at the same time keeping consistency.
Yes! Indeed, standard proofs of elementary versions of the so-called
Lindenbaum Lemma establish the existence of consistent, syntactically
complete extensions of consistent systems such as S through a type of
iterated addition process.287 This iterated addition, however, comes at a
price. As the statement of Grdel's First Theorem indicates, to keep
consistency one must have thrown in so much that the set of non-logical
axioms is no longer recursive--roughly speaking, one must have thrown
in so much that one can no longer tell by algorithmic means whether an
arbitrary formula is a non-logical axiom!288
G6del's so-called Second Incompleteness Theorem raises questions
about the second step in Hilbert's Program." 9 Roughly speaking, what it
says is the following: Let S be any consistent formal system with a
language, logical axioms, and rules of inference of the type indicated
above that has a collection of non-logical axioms that is: (1) rich enough
to contain the formal counterparts of certain elemertary arithmetic
assertions about the natural numbers, and (2) recursive. 'sO Then S does
not prove the formal arithmetic counterpart of a certain natural (i.e. of the
type Hilbert envisioned)29' statement of its own consistency. That is, as a
matter of metatheoretical interpretation, the counterparl says that S is
consistent. As a matter of classical interpretation, the sentence is merely
some complicated arithmetic statement about the natural numbers.
This result casts doubt on the second step of Hilbert's Program
because to the extent that the types of metatheoretical arguments Hilbert
envisioned for these natural statements of consistency are encompassed
286. With some work, one can show that the new system S' is consistent. That is, adding an
undecidable sentence to a consistent system dors not affect consistency. See Mendelson, supra note
228, at 63. Moreover, S' will be rich enough ifS is. Finally, the addition of a single axiom does not
affect the recursivity of the set of non-logical axioms.
287. See Mendelson, supra note 228, at 64-65.
288. For a discussion of this sort of problem with the Lindenbaum Lemma, sze id.
289. See Kleene & Feferman, supra note 253, at 638.
290. Further elaboration is beyond the scope of this Article, but the set cf non-logical axioms
would be more extensive than that required for the First Theorem.
291. For the importance of the qualifier "natural," see infra text accompanying notes 324-27.
Vol. 71:51, 1996
Interdisciplinary Legal Research
by the types of formal systems described, the result indicates the
impossibility of obtaining such arguments. As one mathematician puts it,
"[Gi3del] had proven two theorems which were then considered
moderately devastating and which still induce nightmares among the
infirm.
2 92
Having indicated the balancing that led to the systems Gidel
examined, it is useful to give some idea of techniques that can be used to
obtain these results. Hilbert's Program involves carefully balanced
consistent formal systems. On the one hand, the systems should be rich
enough to capture sophisticated informal systems. On the other hand, the
systems should be simple enough to be amenable to an acceptable
metatheoretical analysis. In essence, what the techniques described here
do is to turn this balancing against itself.
The key insight is that the elementary arithmetic assumptions (EAA)
portion of the axioms of our system S is able to encode much of what is
external to S.293 For the purposes of the discussion of Gidel's First
Theorem, 294 such an encoding has two essential features.
The first essential feature of the encoding is that in some sense EAA
allows certain arithmetic sentences to refer to themselves.295 This self-
referencing feature of encoding essentially is due to the fact that the
elementary arithmetic portion is rich enough to contain the formal
counterparts of a good deal of informal arithmetic reasoning.
Second, EAA in some sense can accurately check purported proofs in
S.296 This feature of the encoding ability essentially is due to the fact that
292. Smorynski, supra note 253, at 825.
293. The encoding has as its heart the so-called G6del numbering technique, in which numbers
are assigned to (sequences of) formulas.
294. There are several approaches to the proofs of G6del's Theorems. This approach is based on
J.N. Crossley et al., What Is Mathematical Logic? (1972); Smorynski, supra note 253, at 825-41.
For another approach, see id. at 860-64.
295. More specifically, let P(x) be an arithmetic formula. This notation is meant to indicate that
the formula P really is a formula only about xr--that is, x, is the only free variable. See supra note
278. One can show that there is an arithmetic sentence a such that (the system whose non-logical
axioms are the) EAA proves that a is equivalent to P([a]), where [a] is the numeral denoting the
Gddel number of a, and [a] has been "substituted" for x, in P(xj). (Numerals are described more
filly supra note 277. The definition of substitution is beyond the scope of this Article.) That is,
(a (-> P((a])) is a theorem of EAA. In this sense, a is a sentence that refers to itself in terms of the
formula P(x1 ).
296. More specifically, there is an arithmetic formula Proofs(xj,x2) (thought of as saying "xz is a
proof in this system S ofxl") such that for any numbers a andp (with numerals a and p), (I) ifa is
the Gddel number of a formula a and p is the G6del number of a proof of a in S, then the formula
Proofs(a,p) is a theorem of EAA-from which it will follow by one of the logical axioms dealing
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(1) the collections of axioms and rules of inference of S are simple
enough that purported proofs can be easily checked,297 and (2) EAA is
rich enough to reflect such checking.
In rough outline, one can establish G6del's First Theorem as follows.
Using the encoding ability, one can produce an arithmetic sentence, here
denoted by r, that can be thought of as saying, "I am unprovable in the
system S."298 That is, as a matter of metatheoretical interpretation, the
sentence says that the sentence is unprovable in S. As a matter of
classical interpretation, the sentence is merely some complicated
arithmetic statement. This 71 is the so-called G6del sentence that Grdel
developed by considering the ancient Liar-type Paradoxes.299 G6del
metatheoretically used the consistency of S to show that r is not a
theorem of S."30 To show that the negation of it is not a theorem of S,
with quantification that (3x2Proofs(a,x2)) is a theorem of EAA; (2) otherwise, ('Proofs(a,p)) is a
theorem of EAA.
In essence, this formula is constructed from a number of other arithmetic formulas encoding
various syntactic concepts. For example, there is a formula Forms(x) (thought of as saying "x3 is a
formula in the language of S") such that for any number a (with numeral a). (1) if a is the G6del
number of a formula cc then the formula Forms(a) is a theorem of EAA; (2) oth -rwise, ('Forms(a)) is
a theorem of EAA.
297. G6del's original simplicity requirement was in fact more stringent than that described in the
text. His formulation of the requirement helped stimulate sustained and systematic investigation of
the concept of "algorithmically computable." See Stephen C. Kleene, Origins of Recursive Function
Theory, 3 Annals Hist. Computing 52, 52-53 (1981).
This concept is important, and it is worth providing some discussion. The dream that reasoning can
be reduced to some kind of calculation has influenced much of Western tlought in general and
mathematical thought in particular. See Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do: The Lifts of
Artificial Intelligence 67-87 (rev. ed. 1979) (discussing influence on Western thought); Hans
Hermes, Enumerability, Decidability, Computability 26-30 (2d rev. ed. 1969) (discussing influence
on mathematical thought). Indeed, Hilbert was interested in the algorithmic solvability of his so-
called Entscheidungsproblem. See supra note 247. During the first half of the 1930s, mathematicians
settled on a notion of recursive that is intended to be the mathematical counterpart of the concept of
algorithmically computable. The (non-mathematical) assertion that the mathematical notion captures
this concept is the so-called Church-Turing-Kleene-Post Thesis. See Hartley Rogers, Jr., Theory of
Recursive Functions and Effective Computability 1-21 (1967); see also Kleene, supra, at 59.
As this work on recursivity was progressing, mathematicians realized that G0del's original
requirement could be relaxed to that described in the text. See Stephen C. Kleene, The Work of Kurt
Gddel, 41 J. Symbolic Logic 761, 769 (1976). Moreover, Alonzo Church (and independently Alan
Turing) showed that Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem was not recursively solvable by showing that
in certain formal arithmetic systems, the set of theorems is not recursive. Alonzo Church, A Note on
the Entscheidungsproblem, 1 J. Symbolic Logic 40 (1936); A.M. Turing, On Computable Numbers,
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, 42 Proc. London Mathematical Soc'y 230 (1937).
298. Let P(xi) be the formula ("(Hx 2Proofs(xx 2))). Then the corresponding self-referencing
sentence can be thought of as saying, "I am unprovable in the system S."
299. See Gddel, supra note 274, at 598.
300. For ease of notation, let Provs(xi) denote (3x 2Proofs(x, x 2)). That is, Provs(x) can be thought
of as saying, "xi is provable in the system S." Suppose nt were a theorem of S. It follows from (1) of
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however, he needed to strengthen the consistency requirement to what is
called o-consistency.3"' This strengthening to 1-consistency is necessary,
otherwise the system might prove the negation of the Gbdel sentence.0 2
By using a slightly different arithmetic sentence, however, J.B. Rosser
was able to relax the requirement back to consistency.3 3
It is worth making one further comment on Gdel's original paper and
the First Theorem. As noted above, arithmetical syntactic incompleteness
for S implies arithmetical semantic incompleteness.3" Gtdel himself,
however, was able to obtain arithmetical syntactic incompleteness for S
only by strengthening the consistency requirement to o-consistency
(although Rosser later was able to remove this shortcoming).
Nonetheless, G6del's paper did contain the arithmetical semantic
incompleteness result for S under the weaker hypothesis of consistency
because: (1) he was able to show that the Gtdel sentence is unprovable,
and (2) he noted that the Gtdel sentence is true.305
the second encoding property, see supra note 296, that Provs([it]) is a theorem of EAA, hence of S.
And by the definition of it, we have that (Provs(fic]) -> (-t)) is a theorem of EAA hence of S. Thus,
by modus ponens we would have that (-7t) is also a theorem of S. This would contradict the
consistency ofS.
301. Roughly speaking, S is o)-inconsistent if there is some property such that it is provable that
there is something satisfying the property, but for anything specifically chosen, S proves that the
thing does not satisfy the property. More technically, S is co-inconsistent if there is a formula A(x2)
such that (x 2A(x 2)) is a theorem of S, but for each natural number p, (-A(p)) is a theorem of S.
Clearly, o-consistency implies consistency because an inconsistent system proves all formulas. But
consistency does not imply co-consistency. See infra note 309.
Now one establishes the unprovability of the negation as follows. Suppose that (-n) were a
theorem of S. Then by the definition of irt, it would follow that (-x2Proofs([7t],x2)) is a theorem of S.
Now by the consistency ofS it cannot be the case that it is a theorem of S. It follows from (2) of the
second encoding property, see supra note 296, that for each natural number p, ("Proofs([I],p)) is a
theorem of EAA (hence of S). However, if"(3x 2Proofs([ir],x2)) is a theorem of S and ('Proofs([it],p))
is a theorem of S for all natural numbers p, then S is co-inconsistent.
302. See infra note 309.
303. Rosser changed the formula P(xi) described supra note 295 so that the resulting self-
referencing sentence could be read as saying, "If there is a proof of me in the system S, then there is
an earlier proof in S of my negation." For the details, see Kleene, supra note 172, at 208-09;
Mendelson, supra note 228, at 144-46.
304. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
305. That is, the G6del sentence is true as a matter of classical interpretation. G6del's original
paper emphasized syntactic rather than semantic incompleteness, although he did mention semantic
incompleteness. See GOdel, supra note 274, at 596-99. He was hesitant to enter into a debate on the
nature of mathematical truth in a climate he believed to be dominated by Formalist ideas. See
Solomon Feferman, Kurt G~del: Conviction and Caution, in Gtdel's Theorem in Focus 96, 106-08
(S.G. Shanker ed., 1988) [hereinafter Shanker]. By 1934, he was more explicit. See Kurt G6del, On
Undecidable Propositions of Formal Mathematical Systems, in The Undecidable 41, 64-65 (Martin
Davis ed., 1965).
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Establishing G6del's Second Theorem30 6 requires in essence a more
sophisticated EAA with additional encoding features that allow the EAA
to encode part of the argument for the First Theorem.3"7 As stated above,
G6del used the consistency of S to show that r is not a t:heorem of S.303
Using the additional encoding features, it can be shown that EAA can
follow enough of the argument so that the formal arithmetic counterpart
of "IfS is consistent then 7t is not provable in S" is a theorem of EAA. By
the definition of t, however, this means that the formal arithmetic
counterpart of "IfS is consistent then 7t" is a theorem of EAA, and hence
of S. But then S cannot prove the formal counterpart of its own
consistency else it would prove 7c, violating the First Theorem.30 9
Metatheoretically, the argument for truth is as follows. EAAs are sound. Thus, (7t <-> (-Provs([it])))
is true. Now it has just been seen that 7t is not a theorem of S. The truth of(-'Prvs([it])) follows from
a metatheoretical consideration of its construction. Thus, 7t is true.
Why is this only a metatheoretical argument? As described above, there are three types of systems
under consideration: (1) the informal that is to 1e captured; (2) the formal that is to do the capturing,
and (3) the metatheoretical. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. What has just been
presented is not a system (I) argument for the truth of 7t, but rather a system (3) argument. However,
one can choose to turn such a system (3) argument into an informal system ar.,mnent by restricting
the discussion to (G6del) numbers. Cf. Kleene, supra note 172, at 206.
306. Interestingly, G6del himself sketched but did not prove his Second Theorem. See G6del,
supra note 274, at 614-16. He intended to provide the details in a later paper, but the paper never did
appear. See id. at 616 & n.68a.
307. The approach here is based on Smorynshi, supra note 253.
308. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
309. Specifically, one takes a particular formal counterpart of consistency, call it CONs. For
example, one may take CONs to be the statement asserting that it is not the case that S proves 7r and S
proves ('-nt), where 7c denotes the G6del sentence for S. Thus, CONs would be the formula
(-(Provs([7t)) A Provs([(-t)]))). Given the discussion of consistency supra note 238 and
accompanying text, there are other choices. They are all provably equivalent in the type of EAA
envisioned by the Second Theorem. That is, if one takes a CON's based on one of the other
definitions, then (CONs <-> CON's) is a theorem of EAA.
The heart of the Second Theorem is showing that (CONs - t) is a thec rem of EAA. Hence
(CONs -- it) is a theorem of S. So S cannot prove CONs-else S would prove 7t, violating the First
Theorem.
Now how does one show that (CONs -- it) is a theorem of EAA? This gets recily technical!
As mentioned in the text, one needs an EAA with additional properties. With them, EAA can
encode enough of(1) of the second encoding property described supra note 296. Basically, such an
EAA proves the formal counterpart of, "IfS proves a, then S proves that S provs a." Specifically, if
a is a formula, then the following is a theorem of such an EAA:
(Provs([a]) - Provs([Provs([a])])), where [cc] is the G6del number of a.
Also, such an EAA can encode modus ponens. Basically, such an EAA proves the formal
counterpart of, "If S proves a and S proves (a -+ 3), then S proves 3." Specifically, if at and 3 are
formulas, then the following is a theorem of such an EAA:
((Provs([a]) A Provs([( -- 3)])) - Provs([P]) ).
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In light of the above discussion, some of the descriptions of Gidel's
Theorems that appear in the legal literature are what only can be called
confused. One article tells us that "as Kurt GSdel demonstrated, any
formal logical system ultimately rests on some undecidable--that is,
With these two additional encoding properties, one can show that (CONs -+ 7r) is a theorem of
such an EAA. In essence, one begins by encoding the argument given supra note 300, reproduced as
follows with annotations keyed to the discussion below:
Suppose it were a theorem of S. It follows from (1) of the second encoding property that
Provs([it]) is a theorem of EAA, hence of S (*). And by the definition of it, we have that
(Provs([it]) -- (-nit)) is a theorem of EAA hence of S (**). Thus, by modus ponens we would
have that (",n) is also a theorem of S (***). This would contradict the consistency of S (****).
Then one proceeds as indicated in the text, reproduced as follows with annotations keyed to the
discussion below:
Using the additional encoding features, it can be shown that EAA can follow enough of the
argument so that the formal counterpart of "If S is consistent then n is not provable in S" is a
theorem of EAA (*****). By the definition of 7t, however, this means that the formal counterpart
of"IfS is consistent then 7t" is a theorem of EAA. hence of S(******).
Here we go!
By the third encoding property, the following is a theorem of EAA:
(*) (Provs([it]) -). Provs([Provs([t])])).
By the definition of it and (I) of the second encoding property, the following is a theorem of EAA:
(**) Provs([(Provs([ItI) --> (-t))]).
By the fourth encoding property and the fact that (*) and (**) are theorems of EAA, the following is
a theorem of EAA:
(***) (Provs([ir]) -> Provs(["it)])).
Hence the following is a theorem of EAA:
(Provs([7E]) -+ (Provs([it]) A Provs([(-t)J))).
Hence by the definition of CONs the following is a theorem ofEAA:
(****) (Provs(t]) -> ('CONs) ).
Hence the following is a theorem of EAA:
(*****) ( CONs -> ('Provs([iT])) ).
Hence by the definition ofit the following is a theorem of EAA:
(******) (CONs -> n).
Having established the Second Theorem, we finish with an observation and three remarks.
Observe that by the definitions of CONs and 7t, (7c -). CONs) is a theorem of EAA. Using this
observation and (******), we remark that EAA proves that the G6del sentence for S is equivalent to
CONs. As an additional remark, one can use this observation to see why the G6del sentence will not
suffice to establish syntactic incompleteness. Take a system T to which the Second Theorem applies.
Consider the system 7' obtained by adding the axiom ('CONr). The consistency of T' follows from
the fact that T does not prove CONr. See Mendelson, supra note 228, at 63. Moreover, it is not
difficult to see that T' proves its own inconsistency, hence, by the observation, the negation of its
Gddel sentence. Finally, we remark that such a 7' is consistent but, because it proves the negation of
its G6del sentence, co-inconsistent by G6del's original version of the First Theorem.
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unprovable--propositions."'31  Another refers to "G6del's proof of
ultimate inconsistency in mathematics." '' A third explains that "A
'complete' theorem is inconsistent if it is an axiom. Nothing purely
complete is proved."3 2
Other descriptions have problems with the subtleties of the First
Theorem. Some articles have trouble with the definition of an
undecidable sentence313 or the distinction between truth (semantics) and
310. Loevinger, supra note 5, at 343. See also Richard A. Givens, Manual of Federal Practice
§ 9.26 (4th ed. Supp. March 1995) (characterizing G6del's Theorem as showing that "no formal
system can describe even in theory all of the information needed for its operation"); Boris I. Bittker.
The Erwin Griswold Lecture, I1 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 213, 216 (1995) ("Goedel was a am-of-the-
century mathematician who looked at a number of mathematical propositions and proved, at least to
the satisfaction of people who understand these things, that certain of those propositions could never
be proved as either true or false.").
311. Aoki, supra note 6, at 382 (quoting Venturi, supra note 6, at 16).
312. Jaffee, supra note 7, at 1193. Purcell describes G6del's results as follows:
[G6del] demonstrated to the satisfaction of most of his colleagues that it was theoretically
impossible to produce any final or ultimate solution to the problem of the foundations of
mathematical logic.
Purcell, supra note 51, at 56.
In the quotation above, Purcell cites Parsons but what Parsons says is that "[t]he first theorem...
undermines most attempts at a final solution to the problem of foundations by nieans of mathematical
logic." Parsons, supra note 253, at 208. What Parsons means by "mathematical logic" is Hilbert's
approach.
Given these two statements and the comment supra note 285, the reader might try to evaluate the
following:
[T]here are good reasons to handle the concept of rationality with caution: at least since Goedel
proposed his eponymous theorem, there has been good reason to believe that mathematics,
supposedly the purest expression of human reason, rests at bottom on begg,,d questions rather
than logical proof. At least that is one interpretation of the theorem's implications. [G6del's
First Theorem] deals only with the possibility of establishing the logical foundations of the real
number system.
Paul B. Stephan III, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Econotric Law: Barbarians
Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 Am. U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 745, 750-51 & n.5 (1995).
313. Rogers and Molzon seem to imply that a statement that is true but unprovable is undecidable:
[G6del] proved that if a number theory system's set of axioms is complex enough to include
simple arithmetic, then there are true statements within the system that cannot be reached using
the axioms and rules of the system. In other words, he proved that such systems have formally
undecidable propositions.
Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4, at 993. However, if one takes the system T' described supra note
309, the consistency sentence for T' is true, but its negation is provable. In this r.-gard, one also might
want to consider the statement that "in any consistent system the statemert that the system is
consistent.., is... undecidable." Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier, Logic and Law: The Precedence of
Precedents, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 655, 662 (1967).
For another example of a confused notion of undecidable, consider the statement that
"mathematical undecidables are not easy to find, and there is always the possibility that they will
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theoremhood (syntax).314 The most important errors, however, have to do
with the limits of what the First Theorem says. For the conclusion that a
someday be proved, e.g., the four-color mapping problem (recently proved by computer)." D'Amato,
supra note 284, at 173 n.80.
314. It is unfortunate to see statements such as:
Godel's Theorem demonstrates that any formalization of arithmetic will be incomplete. That is,
no matter what axioms one chooses as the basis from which to prove the truths of arithmetic,
there will always exist propositions that can neither be proved true nor false. There will always
be gaps, and the addition of further axioms for arithmetic will not fill the gaps. Thus, an infinity
of unprovable propositions will always remain.
Kevin W. Saunders, Realism, Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 Okla. L. Rev. 219, 219 (1993). For other
examples, see Bittker, supra note 310, at 216 ("Goedel was a turn-of-the-century mathematician who
looked at a number of mathematical propositions and proved, at least to the satisfaction of people
who understand these things, that certain of those propositions could never be proved as either true
or false."); Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363, 370 n.8 (1986) ("If
a system is logically incomplete, then there are statements that are neither provably true nor provably
false."); Girardeau A. Spann, Secret Rights, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 669, 698 n.58 (1987) [hereinafter
Spann, Secret] ("G6del has demonstrated that within closed, consistent logical systems having a
threshold level of complexity and sophistication, there exist formally undecidable statements-
propositions whose truth or falsity can never be proven."); Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the
Legislative Veto, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 540 (1984) [hereinafter Spann, Deconstructing] (stating that
Godel's work showed mathematicians that "the categories of 'true' and 'false' were not
exhaustive"); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332, 366 n.146 (1986)
("In logic, 'incomplete' means that in any theory that attempts to formalize the area, there will be
sentences that cannot be proved either true or false."); Kelso, supra note 11, at 831 ("Gdel's
theorem is proven by constructing a function from within the set of permissible functions which...
neither can be included as true nor rejected as false on logical grounds.").
Others waver between relatively precise distinctions and potentially misleading colloquialisms.
Such an expository approach is not objectionable when dealing with an audience that has some
familiarity with the topic of discussion, but it is inadvisable when dealing with readers who have no
prior exposure.
At one point, Brown & Greenberg, for example, do quote Roger Penrose's discussion of the
distinction between syntax and semantics. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1466 n.147.
On the other hand, they make the following statement:
Consider a classical formal system such as arithmetic.... Its proof rules implement certain
logical operations, such as "if P and Q are true then P is true," as well as basic applications of
the arithmetic operations .... such as "x +y =y + x." These axioms and arithmetical operations
provide the recipe for deducing theorems and truths about the system.
Id. at 1445 (footnotes omitted). They also say that "[a] 'formal system' ... is a reasoning process
designed to... deduce truths." Id. Finally, they say that "[t]he ability to prove a single inconsistency
would so infect the entire system that all propositions (and their negations) would be true!" Id. at
1448.
At one point, Rogers & Molzon say that "the concepts of truth and derivation are not at all
equivalent." Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4, at 996. They also say that "[f]rom a limited number of
axioms, the number theorist-like the mathematician generally---develops (proves) other statements
(theorems)." Id. at 993. On the other hand, they say that "[i]n a particular 'system,' propositions must
be expressed in a certain way and a particular set of axioms (assumed truths) and rules is used to
generate a set of properly expressed statements that are 'true."' Id. They further say that "[ilt is
possible that every consistent system of statements that is expressive enough to include self-
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consistent system S with a language, logical axioms, and rules of
inference of the type indicated above is syntactically incomplete, the
theorem has two requirements: (1) S must satisfy the ceiling requirement
that it is simple enough that the question whether an arbitrary formula is
a non-logical axiom can be answered algorithmically and (2) the floor
requirement that it is complex enough to contain the formal counterparts
of a certain amount of elementary arithmetic. One can see how these
requirements flow out of the balancing that is itself a product of the
intellectual context of the Theorem; this is one reason why history is
important. Not all formal systems satisfy these requirements. For
example, the system whose non-logical axioms are the classically true
arithmetic sentences is sound, syntactically complete, and semantically
complete (hence includes EAA and so satisfies the floor requirement).
But this set of non-logical axioms is not recursive, and hence the system
does not satisfy the ceiling requirement.3"5 Moreover, if one restricts the
language to addition (or to multiplication), then with respect to this
restriction the system whose non-logical axioms are the classically true
sentences is sound, syntactically complete, and semantically complete. In
addition, this set of non-logical axioms is recursive (hence the system
satisfies the ceiling requirement).316 But this set of non-logical axioms
does not include EAA, and hence the system does not satisfy the floor
requirement. Note also that G6del's First Theorem does not assert that
every consistent formal system is syntactically incomplete. Indeed, the
Lindenbaum Lemma contradicts any such assertion. 1 Nonetheless,
descriptions in a number of law articles indicate little or no sensitivity to
referential statements includes some statements that turn on themselves in this way--statements that
cannot be proved true or false within the system." Id.
For another example, compare Dow, supra note 4, at 713 & n.29 (separating "formally
demonstrable" and "true") with id. at 712 ("Gtdel proved '... . that within any consistent formal
system, there will be a sentence that can neither be proved true nor proved false. (quoting R.
Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius 295 n.* (1990))).
315. See Hamilton, supra note 280, at 154-55.
316. See Hao Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy 174 (1974).
317. See supra note 287. Whether any system not subject to G6del's Theorems and their
generalizations can serve as a suitable foundational vehicle for mathematics is 2et to be determined.
See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 313. In any case, there are those who maintain that "quite a large
part" of Hilbert's Program actually survives G6lel's results. See Simpson, supra note 184, at 353.
What they offer are formal systems within which one can carry out quite a bit of infinitary reasoning
and for which one can carry out a modified version of the conservation goal. See Solomon Feferman,
Hilbert's Program Relativized: Proof-Theoretical and Foundational Reductions, 53 J. Symbolic
Logic 364 (1988); Sieg, supra note 272; Simpson, supra note 184. For another discussion of some
things that can be done with this Article's version of Hilbert's Program in the wake of G6del, see
Prawitz, supra note 253, at 262-72. For a different view of Hilbert's Program and its defense in the
wake of G6del, see Detlefsen, supra note 253.
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the limits of what G6del's First Theorem says. One article tells us that
"to G6del we owe the insight that every mathematical system contains
'undecidable arithmetic propositions'." '318 Another article says that "in
mathematics, a system of explanation cannot be both complete and
consistent."3" 9
"Grading" descriptions of G6del's First Theorem is futile, but some
generalizations can be made along the following lines. As in the two
preceding quotations, the descriptions in some articles more or less miss
the boat entirely, recognizing neither a ceiling nor a floor requirement.32
Some authors arguably allude to one or more aspects of the requirements,
but it is not always clear that the authors realize the significance.32' Many
318. John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the
McCarran-Walter Act, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1481, 1525 (1988).
319. Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension
for the New Legal Process, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 83, 89 n.36 (1989).
320. See Banner, supra note 45, at 253 n.33 ("[G6del] proved that a mathematical/logical system
cannot be both complete and consistent; that is, a system cannot contain both all true propositions
and only true propositions."); Steven P. Goldberg, On Legal and Mathematical Reasoning, 22
Jurimetrics 83, 87 n.26 (1981) ("G6del's incompleteness theorem ... establishes that within any
axiomatic system there is a statement S such that neither S nor not-S is a theorem."); Susan K.
Houser, Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 1139. 1152 (1993) ("Godel
proved that a mathematical system is inherently incomplete in that there are assertions that can never
be either proved or disproved within the system of known mathematics."); Nancy Levit, Ethereal
Torts, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 136, 136 n.3 (1992) ("[A]ny internally consistent mathematical system
will be incomplete, in that the system will contain some unprovable propositions."); Rudolph J.
Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 956, 999 n.214 ("Some sixty years ago,
mathematician and logician Kurt G6del published his Incompleteness Theorem, a demonstration of
the necessary incompleteness of sound formal systems ...."); Spann, Deconstructing, supra note
314, at 540 (stating that G6del's work showed mathematicians that "the categories of 'true' and
'false' were not exhaustive"); Roy Stone, Affinities and Antinomies in Jurisprudence, 1964
Cambridge L.J. 266, 281 ("G6del's theorem ... says that where in a logical system a statement in the
system is provable, it is refutable in the system, and where it is refutable it is provable.");
Greenwood, supra note 237, at 576 ("In pure mathematics... G6del demonstrated that a system
cannot be both consistent and complete ....").
321. See Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Even axiomatic math cannot
yield 'factual' (logically true) statements about all interesting arithmetical relations, as G6del and
Turing established."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Komstein, supra note 9, at 126 ("G6del
proved that a logical system that has any richness can never be complete ...."); Dan L. Burk &
Barbara A. Boczar, Biotechnology and Tort Liability: An Industry at Risk, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 791,
825 (1994) ("In mathematics ... the work of Kurt G6del disclosed the disturbing proposition that no
formal system that includes at least arithmetic can be both complete and consistent."); Craig
Calhoun, Social Theory and the Law: Systems Theory, Normative Justification, and Postmodernism,
83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 398, 408 (1989) (referring to "Kurt Godel's proof of the insufficiency of the
arithmetic postulates"); Vivian G. Curran, Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the Law,
36 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 28 n.71 (1994) (stating that G6deI demonstrated "'the impossibility of
constructing a theoretical system within which all true statements of number theory are theorems"'
(quoting Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism 133
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(1982))); Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 Va.
L. Rev. 561, 597 (1989) ("G6del ... proved that there are some mathematical propositions ... that
can neither be proved nor disproved within a mathematical system of at least enough complexity as
to include ordinary arithmetic."); D.H. Kaye, The Logic andAnti-Logic of Secret Rights, 72 Minn. L.
Rev. 603, 617 n.71 ("Gdel's proof does demonstrate that there are arithmetic truths that cannot be
proved within a strictly formal system."); Warren Lehman, Rules in Lav, 72 Geo. L.J. 1571, 1592 &
n.59 (1984) ("[E]ven arithmetic cannot be treated as a closed system.... Got-del's Theorem...
announced the impossibility in mathematics of a completely closed system."); Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Subject: Object, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 53 (1992) ("Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem ...
mathematically proves that all statements within a fixed number system cannot be mathematically
proved."); Spann, Secret, supra note 314, at 698 n.58 ("Gidel has demonstrated that within closed,
consistent logical systems having a threshold level of complexity and sophistication, there exist
formally undecidable statements--propositions whose truth or falsity can never be proven."); Stick,
supra note 314, at 366 n.146 ("Kurt G6del demonstrated by means of his incompleteness theorems
that even elementary areas of mathematics such as first-order arithmetic are incomplete."); John T.
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 83, 124
n.215 (1986) ("Even in arithmetic, G6del has shown, one cannot have both completeness and
consistency."); Williams, supra note 12, at 439 (stating that G6del's "incompleteness theorem"
demonstrates "that arithmetic cannot be both complete and internally consistent"); Jennifer L. Orff,
Note, Demanding Justice Without Truth: The Diffculty of Post Modern Feminist Legal Theory, 28
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1197, 1202 (1995) (quoting Williams, supra note 12. at 439); Veilleux, supra
note 81, at 1997 ("G6del's Theorem demonstrates the impossibility of a compleie, consistent logical
system of any complexity."); Mary I. Coombs. Lowering One's Cites: A (Sort ol) Review of the
University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1102 n.16 (1990) (book
review) ("[Complex mathematical systems can never be both self-contained and complete.");
Bernard E. Jacob, Ancient Rhetoric, Modern Legal Thought, and Politics: A Review Essa' on the
Translation of Viehweg's "Topics and Law", 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1622, 1657 n.126 (1995) (book
review) ("Gdel's Proof is a widely accepted metamathematical theorem ihat shows that no
mathematical axiomatic system of complexity is 'complete'."); David E.B. Smith, Just When You
Thought It Was Safe to Go Back into the Bluebook." Notes on the Fifteenth Edition, 67 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 275, 275 n.1 (1991) (book review) ("[N]o sufficiently complex mathematical system can
simultaneously achieve completeness and consistency.").
It is often difficult to decide whether a quotation should be placed in this or the preceding
footnote. For example, it is possible to find some allusion to the floor requirement in Jean W. Bums,
Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for Consistency, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1239,
1287 n.218 ("As Kurt G6del proved in 1931, mathematics cannot be both internally consistent and
complete at the same time...."); Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 44 n.96
(1983) ("[T]he closer that economics might come to mathematical precision, the more likely it is that
a 'Godel' problem will arise, where no improvement in the system's postulates xill suffice to answer
as a formal matter all the economic-law problems that may confront it."); Thomas C. Heller,
Structuralism and Critique, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 154 n.52 (describing "Goedel's proposition that
logic, mathematics, and other complex systems can never be fully described by a closed set of
rules"); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing Revisited: How Far Will Law and
Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 74 (1985) ("Gdel and others have laid
to rest any hope of discovering the one grand and complete set of axioms from which all true
statements of mathematics can be derived.").
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of those who make some attempt to describe the limits of what GSdel has
to say slip into misleading generalities.322 Very few authors avoid these
problems.3"
322. Such an expository approach is not objectionable when dealing with an audience that has
some familiarity with the topic of discussion, but it is inadvisable when dealing with readers who
have no prior exposure. At one point, for example. Saunders does say:
[G6del's First Theorem] works in mathematics, because Godel managed to express the
metalanguage for arithmetic, the language used to talk about arithmetic, within arithmetic. In
order for Godel's Theorem to apply to law, it would seem that the same feat must be
accomplished for law. More is required than showing that laws may be self-referential or that
law may have rules and metarules. Required is a demonstration that the metalanguage of law--
legal English--can in some sense be embedded in the law.
Saunders, supra note 314, at 220 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, he says:
Godel's Theorem demonstrates that any formalization of arithmetic will be incomplete. That is,
no matter what axioms one chooses as the basis from which to prove the truths of arithmetic,
there always will exist propositions that can rieither be proved true nor false. There swill always
be gaps, and the addition of further axioms for arithmetic will not fill the gaps. Thus, an infinity
of unprovable propositions will always remain.
Id. at 219. Compare Dow, supra note 4, at 713 (quoting Roger Penrose's precise description of
G6del's First Theorem) with id. at 712 ("G6del proved '... . that within any consistent formal system,
there will be a sentence that can neither be proved true nor proved false .... ' (quoting Monk, supra
note 314, at 295 n.*)); compare Kelso, supra note 11, at 831-32 (attempting to describe two
encoding properties used in establishing G6del's First Theorem) with id. at 834 n.48 ("G6del's
theorem does prevent any mathematical system of axioms from even being complete and
consistent."); compare Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4, at 996 (discussing inclusion of arithmetic
and use of encoding properties) with id. at 993 ("[l]f a number theory system's set of axioms is
complex enough to include simple arithmetic, then there are true statements within the system that
cannot be reached using the axioms and rules of the system.") and id. at 996 n.9 ("G6del's
incompleteness result holds in any... language which is expressive enough to describe arithmetic
with addition and multiplication.") and id. at 1022 ("Analogy to G6del's Theorem teaches a more
fundamental lesson: any sufficiently expressive formal system must have undecidable
propositions."); compare John M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept
of Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 195, 224-25 (1980) (providing somewhat vague discussion of
limitations) with id. at 225 ("G6del demonstrated that a deductive logical system sophisticated
enough to express arithmetic is necessarily either inconsistent or incomplete."); compare Stone-de
Montpensier, supra note 313, at 664, 670 n.54 (quoting Hao Wang's description of G6del's First
Theorem and describing importance of recursivity requirement) with id. at 662 ("The G6del result
shows that if a statement in a mathematical system is provable it is refutable, and if it is not provable
it is not refutable.").
323. Perhaps the best description, so far as it goes, is contained in Brown & Greenberg, supra
note 4. They quote scientist Roger Penrose's definition of formal system to include a finite set of
axioms, id. at 1445, and state that "G6del demonstrated that formal systems powerful enough to
express the axioms and propositions of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent," id. at
1466. Penrose seems to mean a finite set of axiom schemas, but it is clear that his notion is meant to
imply that the set of non-logical axioms is recursive. This seems to be the implication that Brown &
Greenberg draw as well. Id. at 1445-46. They also point out that his argument was "closely tied to
the specific formal system he considered." Id. at 1467. They also emphasize the existence of
limitations. Id. at 1467 n.150. For another example, see Brilmayer, supra note 314, at 370 n.8 ("The
mathematician G6del proved that certain types of mathematical systems are incomplete .... ").
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There are similar problems with the treatment of the Second Theorem.
Once again, the limitations are closely tied to the history. G6del's
Second Theorem does not say that it is impossible to argue for
consistency. Metatheoretical arguments for consistency are available for
a wide variety of formal systems.324 Moreover, for certain arithmetic
systems there are particular statements of consistency (although not of
the type Hilbert envisioned) that are metatheoretically equivalent to the
statement used in the Second Theorem,325 and whose formal counterparts
can be proved within the system. 26 Indeed, mathematicians warn that
"care needs to be taken in stating exactly what has been proven in this
area."327 Many articles, however, indicate little or no sensitivity to these
distinctions. One article tells us, for example, that "G6del proved that a
logical system that has any richness can never be ... guaranteed to be
consistent." '328 Another article says that "[e]ven arithmetic, Kurt G6del
has shown, cannot be shown to be internally logically consistent." '329
"Grading" descriptions of G6del's Second Theorem also is futile, but
some generalizations can be made along the followiag lines. Few
mention that there exist arguments for the consistency of various
324. Indeed, several years after G6del's work was published, Gerhard Gentzen provided
arguments (although not quite as simple as Hilbert would have liked) for an important arithmetic
formal system known as Peano Arithmetic. G6del's Second Theorem indicates the impossibility of
establishing the consistency of Peano Arithmetic by means as simple as Hilbert would have liked
(finitary means). What Gentzen did was add to Hilbert's finitistic machinery a certain amount of
infinitary machinery. He showed that this new metatheoretical machinery wits strong enough to
prove the consistency of Peano Arithmetic. See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, al 314; Gaisi Takeuti,
Proqf Theory 114 (1987). Gentzen's techniques are what this Article calls proof-theoretic or
metamathematical techniques. See supra note 254. Moving in the other direction, one can prove the
consistency of "large chunks" of Peano Arithmetic by finitary proof-theoretic means. See Richard
Kaye, Models of Peano Arithmetic 140 (1991).
The consistency of the systems described supra text accompanying notes 315--6 follows from the
fact that a set of sentences true in some model is consistent. For a discussion of this fact, see Jane
Bridge, Beginning Model Theory: The Completeness Theorem and Some Consequences 67 (1977).
Such an argument is what this Article calls a model-theoretic argument. See supra note 254.
325. They are not equivalent by means formalizable in the formal system, else the Second
Theorem would be violated.
326. See Michael D. Resnik, On the Philosophical Significance of Consistency Proofs, in
Shanker, supra note 305, at 115, 123; see also Mendelson, supra note 228, at 148-49; Thirty Years
of Foundational Studies, in I Andrzej Mostowski, Foundational Studies: Selected Works 1, 19-22
(1979).
327. Hunter, supra note 233, at 257.
328. Kornstein, supra note 9, at 126-27.
329. John T. Valauri, Confused Notions and Constitutional Theory, 12 N. Ky. L. Rev. 567, 572
n.25 (1985).
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systems.33° No one mentions the fact that the Second Theorem depends
on a particular formulation of consistency.33" ' Some authors do not even
clearly distinguish between the First and Second Theorems.332
G6del himself was aware of at least some of these problems. He
wanted, for example, to use special language to indicate that there were
limitations on the applicability of his results. He suggested that the
phrase "formal system" only be used to indicate those systems simple
enough to satisfy the ceiling requirement.333 Other mathematical authors
use the phrase "axiomatized system" in a restrictive way.334 In the legal
literature, these mathematical terms of art often appear without any
330. For an example of an author who does mention this, see Stone-de Montpensier, supra note
313, at 670 n.55.
331. In addition to those descriptions already mentioned, see Curran, supra note 321, at 28 n.71
("'[N]o axiomatic system can even be proved to be fully coherent and consistent from within its own
rules and postulates."' (quoting George Steiner, Real Presences 125 (1989))); D'Amato, supra note
321, at 597 n.94 (quoting Nagel & Newman, supra note 274, at 6 for proposition that G6del
"'proved that is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a very large class of
deductive systems-elementary arithmetic, for example-unless one adopts principles of reasoning
so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the systems themselves');
Dow, supra note 4, at 712 (characterizing G6del's Second Theorem as showing that "'the
consistency of a formal system of arithmetic cannot be proved within that system"' (quoting Monk,
supra note 314, at 295 n.*)); id. at 713 (stating that "the consistency of a formal system of arithmetic
cannot be proved by any means that is formalizable within that system"); Houser, supra note 320, at
1151-52 ("Kurt Godel ... showed that a mathematical system could only be consistent (non-
paradoxical) when viewed from 'outside' the system. That is, a definition of a system must be made
independently of the system itself to avoid the paradoxes of self-reference."); Scanlan, supra note
318, at 1525 ("mo G6del we owe the insight that every mathematical system... is ... incapable of
demonstrating its own 'consistency."'); Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 313, at 664 (describing
"impossibility of formalizing any consistency proof' in "any sufficiently rich formal system");
Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1223, 1291 n.225 (1995) ("The mathematician Kurt
G6del showed that no finite, consistent axiomatic system can provide for the proof of its own
consistency." Tribe cites Hofstadter, supra note 11, and that source indicates that the use of the word
"finite" means that the system encompasses what Hilbert called finitistic methods. See supra text
accompanying note 269.).
332. For examples, see Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1470 n.160 (quoting comments on
Second Theorem by Nagel & Newman, supra note 274, at 98 n.3 1, in midst of discussion of First
Theorem); Williams, supra note 12, at 439 & n.63 (describing G6del's First Theorem as
demonstrating "that arithmetic cannot be both complete and internally consistent" (citing to
discussion of both First and Second Theorems by Nagel & Newman, supra note 274, at 85-97), and
then stating that "G5del's analysis did not rule out a metamathematical proof of the consistency of
arithmetic.. ." (citing to discussion of Second Theorem by Nagel & Newman, supra note 274, at
96-97)).
333. See G6del, supra note 274, at 616 n.70.
334. See, e.g., Herbert B. Enderton, A Mathematical Introduction to Logic 146 (1972).
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explanation of their possible significance.335 Indeed, few authors seem
aware of any such significance.336
With respect to the techniques described here for establishing Grdel's
Theorems, two points are in order. As mentioned above, the G5del
sentence will not suffice for the syntactic incompleteness part of the First
Theorem--the Gdel sentence need not be undecidable.33' However, the
presentations of a number of commentators suggest that the Grdel
sentence does suffice.338 Second, it must be noted that the encoding
properties utilized in the arguments described here are limited in scope.
Vague statements implying that there are simple ways of encoding every
335. See Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Even axiomatic math cannot
yield 'factual' (logically true) statements about all interesting arithmetical rel-tions, as G0del and
Turing established."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Givens, supra rote 310, at § 9.26
(characterizing G6del's Theorem as showing that "no formal system can describe even in theory all
of the information needed for its operations"); Burk & Boczar, supra note 321, at 825 ("In
mathematics.., the work of Kurt G6del disclosed the disturbing proposition that no formal system
that includes at least arithmetic can be both complete and consistent."); Curran, .supra note 321, at 28
n.71 ("'[N]o axiomatic system can even be proved to be fully coherent and consistent from within its
own rules and postulates."' (quoting Steiner, supra note 331, at 125)); Dow, ,'upra note 4. at 712
("G6del proved '. . . that within any consistent formal system, there will be a sentence that can
neither be proved true nor false ... ' (quoting Monk, supra note 314, at 295 n.*)); Goldberg, supra
note 320. at 87 n.26 ("Gddel's incompleteness theorem ... establishes that within any axiomatic
system there is a statement S such that neither S nor not-S is a theorem."); Kay,., supra note 321, at
617 n.71 ("G6del's proof does demonstrate that there are arithmetic truths that cannot be proved
within a strictly formal system."); Peritz, supra note 320, at 999 n.214 ("Some sixty years ago,
mathematician and logician Kurt Gddel published his Incompleteness Theorem, a demonstration of
the necessary incompleteness of sound formal systems... "); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case
of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 Geo. L.J. 37, 40 n.16 (1987) ("'[A]II .onsistent axiomatic
formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions."' (quoting Hofstadter, supra note
11, at 17)); Schroeder, supra note 321, at 53 n.141 ("'[A]II consistent axiomatic formulations of
number theory include undecidable propositions."' (quoting what she ca Is the "colloquial"
description in Hofstadter, supra note 11, at 17)); Tribe, supra note 331, a: 1291 n.225 ("The
mathematician Kurt G6del showed that no finite, consistent axiomatic system can provide for the
proof of its own consistency."); Mark G. Yudof. In Search of a Free Speech Principle, 82 Mich. L.
Rev. 680, 690 n.33 (1984) (quoting Hofstadter, supra note 11, at 24 for the proposition that "no
axiomatic system whatsoever could produce all number-theoretic truths, unless it were an
inconsistent system"); Jacob, supra note 321, at 1657 n.126 ("Gdel's Proof is a widely accepted
metamathematical theorem that shows that no mathematical axiomatic system of complexity is
'complete'."); Kelso, supra note 11, at 832 n.39 ("G6del's proof pertains to any non-trivial
axiomatic system.").
336. Brown & Greenberg do attach a particular significance to the use of the phrase "formal
system." Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1445-46. Stone-de Montpensier perhaps does so as
well. See Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 313, at 670 n.54.
337. See supra text accompanying note 302; supra note 309.
338. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1468; Dow, supra note 4, at 713; Rogers &
Molzon, supra note 4, at 993, 996; Kelso, supra note 11, at,833 n.44.
John Farago uses the G6del sentence, but his version of the First Incompleteness Theorem only
covers semantic incompleteness. See Farago, supra note 322, at 225.
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metatheoretical concept are misleading and must be highly refined.339
Indeed, the realization of a difference in the encodability of concepts
involving proof and truth helped lead G6del to his results in the first
place.
It is worth examining this second point in some detail. G6del did not
set out to destroy the Hilbert Program. Indeed, his work began with
attempts to implement it.3" G6del had hoped to use some notion of
encoding as the basis for various finitistic consistency arguments.34' His
use of encoding led him to consider what might be done with the
following Liar-type Paradox statement: "This statement is false." G6del
realized that definite sense could be given to the phrase "this statement"
through self-referencing. He saw that if truth were encodable in a certain
manner, he could find a precise version of the Liar statement, giving a
339. Farago, for example, says the following:
G6del demonstrated that even a logical system as simple as arithmetic can express within
itself a system of analysis about itself. He developed a formal mapping of meta-arithmetic onto
arithmetic....
The technique G6del adopted was roughly the following. He initially developed a way in
which to associate meta-arithmetical expressions with the numbers of arithmetic; that is, he
devised a way to assign numbers (integers) to statements about arithmetic.
Farago, supra note 322, at 224-25 (footnotes omitted).
Rogers & Molzon say the following:
One of G6del's accomplishments was demonstrating that a formal language, arithmetic, could
serve as its own metalanguage. He did this by describing a correspondence between statements
in arithmetic and statements in the metalanguage. In fact, G6del described this relationship so
precisely that one can think of it as a machine that, when given a metamathematical statement as
input, chums out [an arithmetic] statement. The machine can also run in reverse, so that if one
plugs in an [arithmetic] statement, out pops the corresponding metamathematical statement.
Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4, at 996.
Saunders says the following:
[G6del's First Theorem] works in mathematics, because Godel managed to express the
metalanguage for arithmetic, the language used to talk about arithmetic, within arithmetic. In
order for Godel's Theorem to apply to law, it would seem that the same feat must be
accomplished for law. More is required than showing that laws may be self-referential or that
law may have rules and metarules. Required is a demonstration that the metalanguage of law-
legal English-can in some sense be embedded in the law.
Saunders, supra note 314, at 220 (footnotes omitted).
For another example, see Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1469 ("[G6del] demonstrated that
any proposition--or more accurately, any metaproposition about propositions of arithmetic-can be
expressed as a statement about numbers, and hence as a statement within arithmetic.").
340. See Karl Sigmund, A Philosopher's Mathematician: Hans Hahn and the Vienna Circle,
Mathematical Intelligencer, Fall 1995, at 16,22-23.
341. See Feferman, supra note 305, at 105; Hao Wang, Some Facts About Kurt G6del, 46 J.
Symbolic Logic 653, 654 (1981).
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contradiction. It follows that truth could not be so encoded. However, he
realized that certain concepts involving proof were so encodable. Self-
referencing applied to these concepts leads to his First Theorem. As has
been seen, the main work in the proof of Gtdel's First Theorem consists
of making these realizations more concrete.342 Thus, somewhat ironically,
Gtdel was led to his results through attempts to implement the second
step in Hilbert's Program!343
The reader also should pause and consider the context of G6del's
work-a context that here has been briefly sketched and much
simplified. It is worth comparing this presentation to the sparse and
sometimes inaccurate accounts presented in the legal literature.3" Indeed,
342. Feferman, supra note 305, at 105-06. See also John W. Dawson, Jr., The Reception of
Gtdel's Incompleteness Theorems, in Shanker, 3upra note 305, at 74, 92 n.5; G~del, supra note 305,
at 63-65. In this regard, and recalling the discussion supra note 168, one might want to consider the
following:
Russell and Whitehead believed that they could banish paradoxes frora mathematics by
segregating the component parts of the paradox on different levels of analysis. G6del's Theorem
convinced mathematicians of the impossibility of getting rid of this patlem of circularity,
recursive definition, and self-swallowing analysis.
James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1413, 1444 (1992).
The distinction in the encodability of semantic and syntactic concepts, although clearly anticipated
by G6del, was systematically investigated for tha first time in Alfred Tarski, The Concept of Truth in
Formalized Languages, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-1938 (J.H.
Woodger trans., 1956). For more on how one might measure how difficult it is to encode or define a
concept, see Peter G. Hinman, Recursion-Theoretic Hierarchies (1978).
The results of G6del, Tarski, and Church, described supra note 297, are often referred to as
"limitative results." See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 310-20. Either Churelb's results or Tarski's
results can be used to establish Gdel's First Theorem. See Enderton, supra note 334, at 227-29
(using Tarski); Shoenfield, supra note 226, at 131-32 (using Church). The fact that Church can be
used is recognized, somewhat obliquely, in Farago, supra note 322, at 228.
343. Hao Wang calls this an example of "problem transmutation." Wang, supra note 247, at 56.
344. Jaffee says the following:
Some positivists (and some "realists") insist that a normative system can obtain from a mere
assumption-an hypothesis that the system exists. If we assume the system as if it were a fact,
they say, we can believe it without reference to any norm or premise beyond E.
Well, Russell and Whitehead tried to do the same in Principia Mathematica, and G6del's
famous proof crumbled the effort.
Jaffee, supra note 7, at 1193.
Dow says the following:
At the turn of the century, some thirty years before G6del developed tfese theorems, the
mathematician David Hilbert had asked whether it could be proved that the a).ioms of arithmetic
are consistent---that is, whether the finite number of logical steps based upon these axioms could
ever lead to contradictory results. Some ten years after Hilbert posed the question, Bertrand
Russell and Alfred Whitehead published the first volume of Principia Mathematica. This work
endeavored to prove that all pure mathematics can be derived from a small number of
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the technical mischaracterizations of G6del's work illustrate what can
occur when mathematical results are torn from their intellectual heritage.
6. Final Comments
This section illustrates what is entailed in overcoming the first hurdle
in doing meaningful interdisciplinary work-namely, gaining an
understanding of what is often a foreign discipline. Such an
understanding also helps address the second hurdle because a detailed
study of a part of another discipline often reveals that discipline's
relevance and separateness. Those who doubt the necessity of such an
undertaking might want to consider the next section.
C. Legal Implications
1. The Current Foundational Crisis in Mathematics and the Critique
of Legal Science
Legal scholars have invoked the foundational crisis in mathematics in
their own specific foundational debates. In particular, they have applied
G6del's work to law and have drawn a variety of specific conclusions
about legal reasoning. For some, the applications help establish or
highlight the "indeterminacy" or "uncertainty" present in legal analysis
fundamental logical principles. The Principia failed in this quest; it also did not answer
Hilbert's question; Gadel's Theorem addressed the system described in the Principia.
Dow, supra note 4, at 713-14.
For other examples, see Komstein, supra note 9, at 126 ("IThere had been many attempts by
mathematicians and philosophers to mechanize the thought processes of reasoning, always stressing
the completeness and consistency."); Banner, supra note 45, at 253 n.33 ("While the Langdellians
were attempting to reformulate law as an organized group of propositions flowing from a small
number of fundamental axioms, the exact same thing was occurring in mathematics, an effort which
culminated in A.N. Whitehead & Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica .... G6del proved the
impossibility of the project in 1931 .... ); Farago, supra note 322, at 224 ("[Grdel's work] relates
to a series of paradoxes within logical thought that became increasingly troublesome as logic became
increasingly formalized."); Saunders, supra note 314, at 229 ("[Grdel's First Theorem] dealt a blow
to the Hilbert Program of developing a formalization that would capture all of mathematics.").
Brown & Greenberg focus on Hilbert's interest in the Entscheidungsproblem described supra note
247 and accompanying text. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1466. Now it is the case that
with hindsight we can see that the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem follows from work
contained in G~del's 1931 paper and a result in a 1935 paper of Kleene. See Davis, supra note 305,
at 109. But this was not noticed at the time, and as described supra note 297, the work of Turing and
Church are credited with establishing the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem. G6del's 1931
paper was focused on Hilbert's Program, not the Entscheidungsproblem. This distinction in
intellectual history is recognized in Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind 34 (1989), the very
source cited by Brown & Greenberg for their historical remarks.
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(what is here called legal science).345 For others, the applications show no
more than that criticisms based on indeterminacy are "unfair." '346 For still
others, a close examination of Gdel's work actually shows how to
overcome any such problems.347 The intent here is not to evaluate the
ultimate conclusions, but merely to examine the machinery used to
obtain them. In particular, no attempt is made to evaluate the various
notions of indeterminacy and uncertainty that have appeared in the
general legal literature.348
Scholars "apply" Grdel's work in several ways. Some claim that the
hypotheses of something like his First Theorem are satisfied in the legal
setting, while others create legal analogues of the G6del sentence or
analyze the argument establishing the First Theorem.
Satisfying the hypotheses of such a theorem in a legal context would
require several steps. One would have to provide a foimal system for
law. In particular, one would have to provide a legal language, which in
turn requires specifying an alphabet and the set of legal formulas; a set of
legal axioms; and a set of rules of legal inference. One need only
examine the formal system provided for propositional logic to get an idea
of the difficulty that this would entail.349 This, however, is not sufficient
in and of itself. The resulting legal formal system must be properly
345. See Kornstein, supra note 9, at 127; Colin H. Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law: A
Doctrinal Framework Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 Hous. L.
Rev. 875, 904 n.1 66 (1987); D'Amato, supra note 321, at 597-603: Veilleux, sa4pra note 8 1, at 1997.
Cf Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1487-88; Farago, supra note 322, at 236-39; Goldberg,
supra note 320, at 90.
346. See Rogers & Molzon. supra note 4, at 992, 1022.
347. See Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 313, at 670.
348. For some taxonomies of indeterminacy with varying meanings, see Jules L. Coleman &
Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 559-78 (1993)
(discussing indeterminacy of reasons and indeterminacy of causes); Dow, .rupra note 4, at 716
(discussing linguistic indeterminacy, formal indeterminacy, and conceptual indeterminacy); Ken
Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 134 (1990) [hereinafter
Kress, Preface] (discussing epistemological irdeterminacy and metaphysical indeterminacy); Ken
Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1989) (discussing radical indeterminacy and
moderate indeterminacy); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fai'ness: Justifying Rule
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1993) (discussing practical
indeterminacy and theoretical indeterminacy); Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement:
Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 Yale L.J. 997, 999-1002 (1994) (discussing
underdeterminacy and rational indeterminacy). For some general comments on indeterminacy, see
Miller, supra, at 10-11 & nn.33-36.
For discussions of uncertainty, see D'Amato, supra note 320, at 2 (discussing legal uncertainty);
John M. Farago, Judicial Cybernetics: The Effects of Self-Reference in Dworkn 's Rights Thesis, 14
Val. L. Rev. 371, 385 (1980) (discussing "four sources of... uncertainty").
349. See supra note 228.
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balanced to assure something like the encoding properties previously
described."' Moreover, if one wants to invoke semantic incompleteness,
then a notion of truth will have to be developed as well. Finally, recall
that the precise conclusion given by the proof of G6del's First Theorem
is the existence of an undecidable arithmetic sentence."' Presumably, a
more legal-type conclusion would have to follow for an undecidability
result to be of particular interest in legal foundational debates. What of
efforts to do all this? About the best that can be said is that "[t]hough
some theorists suppose this ... is feasible, no effort ... has come even
remotely close to accomplishing this feat."35 Ignoring these types of
problems can result in making the mistake of turning a "law and
[discipline X]" study into a "law as (a subset of) [discipline X]" study.
One must consider carefully statements such as, "The implications of
G6del's Theorem for any theory of law have been ignored for too
long .... Every theory of law is incomplete.""3 3
350. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
35 1. See supra text accompanying note 284.
352. Dow, supra note 4, at 715. See Banner, supra note 45, at 244 n.4; Kaye, supra note 321, at
617 n.71; Saunders, supra note 314, at 220; M.B.W. Sinclair, Notes Toward a Formal Model of
Common Law, 62 Ind. L.J. 355, 363 n.33 (1987); Spann, Secret, supra note 314, at 698 n.58; Stick,
supra note 314, at 366 n.146; Kelso, supra note 11, at 834 n.48; see also Brown & Greenberg, supra
note 4, at 1462, 1472-74 (considering project to be feasible but difficult).
353. Komstein, supra note 9, at 127. Komstein provides no details. He is cited with approval in
Veilleux, supra note 81, at 1997 nn.132-33.
Goldberg, although noting that judicial reasoning is often only a "parody of a mathematical
theorem," Goldberg, supra note 320, at 86, goes on to assert without elaboration that judges use "the
axiomatic method" which is subject to "G6del's incompleteness theorem ... that emphasize[s] the
limitations of what axiom systems can do," id. at 90.
D'Amato opines that "[a]ny existing language qualifies as a system of at least as much complexity
as ordinary arithmetic, and hence G6del's proof applies to legal, textual, and linguistic
demonstrations." D'Amato, supra note 321, at 597. This is not much more help. Moreover, he cites
Raymond Smullyan as support for this somewhat vague generalization. I have read the indicated
citation, and I am unable to see any support there; Smullyan is quite precise about the types of
systems to which his versions of G6del's Theorems apply. Levit similarly cites Smullyan without
explanation. Levit, supra note 320, at 136 n.3.
Farago suggests that "some jurisprudential logician could use G6del's Proof as a paradigm to do to
law what G6del did to mathematics, i.e., demonstrate the necessary incompleteness or inconsistency
of the legal systems." Farago, supra note 322, at 228-29. However, he does add something by
alluding to the encoding features in the argument establishing G6del's First Theorem: "self-reference
is not just a part of the law; it is essential to it," and "like arithmetic, it must be that to the extent we
can capture 'law' within a formal system, we also will be able to express 'meta-law' within that same
system." Id. at 226. But he admittedly does not carry out the details. 1d. at 226, 229 n.141.
Similarly, Rogers & Molzon assert that "G6del's theorem at least suggests (and by analogy
proves) that all systems of law permit the construction of undecidable propositions." Rogers &
MoLzon, supra note 4, at 1014. Indeed, they cite Farago and Komstein as examples of earlier efforts.
Id. at 997 n.l 1. Rogers & Molzon go on to refer to the encoding features saying that "[it is in fact
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Some scholars hope to avoid these problems by producing a specific
incompleteness based on legal versions of the G6del sentence itself. Two
scholars offer the following legal version of the G6del sertence:
"[Y]ields a statement for which, when presented to e court as an
example of an indeterminate proposition of the law under
circumstances where the question of its determinacy is necessary to
resolve the dispute in question, the law does not compel a court to
determine that it is true, when appended to its own quotation"
yields a statement for which, when presented to a court as an
example of an indeterminate proposition of the law under
circumstances where the question of its determinacy is necessary to
resolve the dispute in question, the law does not compel a court to
determine that it is true, when appended to its own quotationY'
Other examples are culled from extant legal problems, such as
whether certain highest court decisions can bind the highest court.35 As a
preliminary matter, it is not clear that these scholars have a,'oided all of
the criticisms described above. Defining words such as "statement,"
"indeterminate," "proposition," and "true," would lead to the difficulties
easy to conclude that legal rules can be self-referential" and that "statements about the law can be in
the form of laws." Id. at 1010. But outside of isolated examples, the details are lacking.
D'Amato offers an interesting twist by arguing in a later piece that "[a]lthough [it] is technically
correct in saying that [Gddel's First Theorem was] designed to apply to formal systems, my position
is that either [G6del's First Theorem applies] a fortiori to non-formal systems such as law, or if [it
doesn't] apply because law is a non-formal system, then for that reason the Indeterminacy thesis is
proven." D'Amato, supra note 284, at 176 n.92. Readers may want to digest this argument for
themselves, but the following questions may be helpful as a starting point. (1) If G6del's First
Theorem doesn't apply, why might it not be th- case that some other mathemitics does apply, and
the other mathematics suggests that law is "determinate"? After all, G6del's First Theorem applies
only to certain types of formal systems. (2) If mathematics doesn't apply, how does it follow that law
is indeterminate?
The positions of Komstein and Farago are cited with approval in Buckley, stpra note 345, at 904
n.166. Buckley also asserts that G6del's work shows that we "cannot filly describe the structure of
law." Id. According to Buckley, this application of G6del is justified because "law is self-referential"
and "when we seek to define law, we do so in its own terms." Id. There is no elaboration on these
references to the encoding features.
354. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1479 n.181.
355. See Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 313; Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier, The Complete
Wrangler, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 1001 (1966) [hereinafter Stone-de Montpensier, Wrangler]; Stone,
supra note 320.
Some scholars place Stone-de Montpensier in the first group discussed-narrely, those who try to
satisfy the hypotheses of (something like) G~del's Theorems. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4,
at 1470 & n.161; Sinclair, supra note 352, at 363 n.33. Stone-de Montpensier d~es say that "[Gdel]
seems to apply [to law]." Stone-de Montpensier, Wrangler, supra, at 1002; Stone, supra note 320, at
281. To my mind, however, the discussion in his writings, taken as a whole, suggests that Stone-de
Montpensier is in the second group.
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described above. In any case, what these scholars have done is simply
attempt to find legal analogues of the ancient Liar-type Paradoxes.356 The
Greeks had legal versions of these paradoxes themselves.357 Given the
fact that these paradoxes are millennia old and extensively discussed,358 it
is not clear what is added to the specific legal debates by the invocation
of G6del's work outside of the observation that G6del also relied on
these same paradoxes.
Finally, others hope to draw lessons by analyzing the arguments that
establish G6del's First Theorem. One scholar, noting that the First
Theorem does involve a certain balancing, concludes as follows:
G6del's result remains valid so far as formal modes of argument are
concerned... but does not extend to paraductive arguments. This is
why, in spite of appearances, the legal system may be complete ...
and must be consistent.35
9
But what is the miraculous cure of paraduction?
Paraduction is a method of argument, similia e similibus, case by
case, which is appropriate to a priori, nonnecessary connection.360
This appeal to some case-by-case, extra-formal, or intuition-based
analysis is made by other commentators who believe that G6del's work
applies to law.36" ' Indeed, scholars in general seem to believe that this is
one of the lessons that the mathematical community has learned.362 The
fact, however, is that a great controversy exists in the mathematical
community about whether the limitations that G6del's Theorems places
on certain types of formal systems apply to human reasoning as well.
Indeed, one commentator opines that this issue "has generated more
356. In fact, they admit as much. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1474; Stone-de
Montpensier, supra note 313, at 669; Stone-de Montpensier, Wrangler, supra note 355, at 1015;
Stone, supra note 320, at 281.
357. See J.C. Hicks, The Liar Paradox in Legal Reasoning, 29 Cambridge L.J. 275, 275-76
(1971).
358. For numerous articles on the Liar Paradoxes, see The Paradox of the Liar (Robert L. Martin
ed., 1970); Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox (Robert L. Martin ed., 1984).
359. Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 313, at 670.
360. Id. at 671.
361. See Kornstein, supra note 9, at 127-28; Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1481, 1485;
Farago, supra note 322, at 236-39.
362. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1468, 1487; Kaye, supra note 321, at 617 n.71;
Stone-de Montpensier, supra note 313, at 670 & n.55.
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discussion than any other ... on the philosophical import of [G6del's
First Theorem]. 363
For the academic legal scholar, perhaps one lesson comes from the
realization that mathematics has grown, flourished, and renewed itself,
because, not in spite, of its foundational crises. 3' This realization might,
for example, lead to a different emphasis in the analysis of the growth of
movements such as legal realism and critical legal studies.365
For the working lawyer, the lessons are even less clear. Quite frankly,
many working mathematicians are not overly impressed by G6del's
specific results.366 Grdel's First Theorem tells the working number
theorist, for example, that given a formal system satisfying certain
properties, there is a certain informal statement about the natural
numbers whose formal counterpart cannot be proved or disproved within
the system. Her first response will be, "Why should I care about this
statement?" It will be no good to tell her that metatheoretically the
statement can be viewed as saying something like, "I am unprovable in
this system," for she will want to know whether the statement says
anything interesting about the properties of natural numbers. In this
regard, it is worth noting that very few such interesting statements have
been found with respect to some of the standard formal systems of
interest to number theorists. Whereas G6del's First Theorem was proved
in 1931, it was not until the late 1970s that mathematicians found an
interesting arithmetic statement whose formal counterpart was
undecidable with respect to the traditional formal system called Peano
Arithmetic. 367 In addition, there is no known interesting arithmetic
statement whose formal counterpart has been shown urtdecidable with
respect to the more complicated set-theoretic systems in which number
theorists routinely work.365 Indeed, one legal commentator suggests that
363. Howard de Long, A Profile of Mathematical Logic 273 (1971). There is voluminous
literature on this issue. See id. For brief introductions to the contours of the debate, see Michael A.
Arbib, Brains, Machines, and Mathematics 138-40 (1964); Michael Barr, Book Review, 97 Am.
Mathematical Monthly 938 (1990) (reviewing Penrose, supra note 344). Although not referring to
this debate specifically, Rogers and Molzon do raise the issue. See Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4,
at 1010 n.52.
364. Western thought has grown similarly.
365. Cf. Banner, supra note 45, at 253 n.33.
366. See King, supra note 32, at 54.
367. See Jeff Paris & Leo Harrington, A Mathematical Incompleteness in Peano Arithmetic, in
Handbook, supra note 253, at 1133, 1133 n.*.
368. Telephone Interview with Peter Hinman, Professor of Mathematics, University of Michigan
(Feb. 1996).
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"[a]s in arithmetic, the important [legal] issues might be resolvable." '369
Having said this about arithmetic, it must be admitted that there are a
number of interesting non-arithmetic sentences undecidable with respect
to traditional set-theoretic systems.370 Still, this fact has not led working
set theorists to despair but to the consideration of potential new set-
theoretic axioms and their implications.37" ' As far as the Second Theorem
is concerned, most working mathematicians have come to accept the
validity of infinitary reasoning.372 And as Hilbert intuited with respect to
his conservation goal,373 in many situations arithmetic sentences provable
in more complicated systems can be derived in a simpler system whose
set of axioms is augmented with the assumption that the more
complicated system is consistent.3 74 Moreover, consistency is an issue for
working mathematicians only if an inconsistency arises. In each of the
three crises, mathematicians were content to continue doing their work
once they developed techniques that seemingly eliminated the specific
inconsistencies confronting them. One might speculate that working
lawyers in a common law system must be similarly charitable.375
2. The Crisis and the Critique of Science
As described in section D of part II, the past 150 years have seen a
complex and comprehensive reevaluation of the Western intellectual
tradition. In particular, a variety of intellectual currents have led scholars
to question traditional approaches to what this Article refers to as science
(i.e. classification).
369. Saunders, supra note 314, at 229. Cf. Jacob, supra note 321, at 1657 n.126. On the other
hand, D'Amato opines that "if we peruse the most recent 1,000 cases on free exercise of religion
under the first amendment,... I would not be surprised if at the very least 999 of them are Godelian
undecidables." D'Amato, supra note 284, at 173 n.80. See also Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at
1481.
370. As has been noted in connection with non-Euclidean geometry, G6del's work does not
represent the only machinery available for showing that certain sentences are undecidable with
respect to certain formal systems. See text accompanying supra notes 220-21 For a detailed
discussion of methods used in connection with set-theoretic systems, see Kenneth Kunen, Set
Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs (1980). However, I do not know of any attempts to
apply such techniques to law.
371. See J.R. Shoenfield, Axioms of Set Theory, in Handbook, supra note 253, at 321, 341-44.
372. See Michael J. Beeson, Foundations of Constructive Mathematics 431 (1985); see also Davis
& Hersh, supra note 34, at 152-57.
373. See supra text accompanying note 269.
374. See Smorynski, supra note 253, at 858.
375. See Greenwood, supra note 237, at 576. For a similar assertion from an author steeped in the
civil law tradition, see Ilmar Tammelo, Modern Logic in the Service ofLaw 127-28 (1978).
Washington Law Review
In describing the American incarnation of the overall reevaluation,
Williams and Purcell single out the evolution of American pragmatism,
the importation of logical positivism, and the impact of certain
developments in mathematics and physics, especially non-Euclidean
geometry, G6del's Theorems, relativity, and quantum physics." 6 The
intent here is not to evaluate the ultimate conclusions of the reevaluation,
but to ask whether scholars have critically considered the content,
context, and relevance of the mathematical material. Williams and
Purcell have placed legal realist and critical legal studies scholarship in
this larger intellectual context, and this explains how esoteric
mathematical results have made their way into the legal literature.377
Purcell comments on the impact of non-Euclidean geometry on
scholars in other fields as follows:
The impact on mathematicians and geometers, who had always
assumed that only one geometry was possible, was staggering. If
Euclid's geometry was true, then the non-Euclidean geometries had
in some way to be false. Yet no one was able to find any
contradictions or inconsistencies .... Gradually durilig the latter
half of the nineteenth century mathematicians and geometers came
to understand that geometries were, in themselves, wholly formal
systems with no necessary connection with any empirical reality.
Geometries were logical systems, based on arbitrary postulates,
whose only necessary characteristic was self-consistency.
That discovery, although it implied a challenge to the belief in
synthetic a priori knowledge, would perhaps not have had such a
great impact had it not been for the work of. . . Einstein ...
Among his monumental achievements, he demonstrated
conclusively that Euclidean geometry did not completely describe
the physical universe....
The popular discussion of non-Euclidean geometry was one of the
broad results of the confirmation of the theory of relativity ...
Axioms and principles were "free creations of the human mind,"
376. See Purcell, supra note 51, at 47-73; Williams, supra note 12; see also James Boyle, The
Politics ofReason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. _. Rev. 685, 730-32
& n.141 (1985); D'Amato, supra note 284, at 152 n.16; Roberta Kevelson, Semiotics and the Law,
61 Ind. L.J. 355, 364-65 (1986); Levit, supra note 320, at 136-37 & n.3; McDougall, supra note
319, at 89; Stick, supra note 314, at 343.
377. See Purcell, supra note 51, at 62-63, 74-94; Williams, supra note 12.
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Einstein insisted in 1922, and as such had necessarily "to be taken in a
purely formal sense, i.e. as void of all content of intuition or
experience." All deductive systems were formal creations that might
or might not connect with the world of physical reality. "One
geometry cannot be more true than another," declared the great French
mathematician Henri Poincar6 . . . . "[I]t can only be more
convenient." Deduction could discover or prove nothing, and belief in
synthetic a priori knowledge lacked any scientific, geometric, or
logical basis. There was no reason to think that any allegedly self-
evident truth was either self-evident or true. "The Kantians,"
summarized one scientist, "were most decidedly in the wrong when
they assumed that the axioms of geometry constituted a priori
synthetic judgements transcending reason and experience."
The discovery, popularization, and scientific utility of non-
Euclidean geometry helped create a widespread belief in the non-
Euclidean possibilities of all lines of reasoning. The characteristics of
geometry, many argued, were clearly the characteristics of all fields of
deductive thought; it followed that social thought, political theory, and
ethics could all produce non-Euclidean or nonconventional systems
that would be as valid logically as the most traditional and thoroughly
accepted theories.... The concept of non- Euclideanism, generalized
to include all types of deductive thought, robbed every rational system
of any claim to be in any sense true, except insofar as it could be
proved empirically to describe what actually existed.
. . . Non-Euclideanism came, in fact, to stand not only for the
presumably unchallengeable logico-mathematical proof of the
inherent formalism of deductive reasoning, but also metaphorically for
almost any new or radical hypothesis that might be put forward.37
378. Purcell, supra note 51, at 50-53. This type of metaphorical use of non-Euclidean geometry is
alive and %vell in modem legal scholarship. For examples, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices, 81 Geo. L.J. 2567, 2610 n.190 (1993); Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value of
Analyzing Codifications by Reference to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the
Codification, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1080, 1081-82 (1985); Robert H. Bork, The Place of Antitrust
Among National Goals, in Nat'l Indus. Conference Bd., Basic Antitrust Questions in the Middle
Sixties: Fifth Conference on the Impact of Antitrust on Economic Growth 18 (1966); Ronald Cass,
Sentencing Corporations: The Guidelines' White Collar Blues, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 291, 299 (1991);
Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 Cornell L.Q. 568 (193 1);
Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court As a (Counter) Majoritarian Institution: Misperceptions of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, 1994 Det. C.L. Rev. 1, 59; Ronald C. Kahn, God Save Us
from the Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking, Polity Principles, and Religious Freedom, 43
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 983, 1019 n.164 (1993); Leiser, supra note 217, at 60; Frank 1. Michelman,
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Williams has a similar description of the impact of non-Euclidean
geometry on what she describes as the "first wave" scholars:
[Intellectuals] focused on the most obvious implications of non-
Euclidean geometries--that abstract, deductive logic has no
necessary connection with an external reality. Thus, they concluded
that theories do not describe an objective reality, but that facts do.
After considering the implications of non-Euclidean geometries,
... intellectuals concluded that the only way to determine whether
a given logical system has any connection with the real. world is to
test its predictions empirically. In the words of one contemporary
mathematician, Henri Poincar6: "One geometry cannot be more
true than another; it can only be more convenient." [As Purcell puts
it,] [ilf one theory of mathematics proves to be empirically
inaccurate, it is not because "the 'mathematics is wrong, but only
[because] we have chosen the wrong mathematics!" 379
As Purcell and Williams describe the overall reevaluation, a typical
invocation of the mathematical developments involves a two-step
argument: (1) mathematics has been forced to reject some position,
(2) hence so must some other field.
As far as the second step in the invocation is concerned, it is not clear
why decisions within mathematics should be dispositive of issues in
other disciplines any more than decisions in some other discipline should
be dispositive of issues in mathematics. Mathematics is certainly a
central concern of the Western intellectual tradition, but it is not the
Western intellectual tradition. However appealing as a psychological
matter, the second step requires a justification. Without one, such an
implication ignores the question of the relevance and separateness of the
other discipline.3
The Parts and the Whdle: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry, 32 J. Legal Educ. 352 (1982);
Peritz, supra note 217, at 1251-52; Stone, supra note 321, at 74.
379. Williams, supra note 12, at 441.
380. With respect to this second step, one might want to consider the following:
Constitutional law is not mathematics-but one must wonder why, if mathtmaticians in this
post-G6delian age treat as inevitable the fact that interesting logical systems are open-ended,
constitutional lawyers continue to demand that their universe of discourse be closed.
Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 47 (1978).
Imagine, however, seeing the following hypothetical quotation in a 1978 mathematics journal:
Mathematics is not constitutional law-but one must wonder why if constitutional scholars in
this post-Warren Age demand that their universe of discourse be closed, mathematicians
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More troubling is the first step of the typical invocation. Scholars in
other fields betray a lack of understanding of the content and context of
the mathematical material itself. The mathematical community simply
has not reached the conclusion that non-Euclidean geometry forecloses
any particular scientific stance. The reader should be aware that not all
scholars even accept the conclusion that non-Euclidean geometry
destroys Kant's geometric approach. K6mer puts it as follows:
The distinction which Kant makes... between the thought of a
mathematical concept, which requires merely internal consistency,
and its construction, which requires that perceptual space should
have a certain structure, is most important for the understanding of
his philosophy. Kant does not deny the possibility of self-consistent
geometries other than the ordinary Euclidean; and in this respect he
has not been refuted by the actual development of such
geometries.38" '
Moreover, even if the Kantian conception of geometry is destroyed, it
does not follow that all Kantian conceptions of mathematics are
untenable. In this regard, the reliance on Poincar6 is interesting.
Poincar6's original words are as follows:
If geometry were an experimental science, it would not be an exact
science. It would be subjected to continual revision. . . The
geometrical axioms are therefore neither synthetic 6i priori
intuitions nor experimental facts. They are conventions. Our choice
among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts; but
it remains free, and is only limited by the necessity of avoiding
every contradiction, and thus it is that postulates may remain
rigorously true even when the experimental laws which have
determined their adoption are only approximate. In other words, the
axioms of geometry (I do not speak of those of arithmetic) are only
definitions in disguise. What, then, are we to think of the question:
Is Euclidean geometry true? It has no meaning. We might as well
ask if the metric system is true, and if the old weights and measures
are false; if Cartesian co-ordinates are true and polar co-ordinates
continue to assert that logical systems of the sort to which G6del's First Theorem applies are
interesting.
381. K6rner, supra note 97, at 28-29. See also J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from
Kant to Carnap 189 (1991).
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false. One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only
be more convenient.382
As the more complete quotation indicates, Poincar6 specifically
exempts arithmetic from his discussion. Indeed, Poincar, believed in a
Kantian type of intuition about arithmetic on which the whole of
mathematics is based.383 According to Leopold Kronecker, one of
Poincar6's intellectual siblings and one of the forerunners of
Intuitionism,3"4 "God made integers, all else is the work of man."38 The
Intuitionists in general accepted much of Kant outside of his geometric
stance. 86 In any case, as the quotation indicates, Poincar6 is advancing a
geometric conventionalism not a geometric empiricism. Generally
speaking, geometric conventionalism asserts that experiments cannot
distinguish between geometries since one can posit compensating forces
affecting measuring instruments. Therefore the choice of a "real world"
geometry is merely conventional, not empirical.387
In fact, it is not at all clear that non-Euclidean geometry forecloses
any particular stance, let alone Kant's. One need only consider the wide
range of positions held by and within the three schools that emerged at
the turn of the century (hence after the development of non-Euclidean
geometry).3 8
Similar comments on the first and second steps can be made with
respect to the invocations of G6del. With respect to the first step, Purcell
comments on the invocation of G6del as follows:
Any system of mathematics or logic was thus based on certain
axioms and postulates assumed at the start. There was no need to
prove them since foundation postulates were necessary and
unavoidable. There was no way to prove them, either, since initial
postulates were wholly arbitrary. From those initial assumptions the
mathematician or logician developed his system with no thought of
its descriptive or empirical applicability. His only criterion was
internal consistency. "In pure geometry what is demonstrated,"
382. Henri Poincar6, Science and Hypothesis 49-50 (1905).
383. See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 253; see also Max Black, The Nature of Mathematics: A
Critical Survey 178 (1933).
384. See Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 253.
385. Quoted in Robert E. Moritz, On Mathematics 269 (1942).
386. See K6rner, supra note 97, at 119-55.
387. For an overview of geometric conventionalism, see Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time, and
Spacetime 85-146 (1974).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 160-270.
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declared the positivist philosopher Albert E. Blumberg, "is a
theorem or more precisely the relation of analytic deducibility or
tautological implication between postulate-set and theorem." All
logico-mathematical reasoning was thus purely tautological, the
elaboration of implications contained by definition in the
foundation postulates. In 1930, Kurt G6del, one of the logical
positivists who came to the United States, produced his
"incompleteness theorems," with which he demonstrated to the
satisfaction of most of his colleagues that it was theoretically
impossible to produce any final or ultimate solution to the problem
of the foundations of mathematical logic. All of the competing
schools of mathematics, claimed E.R. Hedrick, the chairman of the
mathematics section of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science in 1932, accepted the full implications of
non-Euclidean geometry and the formal nature of mathematical
reasoning. "I may assume that no one of these schools would
attempt to base its system on a claim of reality.,
319
With respect to the second step, Williams describes G6del's effect on
what she calls the "second wave" scholars as follows:
[T]he mathematician Kurt G6del's "incompleteness theorem"
played an important metaphorical role in the thinking of
intellectuals outside of math and physics. G6del's mathematical
proof demonstrated that arithmetic cannot be both complete and
internally consistent. The incompleteness theorem . . reinforced
the conviction of second-wave scholars that languages, including
mathematics, are necessarily incomplete descriptions of reality.
390
Williams further elaborates as follows:
[S]cholars began to argue that neither scientific nor nonscientific
disciplines could gain access to objective truth, but instead could
only provide interpretations of "texts. 39'
It is wrong to describe G6del as a logical positivist as Purcell does.
G6del himself said, "I never was a logical pos[itivist]. '392 Although
G6del attended meetings of the Vienna Circle, he gradually moved away
389. Purcell, supra note 51, at 55-56.
390. Williams, supra note 12, at 439.
391. Id. at454.
392. Quoted in Wang, supra note 247, at 49.
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from it. In any case, he never did agree with their tenet that mathematical
truth was a convention of language.3
G6del's foundational approach used set theory.394 The set-theoretic
approach treats sets as fundamental. It can be traced to Cantor's work
with sets and is in some ways the successor to the early Logicist
reduction program of the Principia. As a foundational approach, serious
problems stem from the development, reminiscent of what took place in
geometry, of a whole collection of equally consistent set theories. As
with Logicism, Formalism, and Intuitionism, the set-theoretic approach
encompasses a wide variety of philosophical positions.
In any case, as E.R. Hedrick and second-wave scholars should note,
G6del was a Platonist who rejected skepticism!395 In G6de1's words:
[T]he assumption of [set-theoretic objects] is quite as legitimate as
the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason
to believe in their existence. They are in the same sense necessary
to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies
are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense
perception... 396
G6del also says:
[L]ogic and mathematics (just as physics) are built up on axioms
with a real content which cannot be "explained away."
397
G6del's epistemological position had both rationalist and
consequentialist strands:
[E]ven disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new [set-
theoretic axiom], and even in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all,
a probable decision about its truth is possible also in another way,
namely, inductively by studying its "success." Success here means
fruitfulness in consequences, in particular in "verifiable"
consequences, i.e. consequences demonstrable without the new
axiom, whose proofs with the help of the new axiom, however, are
considerably simpler and easier to discover, and make it possible to
contract into one proof many different proofs.... A much higher
393. See Feferman, supra note 305, at 101.
394. For general overviews of set-theoretic approaches, see Maddy, supra note 167; Steven
Pollard, Philosophical Introduction to Set Theor, (1990); Tiles, supra note 116.
395. Stick alludes to G6del's stance without detail. See Stick, supra note 314, at 398 & n.282.
396. Kurt G6del, Russell's Mathematical Logic, in Benacerraf & Putnam, supra note 161, at 447,
456-57.
397. Id. at 461.
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degree of verification than that, however, is conceivable. There
might exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable consequences,
shedding so much light upon a whole field, and yielding such
powerful methods for solving problems... that, no matter whether
or not they are intrinsically necessary, they would have to be
accepted at least in the same sense as any well-established physical
theory.398
G6del's philosophical perspective was critical to the development of
his mathematical work, including the incompleteness theorems!399 In
G6del's own words:
[M]y objectivist conception of mathematics ... in general, and of
[infinitary] reasoning in particular, was fundamental....
How indeed could one think of expressing [statements about
mathematics] in the mathematical systems themselves, if the latter
are considered to consist of meaningless symbols... ?
[I]t should be noted that the heuristic principle of my
construction [of the G6del statement] is the . . . concept of...
"mathematical truth", as opposed to that of [provability].4"0
Given G6del's own view and the detailed contextual presentation of
his results in the preceding Section, one might want to consider carefully
the vague but sweeping assertions that have appeared in the legal
literature such as, "[I]t should not be surprising to find that the
philosophical implication of G6del's theorem should question the basic
premise of philosophy--that is, the basic question of whether reality
exists."4 '' With respect to such assertions, Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua
Bar-Hillel, and Azriel Levy say the following:
398. Kurt G6del, Nhat Is Cantor's Continuum Problem?, in Benacerraf & Putnam, supra note
161, at 477. For a discussion of this position, see Maddy, supra note 167, at 31-35.
399. See Feferman, supra note 305, at 106-08.
400. Quoted in Wang, supra note 247, at 9.
401. Kelso, supra note 11, at 833 n.44. See also id. at 833 n.46 ("Father Kung concludes, as
G6del's theorem implies, that not only the decision to believe in God but also the decision to believe
in reality is one ultimately based on trust.").
For another example, consider the following statement by Donald Gjerdingen:
By G6delian worlds, I simply mean the general idea, borrowed from Kurt G6del's work in math
theory, that (a) we construct our worlds-both theoretical and real-out of nested systems of
thought that fold into each other, (b) each system is based on certain axiomatic assumptions that
cannot be proved within the system they create; (c) multiple worlds, each consistent in its own
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way, can be constructed; and (d) such systems are self-referencing.... I believe that such ideas
can be applied on a far grander scale and in far different ways than lawyers have yet been
willing to talk about.
Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Our Past: The Legal Mind and the Legacy of Classical
Common-Law Thought, 68 Ind. L.J. 743, 748 n.3 (1993) (citations omitted).
Peritz says the following:
Some sixty years ago, mathematician and logician Kurt G6del published his Incompleteness
Theorem . . . a project whose importance the community of theoretical mathematicians and
philosophers did not recognize for many years.... Gtdel... exposed the distressing limitations
of Bertrand Russell's neo-Platonic vision of mathematics as the only pure deal for all of our
less precise and thus less aesthetically pleasing practices-philosophy or law, for example.
Russell's idealism crumbled under the weight of Gtdel's Theorem. The world of numbers and
sets turns out to be less than perfectly predictable. Even the purest abstraction cannot provide
the vehicle for returning to a philosophical or empirical Eden--to the nominalist's Garden of
stability and control. Yet most of us embrace science as having falsified Nietzsche's unnerving
claim that final authority for any proposition is ultimately unavailable-that God is dead.
Peritz, supra note 320, at 999 n.214.
Terrell says the following:
Another way to state this sense of perceptual incompleteness is to argue that our logical
capabilities as a whole are a kind of tautology--4hat is a system of rules with internal
consistency that nevertheless cannot produce a verification or justification of itself. The best and
most basic example of a tautological system is mathematics, which is a subject of our logic. Its
lack of an internal verification is captured in G6del's Theorem ....
Terrell, supra note 24, at 319 n.92.
For other examples of broad claims, see Levit, supra note 320, at 137 n.3 ,noting "existence of
indeterminacy in any explanatory system"); Loevinger, supra note 5, at 343 ("[A]s Kurt G6del
demonstrated, any formal logical system ultimately rests on some undecidable-that is,
unprovable-propositions. Thus there is some degree of uncertainty in all proofs-scientific, legal,
philosophical, social, or intuitive.") (footnote omitted); Scanlan, supra note 318, at 1525 (invoking
G6del's work as support for proposition that "[a] characteristic of much of modem thought
extending across a broad spectrum of disciplines is to deny that we all experience the same things,
speak a common language, or employ a single coherent logic in addressing our various concems");
Spann, Secret, supra note 314, at 698 n.58 (stating that one of implications of G6del's work is that
logic is not "a closed system in which things happen in a predictable way, in accordance with orderly
rules that are understandable and reliable"); Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 490, 568 (1992) (citing Gddel's work in support of assertion that
contemporary thinkers place emphasis on "limitations of reason"); Stephan, supra note 312, at 750-
51 & n.5 ("Where are good reasons to handle the concept of rationality with caution: at least since
Goedel proposed his eponymous theorem, there has been good reason to believe that mathematics,
supposedly the purest expression of human reason, rests at bottom on begged questions rather than
logical proof."); Yudof, supra note 335, at 690 ("There are only degrees of certainty and
consistency, even in mathematics."); Greenwood, supra note 237, at 576 (using G6del's work as
support for argument that inconsistency does not necessarily cause trouble for moral or legal stance).
For another example, see Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. '988) (citing G6del's
work as support for proposition that "[e]ourts trying to find one formula to separate 'fact' from
'opinion' ... are engaged in a snipe hunf), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
One also might ask what possibly could be meant by Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the
Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 109, 130 & n.47
(1991) ("If relationalism seeks to reconcile the self and the other, while respecting the otherness of
the other, it may be intensely feminist. But is it characteristically feminine? Relationalism
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Many attempts have been made to interpret . . G6del's
incompleteness theorem as discrediting certain ontological views
and bolstering others. We do not believe that these attempts were
successful.4"'
Even in the wake of non-Euclidean geometry and G6del's Theorems,
the philosophy of mathematics has continued to encompass wide-ranging
foundational stances. Various strains of Logicism, Intuitionism, and
Formalism have evolved, and a number of new approaches have
developed.4"3 Also, as the quotation at the beginning of this part
indicates, Platonism is alive and well in mathematics.4 4 Indeed, Philip
Davis and Reuben Hersh write:
Most writers on the subject seem to agree that typical working
mathematician is a Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on
Sundays. That is, when he is doing mathematics he is convinced
that he is dealing with an objective reality whose properties he is
attempting to determine. But then, when challenged to give a
philosophical account of this reality, he finds it easiest to pretend
that he does not believe in it after all.4 5
The assertion that the rejection of objective truth and certainty has
"permeated ... mathematics" 6 is misleading, if not inaccurate.
One might begin to wonder about the interdisciplinary payoff of
efforts to use the current foundational crisis. 47 On the one hand, it is
interesting that important issues involving the concept of self-reference
appear in disciplines as diverse as mathematics and law.408 Moreover, the
legal perspective provided by an analysis of legal analogues of the Liar-
type Paradoxes no doubt will help shed light on this multi-faceted
concept. On the other hand, the tendency to exalt the concept over its
particular disciplinary manifestations has led to what one commentator
characterizes much contemporary scientific theory. .. [including] G6del's theory of mathematical
systems .... ").
402. Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 342.
403. For brief looks at the diversity of views, see Beeson, supra note 372, at xiii-xvii, 417-38;
Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 331-45; Maddy, supra note 167, at 1-36; Benacerraf & Putnam,
supra note 161, at I; Kitcher & Aspray, supra note 98; supra note 317.
404. See supra text accompanying note 93.
405. Davis & Hersh, supra note 34, at 321 (emphasis added).
406. Williams, supra note 12, at 430-31.
407. See Sinclair, supra note 4, at 33 n.13; Jacob, supra note 321, at 1657 n.126; see also Dow,
supra note 4, at 723-26; Kress, Preface, supra note 348, at 143-45.
408. There is much more to self reference in mathematics than is described in this Article.
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describes as the "self-reference craze."'4"9 Such a tendency can lead, for
example, to the use of G6del's Theorem as a cultural metaphor for
intellectual skepticism."' Not only is such a use a mischaracterization,
41 1
but the acceptance of vague and imprecise metaphorical reasoning in aid
of claims of intellectual skepticism is somewhat circular.
V. CONCLUSION
[F]or two thousand five hundred years mathematicians have been
correcting their errors to the consequent enrichment and not
impoverishment of their [discipline]; and this gives theni the right
to face the future with serenity.
Nicholas Bourbakla 2
It is commendable to look to other disciplines when grappling with
difficult issues in one's own field, but care must be taken to appreciate
both the content and context of other work. The discussion of
foundational concerns in mathematics provides a sobering illustration.
409. See Noam Cohen, Meta-Musings: The Self-Reference Craze, The New Republic, Sept. 5,
1988, at 17; see also Sinclair, supra note 4, at 33 n.13.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 390-91; supra note 401 and accompanying text. For
another example of G6del as a metaphor, consider Pierre Schlag:
Thus, when Fiss tried to fend off nihilism by attempting to constrain the interpretation of legal
rules (with more and better "disciplining rules"), Fish pulled out the infinite regress. A
"disciplining rule" is still a rule. And thus Fiss' "disciplining rules" have all the same problems
as the ordinary low level legal rules. (If all texts are indeterminate, then it's a pretty good bet (if
you believe in G6del) that they can't be shown to be determinate with more text.)
Schlag, supra note 335, at 40 (footnotes omitted). Schlag continues:
For metaphorical analogues of the [G6del's First Theorem] in the legal context, see [David
Kennedy's argument that] modem legal thought masks conflict through indeterminacy[, and
Schlag's arguments that] legal distinctions become self-destructive [and] conventional ways of
understanding rules vs. standards debate only replicate this dispute[.]
Id. at 40 n.16 (citations omitted).
Boris Bittker uses G6del to describe the inability of economists to make precise predictions. See
Bittker, supra note 310, at 220; see also Banner, supra note 45, at 253 & n.33 (citing G6del as
"analogy" to statement that "[t]o the extent that a system aspires to completeness, to including every
person and every life situation, it sacrifices impartiality, the ability to find someone or something
outside the system to serve as a meta-authority"); Spann, Secret, supra note 34, at 698 n.58 (using
G6del as metaphor for uneasiness about ability of legal system to answer questions in a determinate
manner).
411. See supra notes 389-406 and accompanying text.
412. Nicholas Bourbaki, Elements of Mathematics: Theory of Sets 13 (19611). Nicholas Bourbaki
is actually the pen name for a group of French mathematicians.
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Descriptions of the mathematics are misleading at best. In addition, many
scholars use unjustified chains of reasoning to make sweeping
conclusions. Virtually all scholars ignore the fact that the so-called
current foundational crisis is merely one in a sequence dealing with the
same basic questions, and that these crises are symptomatic of larger
periodic internal reevaluations of the Western intellectual tradition. The
mathematical crises have not so much resolved as sharpened
understanding of the basic mathematical issues involved. As a result of
its crises, mathematics has matured scientifically, artistically,
technologically. One can only hope that other disciplines such as law are
as successful in using their opportunities.413
413. Cf Curran, supra note 321, at 28 n.71 (discussing views of Jonathan Culler and George
Steiner); George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1263 (1985).
Many of the major points made in this Article are highlighted by Anthony D'Amato's invocation
of the so-called L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems.
One point is that providing a specific context for complex mathematical results is as important to
understanding them as a description of the work itself. The context provided here for the
L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems involves various strands of Logicist and Formalist ideas.
Recall that one of the developments leading to Logicism was the search for a symbolic notation for
the laws of logic. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63. George Boole's system could describe
the elementary logic of classes. That is, it could symbolize such phrases as "the complement of the
class of people over twenty five." But logicians wanted to be able to symbolize statements such as,
"There is a person who is a friend of a person over twenty five." They wanted a language that could
treat both (1) quantification ("there is"), and (2) general n-place relations ("is a friend of"-a two
place relation) not just one-place relations ("over twenty-five"). See Kneale & Kneale, supra note
163, at 404-34. Thus the language should consist of (1) variables for individuals x1, x2. ... ; (2) the
propositional connective symbols; (3) the quantifiers 3 and V; (4) the relation symbols R(1. 1),
R(I.2 ..... R(2.), R(2 ) ..... where Ri) is thejth i-place relation symbol and one of the two-place
relation symbols is singled out as the "equality" symbol; and (5) punctuation symbols. The formulas
should be specified by (I) if R is an n place relation symbol and x,, x ..... xi, are any n variables,
then R(x 1, x,. .. , x,,) is a formula; (2) if a and 3 are any two formulas then so are (a A 3), (a v 0),
(-), (a -) 3), and (a -* 3); and (3) if a is any formula and x, is any variable, then (3xa) and (Vx a)
are formulas. Such a system is a so-called first-order system in that quantification is over variables
not relation symbols. One might think that such a language is limited because it does not explicitly
encompass function and constant symbols, but functions and constants are easily accommodated in
formal systems using this language. See Davis, supra note 247, at 133 n.t.
Recall the idea of a sentence-a formula with no free variables. See supra note 278. For the
system described in this footnote, any variable occurring in a formula of type (1) is free. A variable
is free in a formula of type (2) if it is free in a or 3. A variable is free in a formula of type (3) if it is
free in aL and is not x1. We will call a set of sentences in this language a set of first-order sentences. A
model for a collection of first-order sentences is a set A together with an "interpretation" under
which the sentences are all true. What is an "interpretation"? Symbols other than relation symbols
(e.g. propositional connectives) are given their intended meanings. Thus, an interpretation is
essentially the assignment of an n-place relation on A to each of the n-place relation symbols
appearing in the set of sentences, subject only to the requirement that the equality relation be
assigned to the equality symbol. The size of the model is the size of its set.
In a 1915 paper, Lrwenheim considered what models collections of first-order sentences could
have. Leopold L6wenheim, On Possibilities in the Calculus of Relatives, in van Heijenoort, supra
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note 164, at 232. Why was he interested in this? One possibility is that he believed that his results
might be of use in determining whether various axiom systems contain extraneous axioms. Id. at 240.
This so-called independence issue was a concem of Hilbert's. See David Hilbert, Foundations of
Geometry 32 (Paul Bemays ed., Leo Unger trans., 10th ed. 1971).
Whatever his motivations, Lewenheim's result was the first in a complicated web of results known
as the L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems. L6wenheim's original result was extended in 1920 and 1922
by Thoralf Skolem, whose work in turn was generalized in one direction in 1936 by Anatolii Malcev
to what is now called the L6wenheim-Skolem Downward Theorem, and in another direction in the
late 1920s by Alfred Tarski to what is now called the L6wenheim-Skolem Upward Theorem. See
Moore, supra note 233, at 251-58. These two theorems, in their various versions, comprise the basic
L6wenheim-Skolem results and are sometimes combined into one proposition called the
L6wenheim-Skolem Theorem. See J.L. Bell & A.B. Slomson, Models and Ultraproducts: An
Introduction 82 (2d rev. ed. 1971). They were generalized further around 1960. See id. at 84-86
(describing so-called L6wenheim and Hanf numbers); Keith J. Devlin, Co'structibility 332-33
(1984) (describing so-called Cardinal Transfer Theorems). Further complications stem from the fact
that there are versions of each of the Upward and Downward Theorems equivalent to the so-called
Axiom of Choice, perhaps the most controversial part of infinitary reasoning. Sve Moore, supra note
233, at 1, 258. Thus, some care must be taken to determine exactly what result is being described.
For the purposes of this Article, we present one version of each of the Dowvnward and Upward
Theorems. Skolem established the following version of the L6wenheim-Skolem Downward
Theorem: If a set of first-order sentences has some model, then it has a model whose set has size at
most that of the set of natural numbers. See -van Heijenoort, supra note 164, at 228-32, 252-54
(describing history of Theorem). Why use the word "downward"? The idea is that even if the set of
sentences has a model of "large" infinite size, one can find a model of "small" size (at most the
infinity of the natural numbers, which is the "smallest" infinity). One version of the L6wenheim-
Skolem Upward Theorem says that if a set of first-order sentences has a model whose size is that of
the natural numbers, then it has models of all other infinite sizes as well. See, e.g., Moore, supra note
233, at 257-58.
How do D'Amato and others do in describing these results? In one paper, D'Amato does quote
Willard Quine's description of Skolem's result, although not in Quine's full context. See Anthony
D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of "Plain Meaning", 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 529, 572 n.135
(1991). However, some of his other descriptions are vague. At one point, he says, "[T]he
L6wenheim-Skolem theory in mathematics proved that, as to any given mathematical facts, an
indefinite number of different theories can be constructed that are consistent with, and explanatory
of, all the data." Anthony D'Amato, Letter from Anthony D'Amato to Editor-iin-Chief, in 80 Am. J.
Int'l L. 148, 149 (1986) (replying to letter written by Michael Akehurst). Other descriptions are
incomplete at best. In one article, he says that "[w~hat is now known as the L6wenheim-Skolem
theorem states that for any axiom system one may choose to characterize any rr athematical set (e.g.,
the positive whole numbers), there is an infinite number of other interpretatior s that are drastically
different and yet also satisfy the axiom system." D'Amato, supra note 321, at 599 n.102. In another
article, he says the following:
Leopold L6venheim and Thoralf Skolem published a series of papers in the early 1920's and
generally proved that, for any set of axioms that one chooses for characterizing any branch of
mathematics, an infinite number of other interpretations are available that are drastically
different and yet satisfy the chosen axioms as well.
Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. Miami L. Rev.
513, 521 n.28 (1989) [hereinafter D'Amato, Constrain].
Quite frankly, it is not clear what result he is describing in the last two quo;ations. One must be
very careful when using the word "characterize" and the phrase "drastically different." What is at
issue in the results described above is the ability of sets of sentences to characterize the size of their
infinite models. In this regard, the reader should keep the following four points in mind.
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(I) There are, for example, sets of first-order sentences with models of all infinite sizes, hence unable
to characterize the size of their infinite models, but all models of a given size are isomorphic
(roughly speaking, there is a one-to-one correspondence preserving all the relations). In this sense,
models of any given size are characterized. See Bell & Slomson, supra, at 178. (More technically,
two models of a collection of sentences are isomorphic if the elements of the sets of the two models
can be placed in one-to-one correspondence such that if R is any relation symbol appearing in the
sentences, then its interpretation in the first model holds of any elements in the first model if and
only if its interpretaion in the second model holds of the corresponding elements in the second
model.)
(2) It is possible for a set of first-order sentences to characterize certain parts of mathematics dealing
with sets of a fixed finite size in the sense that all models will have the same size-a finite size-and
they will be isomorphic. See Bridge, supra note 324, at 103.
(3) Syntactically complete sets of first-order sentences have the property that all models, although
possibly of different sizes, satisfy the same set of sentences. In this sense, the models are very
difficult to distinguish. See id. at 100-01.
(4) Finally, one must be very careful when leaving the situation described in this footnote. On the
one hand, for example, if the language embraces quantification over relations, then one can
characterize the natural numbers up to isomorphism. See George Boolos & Richard Jeffrey,
Computability and Logic 197-206 (2d ed. 1980); of Brown & Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1484
n.204, Kress. Preface, supra note 348. at 144. In this sense, the Ltwenheim-Skolem Upward
Theorem as described above does not hold. One also can provide counter examples to the Downward
Theorem as described above. See Boolos & Jeffrey, supra, at 197-206. On the other hand, certain
generalizations of the Ldwenheim-Skolem results apply to very general situations, including
situations involving languages embracing quantification over relations. See Bell & Slomson, supra,
at 84-86 (discussing Ltwenheim and Hanf numbers). In this sense, versions of the L6wenheim-
Skolem Theorems do hold. With regard to the latter point, one must be very careful when
considering statements such as "the Ldwenheim-Skolem theorem ... does not hold in second-order
languages, which permit such quantifications," Kress, Preface, supra note 348, at 144, or "the proofs
of L6wenheim and Skolem hold only for first-order formal systems," Brown & Greenberg, supra
note 4, at 1484.
One also must consider carefully the content and context of the mathematics in applying the result
specifically to law. D'Amato asserts that the hypotheses of something like the L6wenheim-Skolem
Theorems are satisfied in law. As with his invocation of Gedel's Theorem, he does not attempt to
establish this directly. See Kress, Preface, supra note 348, at 145. Rather, D'Amato appeals to others
such as Raymond Smullyan and Stephan K mer, see D'Amato, Constrain, supra, at 521 n.28, and
Morris Kline, see D'Amato, supra note 321, at 599 n.102. I have read the indicated citations and see
nothing there to support his use of them. In addition, D'Amato makes the "damned if you do damned
if you don't argument," analyzed supra note 353. See D'Amato, supra note 284, at 176 n.92. He also
provides an arguably non-legal "example" of the theorem---namely, specifying only the first few
numbers in a sequence does not determine the remaining numbers. See id. at 174 n.87; D'Amato,
supra note 321, at 597 n.96. Clearly, this can be established without the L6wenheim-Skolem
Theorems. If it is sufficient to make his point, then it is not clear what is added by the invocation of
the L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems.
Finally, one should understand the implications that have been drawn in mathematics itself before
drawing conclusions at large. D'Amato asserts that "the result reached by Lowenheim-Skolem...
simply stated, is that ontology is indifferent to any formal system." D'Amato, supra note 284, at 175.
Aside from the discussion in connection with (1)-(4) above, Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel, and Azriel Levy may be helpful: "Many attempts have been made to interpret . . . the
L6wenheim-Skolem ... theorem as discrediting certain ontological views and bolstering others. We
do not believe that these attempts were successful." Fraenkel et al., supra note 3, at 342.

